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Editorial Office
c/o Basic Books, Inc.
404 Park Avenue South, N. Y. 10016

Business Office
The Public Interest
Box 542
Old Chelsea Post Office
New York, N.Y. 10011

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Toward a national urban policy

DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN

In the spring of 1969, President Nixon met in the Cabinet room with ten mayors of American cities. They were nothing if not a variegated lot, mixing party, religion, race, region in the fine confusion of American politics. They had been chosen to be representative in this respect, and were unrepresentative only in qualities of energy and intelligence that would have set them apart in any company. What was more notable about them, however, was that in the interval between the invitation from the White House and the meeting with the President, four had announced they would not run again. The mayor of Detroit who, at the last minute, could not attend, announced *his* noncandidacy in June.

Their decisions were not a complete surprise. More and more, for the men charged with governance of our cities, politics has become the art of the impossible. It is not to be wondered that they flee. But we, in a sense, are left behind. And are in trouble.

At a time of great anxiety—a time that one of the nation's leading news magazines now routinely describes as "the most serious domestic crisis since the Civil War," a time when Richard Rovere, writing of the 1972 elections, can add parenthetically, "assuming that democracy in America survives that long"—these personal decisions may seem of small consequence; yet one suspects they are not.

All agree that the tumult of the time arises, in essence, from a crisis of authority. The institutions that shaped conduct and behavior in

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the past are being challenged or, worse, ignored. It is in the nature of authority, as Robert A. Nisbet continues to remind us, that it is consensual, that it is not coercive. When authority systems collapse, they are replaced by power systems that *are* coercive.[1] Our vocabulary rather fails us here: the term "authority" is an unloved one, with its connotations of "authoritarianism," but there appears to be no substitute. Happily, public opinion is not so dependent on political vocabulary, certainly not on the vocabulary of political science, as some assume. For all the ambiguity of the public rhetoric of the moment, the desire of the great mass of our people is clear. They sense the advent of a power-based society and they fear it. They seek peace. They look to the restoration of legitimacy, if not in existing institutions, then in new or modified ones. They look for a lessening of violent confrontations at home, and, in great numbers, for an end to war abroad. Concern for personal safety on the part of city dwellers has become a live *political* fact, while the reappearance—what, praise God, did we do to bring this upon ourselves?—of a Stalinoid rhetoric of apocalyptic abuse on the left, and its echoes on the right, have created a public atmosphere of anxiety and portent that would seem to have touched us all. It is with every good reason that the nation gropes for some means to weather the storm of unreason that has broken upon us.

It would also seem that Americans at this moment are much preoccupied with the issue of freedom—or, rather, with new, meaningful ways in which freedom is seen to be expanded or constrained. We are, for example, beginning to evolve some sense of the meaning of group freedom. This comes after a century of preoccupation with individual rights of a kind which were seen as somehow opposed to, and even threatened by, group identities and anything so dubious in conception as *group* rights.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the culmination of the political energies generated by that earlier period. The provisions which forbade employers, universities, governments, or whatever to have any knowledge of the race, religion, or national origin of individuals with which they dealt marked in some ways the high-water mark of Social Darwinism in America; its assumption that "equality" meant *only* equal opportunity did not long stand unopposed. Indeed, by 1965 the federal government had already, as best one can tell, begun to require ethnic and racial census of its own employees, and also of federal contractors and research grant recipients. To do so violated the spirit if not the letter of the Civil Rights Act, with its implicit model of the lone individual locked in equal—and remorseless—competition in the market place, but very much in harmony with the emerging sense of the 1960's that groups have identities and entitle-

[1] "The Twilight of Authority," *The Public Interest*, no. 15, Spring 1969.

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ments as well as do individuals. This view is diffusing rapidly. In Massachusetts, for example, legislation of the Civil Rights Act period, which declared any public school with more than 50 per cent black pupils to be racially "imbalanced" and in consequence illegal, is already being challenged—by precisely those who supported it in the first instance. In so far as these demands have been most in evidence among black Americans, there is not the least reason to doubt that they will now diffuse to other groups, defined in various ways, and that new institutions will arise to respond to this new understanding of the nature of community.

In sum, two tendencies would appear to dominate the period. The *sense of general community is eroding,* and with it the authority of existing relationships; simultaneously, a powerful *quest for specific community is emerging* in the form of ever more intensive assertions of racial and ethnic identities. Although this is reported in the media largely in terms of black nationalism, it is just as reasonable to identify emergent attitudes in the "white working class," as part of the same phenomenon. The singular quality of these two tendencies is that they are at once complementary and opposed. While the ideas are harmonious, the practices that would seem to support one interest are typically seen as opposing the other. Thus, one need not be a moral philosopher or a social psychologist to see that much of the "crisis of the cities" arises from the interaction of these intense new demands, and the relative inability of the urban social system to respond to them.

Programs do not a policy make

Rightly or otherwise—and one is no longer sure of this—it is our tradition in such circumstances to look to government. Social responses to changed social requirements take the form, in industrial democracies, of changed government policies. This had led, in the present situation, to a reasonably inventive spate of program proposals of the kind the New Deal more or less began and which flourished most notably in the period between the presidential elections of 1960 and 1968, when the number of domestic programs of the federal government increased from 45 to 435. Understandably, however, there has been a diminution of the confidence with which such proposals were formerly regarded. To say the least, there has been a certain nonlinearity in the relationship between the number of categorical aid programs issuing forth from Washington and the degree of social satisfaction that has ensued.

Hence the issue arises as to whether the demands of the time are not to be met in terms of *policy,* as well as program. It has been said of urban planners that they have been traumatized by the realization that everything relates to everything. But this is so, and need paralyze

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no one; the perception of this truth can provide a powerful analytic tool.

Our problems in the area of social peace and individual or group freedom occur in urban settings. Can it be that our difficulties in coping with these problems originate, in some measure, from the inadequacies of the setting in which they arise? Crime on the streets and campus violence may mark the onset of a native nihilism: but in the first instance they represent nothing more complex than the failure of law enforcement. Black rage and white resistance, "Third World" separatism, and restricted neighborhoods all may define a collapse in the integuments of the social contract: but, again, in the first instance they represent for the most part simply the failure of urban arrangements to meet the expectations of the urban population in the areas of jobs, schools, housing, transportation, public health, administrative responsiveness, and political flexibility. If all these are related, one to the other, and if in combination they do not seem to be working well, the question arises whether the society ought not to attempt a more coherent response. In a word: ought not a national urban crisis to be met with something like a national urban policy? Ought not the vast efforts to control the situation of the present be at least informed by some sense of goals for the future?

The United States does not now have an urban policy. The idea that there might be such is new. So also is the Urban Affairs Council, established by President Nixon on January 23, 1969, as the first official act of his administration, to "advise and assist" with respect to urban affairs, specifically "in the development of a national urban policy, having regard both to immediate and to long-range concerns, and to priorities among them."

What happened

The central circumstance, as stated, is that America is an urban nation, and has been for half a century.

This is not to say Americans live in *big* cities. They do not. In 1960 only 9.8 per cent of the population lived in cities of 1 million or more. Ninety-eight per cent of the units of local government have fewer than 50,000 persons. In terms of the 1960 census, only somewhat more than a quarter of congressmen represented districts in which a majority of residents lived in central city areas. The 1970 census will show that the majority of Americans in metropolitan areas in fact live in suburbs, while a great many more live in urban settlements of quite modest size. But they are not the less urban for that reason, providing conditions of living and problems of government profoundly different from that of the agricultural, small town past.

The essentials of the present "urban crisis" are simple enough to

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relate. Until about World War II, the growth of the city, as Otto Eckstein argues, was "a logical, economic development." At least it was such in the northeastern quadrant of the United States, where most urban troubles are supposed to exist. The political jurisdiction of the city more or less defined the area of intensive economic development, that in turn more or less defined the area of intensive settlement. Thereafter, however, economic incentives and social desires combined to produce a fractionating process that made it ever more difficult to collect enough power in any one place to provide the rudiments of effective government. As a result of or as a part of this process, the central area ceased to grow and began to decline. The core began to rot.

Two special circumstances compounded this problem. First, the extraordinary migration of the rural southern Negro to the northern city. Second, a postwar population explosion (90 million babies were born between 1946 and 1968) that placed immense pressures on municipal services, and drove many whites to the suburbs seeking relief. (Both these influences are now somewhat attenuating, but their effects will be present for at least several decades, and indeed a new baby boom may be in the offing.) As a result, the problems of economic stagnation of the central city became desperately exacerbated by those of racial tension. In the course of the 1960's tension turned into open racial strife.

City governments began to respond to the onset of economic obsolescence and social rigidity a generation or more ago, but quickly found their fiscal resources strained near to the limit. State governments became involved, and much the same process ensued. Starting in the postwar period, the federal government itself became increasingly caught up with urban problems. In recent years resources on a fairly considerable scale have flowed from Washington to the cities of the land, and will clearly continue to do so. However, in the evolution of a national urban policy, more is involved than merely the question of programs and their funding. Too many programs have produced too few results simply to accept a more or less straightforward extrapolation of past and present practices into an oversized but familiar future. *The question of method has become as salient as that of goals themselves.*

As yet, the federal government, no more than state or local government, has not found an effective *incentive* system—comparable to profit in private enterprise, prestige in intellectual activity, rank in military organization—whereby to shape the forces at work in urban areas in such a way that urban goals, whatever they may be, are in fact attained. This search for incentives, and the realization that present procedures such as categorical grant-in-aid programs do not seem to provide sufficiently powerful ones, must accompany and suffuse the effort to establish goals as such. We must seek, not

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just policy, but policy allied to a vigorous strategy for obtaining results from it.

Finally, the federal establishment must develop a much heightened sensitivity to its "hidden" urban policies. There is hardly a department or agency of the national government whose programs do not in some way have important consequences for the life of cities, and those who live in them. Frequently—one is tempted to say normally!—the political appointees and career executives concerned do *not* see themselves as involved with, much less responsible for the urban consequences of their programs and policies. They are, to their minds, simply building highways, guaranteeing mortgages, advancing agriculture, or whatever. No one has made clear to them that they are simultaneously redistributing employment opportunities, segregating or desegregating neighborhoods, depopulating the countryside and filling up the slums, etc.: all these things as second and third order consequences of nominally unrelated programs. Already this institutional naivete has become cause for suspicion; in the future it simply must not be tolerated. Indeed, in the future, a primary mark of competence in a federal official should be the ability to see the interconnections between programs immediately at hand and the urban problems that pervade the larger society.

The fundaments of urban policy

It having been long established that, with respect to general codes of behavior, eleven precepts are too many and nine too few, ten points of urban policy may be set forth, scaled roughly to correspond to a combined measure of urgency and importance.

1. *The poverty and social isolation of minority groups in central cities is the single most serious problem of the American city today. It must be attacked with urgency, with a greater commitment of resources than has heretofore been the case, and with programs designed especially for this purpose.*

The 1960's have seen enormous economic advances among minority groups, especially Negroes. Outside the south, 37 per cent of Negro families earn $8,000 per year or more, that being approximately the national median income. In cities in the largest metropolitan areas, 20 per cent of Negro families in 1967 reported family incomes of $10,000 or over. The earnings of *young* married black couples are approaching parity with whites.

Nonetheless, certain forms of social disorganization and dependency appear to be increasing among the urban poor. Recently, Conrad Taeuber, Associate Director of the Bureau of the Census, reported that in the largest metropolitan areas—those with 1 million or more inhabitants—"the number of black families with a woman

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as head increased by 83 per cent since 1960; the number of black families with a man as head increased by only 15 per cent during the same period." Disorganization, isolation, and discrimination seemingly have led to violence, and this violence has in turn been increasingly politicized by those seeking a "confrontation" with "white" society.

Urban policy must have as its first goal the transformation of the urban lower class into a stable community based on dependable and adequate income flows, social equality, and social mobility. Efforts to improve the conditions of life in the present caste-created slums must never take precedence over efforts to enable the slum population to disperse throughout the metropolitan areas involved. Urban policy accepts the reality of ethnic neighborhoods based on free choice, but asserts that the active intervention of government is called for to enable free choice to include integrated living as a normal option.

It is impossible to comprehend the situation of the black urban poor without first seeing that they have experienced not merely a major migration in the past generation, but also that they now live in a state almost of demographic seige as a result of population growth. What demographers call the "dependency ratio"—the number of children per thousand adult males—for blacks is nearly twice that for whites, and the gap widened sharply in the 1960's.

TABLE 1. *Children per 1000 adult males*

	1960	1966
White	1,365	1,406
Negro	1,922	2,216

It is this factor, surely, that accounts for much of the present distress of the black urban slums. At the same time, it is fairly clear that the sharp escalation in the number of births that characterized the past twenty-five years has more or less come to an end. The number of Negro females under age five is now exactly the number aged five to nine. Thus the 1980's will see a slackening of the present severe demands on the earning power of adult Negroes, and also on the public institutions that provide services for children. But for the decade immediately ahead, those demands will continue to rise —especially for central city blacks, whose median age is a bit more than ten years below that for whites—and will clearly have a priority claim on public resources.

2. *Economic and social forces in urban areas are not self-balancing. Imbalances in industry, transportation, housing, social services,*

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and similar elements of urban life frequently tend to become more rather than less pronounced, and this tendency is often abetted by public policies. A concept of urban balance may be tentatively set forth: a social condition in which forces tending to produce imbalance induce counterforces that simultaneously admit change while maintaining equilibrium. It must be the constant object of federal officials whose programs affect urban areas—and there are few whose do not—to seek such equilibrium.

The evidence is considerable that many federal programs have induced sharp imbalances in the "ecology" of urban areas—the highway program, for example, is frequently charged with this, and there is wide agreement that other, specifically city-oriented programs such as urban renewal have frequently accomplished just the opposite of their nominal objectives. The reasons are increasingly evident. Cities are complex social systems. Interventions that, intentionally or not, affect one component of the system almost invariably affect second, third, and fourth components as well, and these in turn affect the first component, often in ways quite opposite to the direction of the initial intervention. Most federal urban programs have assumed fairly simple cause and effect relationships that do not exist in the complex real world. Moreover, they have typically been based on "common sense" rather than research in an area where common sense can be notoriously misleading. In the words of Jay W. Forrester, "With a high degree of confidence we can say that the intuitive solution to the problems of complex social systems will be wrong most of the time."

This doubtless is true, but it need not be a traumatizing truth. As Lee Rainwater argues, the logic of multivariate analysis, and experience with it, suggest that some components of a complex system are always vastly more important than others, so that when (if) these are accurately identified a process of analysis that begins with the assertion of chaos can in fact end by producing quite concise and purposeful social strategies.

3. *At least part of the relative ineffectiveness of the efforts of urban government to respond to urban problems derives from the fragmented and obsolescent structure of urban government itself. The federal government should constantly encourage and provide incentives for the reorganization of local government in response to the reality of metropolitan conditions. The objective of the federal government should be that local government be stronger and more effective, more visible, accessible, and meaningful to local inhabitants. To this end the federal government should discourage the creation of paragovernments designed to deal with special problems by evading or avoiding the jurisdiction of established local authorities, and should encourage effective decentralization.*

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Although the "quality" of local government, especially in large cities, has been seen to improve of late, there appears to have been a decline in the vitality of local political systems, and an almost total disappearance of serious effort to reorganize metropolitan areas into new and more rational governmental jurisdictions. Federal efforts to recreate the ethnic-neighborhood-based community organization, as in the poverty program, or to induce metropolitan area planning as in various urban development programs, have had a measure of success, but nothing like that hoped for. Meanwhile the middle class norm of "participation" has diffused downward and outward, so that federal urban programs now routinely require citizen participation in the planning process and beyond; yet somehow this does not seem to have led to more competent communities. In some instances it appears rather to have escalated the level of stalemate.

It may be we have not been entirely candid with ourselves in this area. Citizen participation, as Elliott A. Krause has pointed out, is in practice a "bureaucratic ideology," a device whereby public officials induce nonpublic individuals to act in a way the officials desire. Although the putative object may be, indeed almost always is, to improve the lot of the citizen, it is not settled that the actual consequences are anything like that. The ways of the officials, of course, are often not those of the elected representatives of the people, and the "citizens" may become a rope in the tug-of-war between bureaucrat and representative. Especially in a federal system, "citizen participation" easily becomes a device whereby the far-off federal bureaucracy acquires a weapon with which to battle the elected officials of local government. Whatever the nominal intent, the normal outcome is federal support for those who would diminish the legitimacy of local government. But it is not clear that the federal purposes are typically advanced through this process. To the contrary, an all round diminishment rather than enhancement of energies seems to occur.

This would appear especially true when "citizen participation" has in effect meant putting indignant citizens on the payroll. However much these citizens may continue to "protest," the action acquires a certain hollow ring. Something like this has already happened to groups that have been openly or covertly supported by the federal government, seeking to influence public opinion on matters of public policy. This stratagem is a new practice in American democracy. It began in the field of foreign affairs, and has now spread to the domestic area. To a quite astonishing degree it will be found that those groups that nominally are pressing for social change and development in the poverty field, for example, are in fact subsidized by federal funds. This occurs in protean ways—research grants, training contracts, or whatever—and is done with the best of inten-

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tions. But, again, with what results is far from clear. Can this development, for example, account for the curious fact that there seems to be so much protest in the streets of the nation, but so little, as it were, in its legislatures? Is it the case, in other words, that the process of public subsidy is subtly debilitating?

Whatever the truth of this judgment, it is nevertheless clear that a national urban policy must look first to the vitality of the elected governments of the urban areas, and must seek to increase their capacity for independent, effective, and creative action. This suggests an effort to find some way out of the present fragmentation, and a certain restraint on the creation of federally-financed "competitive governments."

Nathan Glazer has made the useful observation that in London and Tokyo comprehensive metropolitan government is combined with a complex system of "subgovernments"—the London Boroughs—representing units of 200,000-250,000 persons. These are "real" governments, with important powers in areas such as education, welfare, and housing. In England, at all events, they are governed through an electoral system involving the national political parties in essentially their national postures. (Indeed, the boroughs make up the basic units of the parties' urban structure.) It may well be there is need for social inventions of this kind in the great American cities, especially with respect to power over matters such as welfare, education, and housing that are now subject to intense debates concerning "local control." The demand for "local control" is altogether to be welcomed. In some degree it can be seen to arise from the bureaucratic barbarities of the highway programs of the 1950's, for example. But in the largest degree it reflects the processes of democracy catching up with the content of contemporary government. As government more and more involves itself in matters that very much touch on the lives of individual citizens, those individuals seek a greater voice in the programs concerned. In the hands of ideologues or dimwits, this demand can lead to an utter paralysis of government. It has already done so in dozens of urban development situations. But approached with a measure of sensitivity—and patience—it can lead to a considerable revitalization of urban government.

4. *A primary object of federal urban policy must be to restore the fiscal vitality of urban government, with the particular object of ensuring that local governments normally have enough resources on hand or available to make local initiative in public affairs a reality.*

For all the rise in actual amounts, federal aid to state and local government has increased only from 12 per cent of state-local revenue in 1958 to 17 per cent in 1967. Increasingly, state and local governments that try to meet their responsibilities lurch from one

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fiscal crisis to another. In such circumstances, the capacity for creative local government becomes least in precisely those jurisdictions where it might most be expected. As much as any other single factor, this condition may be judged to account for the malaise of city government, and especially for the reluctance of the more self-sufficient suburbs to associate themselves with the nearly bankrupt central cities. Surviving from one fiscal deadline to another, the central cities commonly adopt policies which only compound their ultimate difficulties. Yet their options are so few. As James Q. Wilson writes, "The great bulk of any city's budget is, in effect, a fixed charge the mayor is powerless to alter more than trivially." The basic equation, as it were, of American political economy is that for each one per cent increase in the Gross National Product the income of the federal government increases one and one-half per cent while the normal income of city governments rises half to three-quarters of a point at most. Hence both a clear opportunity and a no less manifest necessity exist for the federal government to adopt as a deliberate policy an increase in its aid to urban governments. This should be done in part through revenue sharing, in part through an increase in categorical assistance, hopefully in much more consolidated forms than now exist, and through credit assistance.

It may not be expected that this process will occur rapidly. The prospects for an enormous "peace and growth dividend" to follow the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam are far less bright than they were painted. But the fact is that as a nation we grow steadily richer, not poorer, and we can afford the government we need. This means, among our very first priorities, an increase in the resources available to city governments.

A clear opportunity exists for the federal government to adopt as a deliberate policy an increase in its aid to state and local governments in the aftermath of the Vietnam war. Much analysis is in order, but in approximate terms it may be argued that the present proportion of aid should be about doubled, with the immediate objective that the federal government contribution constitute one-third of state and local revenue.

5. *Federal urban policy should seek to equalize the provision of public services as among different jurisdictions in metropolitan areas.*

Although the standard depiction of the (black) residents of central cities as grossly deprived with respect to schools and other social services, when compared with their suburban (white) neighbors, requires endless qualification, the essential truth is that life for the well-to-do is better than life for the poor, and that these populations tend to be separated by artificial government boundaries within metropolitan areas. (The people in between may live on either side of the boundaries, and are typically overlooked altogether.) At a

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minimum, federal policy should seek a dollar-for-dollar equivalence in the provision of social services having most to do with economic and social opportunity. This includes, at the top of the list, public education and public safety. (Obviously there will always be some relatively small jurisdictions—"the Scarsdale school system"—that spend a great deal more than others, being richer; but there can be national or regional norms and no central city should be allowed to operate below them.)

Beyond the provision of equal resources lies the troubled and elusive question of equal results. Should equality of educational opportunity extend to equality of educational achievement (as between one group of children and another)? Should equality of police protection extend to equality of risks of criminal victimization? That is to say, should there be not only as many police, but also as few crimes in one area of the city as in another? These are hardly simple questions, but as they are increasingly posed it is increasingly evident that we shall have to try to find answers.

The area of housing is one of special and immediate urgency. In America, housing is not regarded as a public utility (and a scarce one!) as it is in many of the industrial democracies of Europe, but there can hardly be any remaining doubt that the strong and regular production of housing is nearly a public necessity. We shall not solve the problem of racial isolation without it. Housing must not only be open, *it must be available*. The process of filtration out from dense center city slums can only take place if the housing perimeter, as it were, is sufficiently porous. For too long now the production of housing has been a function, not of the need for housing as such, but rather of the need to increase or decrease the money supply, or whatever. Somehow a greater regularity of effective demand must be provided the housing industry, and its level of production must be increased.

6. *The federal government must assert a specific interest in the movement of people, displaced by technology or driven by poverty, from rural to urban areas, and also in the movement from densely populated central cities to suburban areas.*

Much of the present urban crisis derives from the almost total absence of any provision for an orderly movement of persons off the countryside and into the city. The federal government made extraordinary, and extraordinarily successful, efforts to provide for the resettlement of Hungarian refugees in the 1950's and Cuban refugees in the 1960's. But almost nothing has been done for Americans driven from their homes by forces no less imperious.

Rural to urban migration has not stopped, and will not for some time. Increasingly, it is possible to predict where it will occur, and in what time sequence. (In 1968, for example, testing of mechanical

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tobacco harvesting began on the east coast and the first mechanical grape pickers were used on the west coast.) Hence, it is possible to prepare for it, both by training those who leave, and providing for them where they arrive. Doubtless the United States will remain a nation of exceptionally mobile persons, but the completely unassisted processes of the past need not continue with respect to the migration of impoverished rural populations.

There are increasing indications that the dramatic movement of Negro Americans to central city areas may be slackening, and that a counter movement to surrounding suburban areas may have begun. This process is to be encouraged in every way, especially by the maintenance of a flexible and open housing market. But it remains the case that in the next thirty years we shall add 100 million persons to our population. Knowing that, it is impossible to have no policy with respect to where they will be located. *For to let nature take its course is a policy.* To consider what might be best for all concerned and to seek to provide it is surely a more acceptable goal.

7. *State government has an indispensible role in the management of urban affairs, and must be supported and encouraged by the federal government in the performance of this role.*

This fact, being all but self-evident, tends to be overlooked. Indeed, the trend of recent legislative measures, almost invariably prompted by executive initiatives, has been to establish a direct federal-city relationship. States have been bypassed, and doubtless some have used this as an excuse to avoid their responsibilities of providing the legal and governmental conditions under which urban problems can be effectively confronted.

It has, of course, been a tradition of social reform in America that city government is bad and that, if anything, state government is worse. This is neither true as a generalization nor useful as a principle. But it is true that, by and large, state governments (with an occasional exception such as New York) have *not* involved themselves with urban problems, and are readily enough seen by mayors as the real enemy. But this helps neither. States *must* become involved. City governments, without exception, are creatures of state governments. City boundaries, jurisdictions, and powers are given and taken away by state governments. It is surely time the federal establishment sought to lend a sense of coherence and a measure of progressivism to this fundamental process.

The role of state government in urban affairs cannot easily be overlooked (though it may be deliberately ignored on political or ideological grounds). By contrast, it is relatively easy to overlook county government, and possibly an even more serious mistake to do so. In a steadily increasing number of metropolitan areas, it is the county rather than the original core city that has become the only

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unit of government which makes any geographical sense. That is to say, the only unit whose boundaries contain most or all of the actual urban settlement. The powers of county government have typically lagged well behind its potential, but it may also be noted that in the few—the very few—instances of urban reorganization to take place since World War II, county government has assumed a principal, even primary role in the new arrangement.

8. *The federal government must develop and put into practice far more effective incentive systems than now exist whereby state and local governments, and private interests too, can be led to achieve the goals of federal programs.*

The typical federal grant-in-aid program provides its recipients with an immediate reward for promising to work toward some specified goal—raising the education achievement of minority children, providing medical care for the poor, cleaning up the air, reviving the downtown business district. But there is almost no reward for actually achieving such goals—and rarely any punishment for failing to do so.

There is a growing consensus that the federal government should provide market competition for public programs, or devise ways to imitate market conditions. In particular, it is increasingly agreed that federal aid should be given directly to the consumers of the programs concerned—individuals included—thus enabling them to choose among competing suppliers of the goods or services that the program is designed to provide. Probably no single development would more enliven and energize the role of government in urban affairs than a move from the *monopoly service* strategy of the grant-in-aid programs to a *market* strategy of providing the most reward to those suppliers that survive competition.

In this precise sense, it is evident that federal programs designed to assist those city-dwelling groups that are least well off, least mobile, and least able to fend for themselves must in many areas move beyond a *services* strategy to an approach that provides inducements to move from a dependent and deficient status to one of independence and sufficiency. Essentially, this is an *income* strategy, based fundamentally on the provision of incentives to increase the earnings and to expand the property base of the poorest groups.

Urban policy should in general be directed to raising the level of political activity and concentrating it in the electoral process. It is nonetheless possible and useful to be alert for areas of intense but unproductive political conflict and to devise ways to avoid such conflict through market strategies. Thus conflicts over "control" of public education systems have frequently of late taken on the aspect of disputes over control of a monopoly service, a sole source of a needed good. Clearly some of the ferocity that ensues can be avoided

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through free choice arrangements that, in effect, eliminate monopoly control. If we move in this direction, difficult "minimum standard" regulation problems will almost certainly arise, and must be anticipated. No arrangement meets every need, and a good deal of change is primarily to be justified on grounds that certain systems need change for their own sake. (Small school districts, controlled by locally elected boards may be just the thing for New York City. However, in Phoenix, Arizona, where they have just that, consolidation and centralization would appear to be the desire of educational reformers.) But either way, a measure of market competition can surely improve the provision of public services, much as it has proved an efficient way to obtain various public paraphernalia, from bolt-action rifles to lunar landing vehicles.

Here, as elsewhere, it is essential to pursue and to identify the *hidden* urban policies of government. These are nowhere more central to the issue than in the matter of incentives. Thus, for better than half a century now, city governments with the encouragement of state and federal authorities have been seeking to direct urban investment and development in accordance with principles embodied in zoning codes, and not infrequently in accord with precise city plans. However, during this same time the tax laws have provided the utmost incentive to pursue just the opposite objectives of those incorporated in the codes and the plans. It has, for example, been estimated that returns from land speculation based on zoning code changes on average incur half the tax load of returns from investment in physical improvements. Inevitably, energy and capital have diverted *away* from pursuing the plan and *toward* subverting it. It little avails for government to deplore the evasion of its purposes in such areas. Government has in fact established two sets of purposes, and provided vastly greater inducements to pursue the implicit rather than the avowed ones. Until public authorities, and the public itself, learn to be much more alert to these situations, and far more open in discussing and managing them, we must expect the present pattern of self-defeating contradictions to continue.

9. *The federal government must provide more and better information concerning urban affairs, and should sponsor extensive and sustained research into urban problems.*

Much of the social progress of recent years derives from the increasing quality and quantity of government-generated statistics and government-supported research. However, there is general agreement that the time is at hand when a general consolidation is in order, bringing a measure of symmetry to the now widely dispersed (and somewhat uneven) data-collecting and research-supporting activities. Such consolidation should not be limited to urban problems, but it must surely include attention to urban questions.

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The federal government should, in particular, recognize that most of the issues that appear most critical just now do so in large measure because they are so little understood. This is perhaps especially so with respect to issues of minority group education, but generally applies to all the truly difficult and elusive issues of the moment. More and better inquiry is called for. In particular, the federal government must begin to sponsor longitudinal research—i.e., research designed to follow individual and communal development over long periods of time. It should also consider providing demographic and economic projections for political subdivisions as a routine service, much as the weather and the economy are forecast. Thus, Karl Taeuber has shown how seemingly unrelated policies of local governments can increase the degree of racial and economic differentiation between political jurisdictions, especially between cities and suburbs.

Similarly, the extraordinary inquiry into the educational system begun by the U.S. Office of Education under the direction of James S. Coleman should somehow be established on an on-going basis. It is now perfectly clear that little is known about the processes whereby publicly-provided resources affect educational outcomes. The great mass of those involved in education, and of that portion of the public that interests itself in educational matters, continue undisturbed in its old beliefs. But the bases of their beliefs are already thoroughly undermined and the whole structure is likely to collapse in a panic of disillusion and despair unless something like new knowledge is developed to replace the old. Here again, longitudinal inquiries are essential. And here also, it should be insisted that however little the new understandings may have diffused beyond the academic research centers in which they originated, the American public is accustomed to the idea that understandings do change and, especially in the field of education, is quite open to experimentation and innovation.

Much of the methodology of contemporary social science originated in clinical psychology, and perhaps for that reason tends to be "deficiency-oriented." Social scientists raise social *problems*, the study of which can become a social problem in its own right if it is never balanced by the identification and analysis of social *successes*. We are not an unsuccessful country. To the contrary, few societies work as hard at their problems, solve as many, and in the process stumble on more unexpected and fulsome opportunities. The cry of the decent householder who asks why the social science profession (and the news media which increasingly follow the profession) must be ever preoccupied with juvenile delinquency and never with juvenile decency deserves to be heard. Social science like medical science has been preoccupied with pathology, with pain. A measure of inquiry into the sources of health and pleasure is overdue, and is properly a subject of federal support.

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10. *The federal government, by its own example, and by incentives, should seek the development of a far heightened sense of the finite resources of the natural environment, and the fundamental importance of aesthetics in successful urban growth.*

The process of "uglification" may first have developed in Europe; but, as with much else, the technological breakthroughs have taken place in the United States. American cities have grown to be as ugly as they are, not as a consequence of the failure of design, but rather because of the success of a certain interaction of economic, technological, and cultural forces. It is economically efficient to exploit the natural resources of land, and air, and water by technological means that the culture does not reject, albeit that the result is an increasingly despoiled, debilitated, and now even dangerous urban environment.

It is not clear how this is to change, and so the matter which the twenty-second century, say, will almost certainly see as having been the primary urban issue of the twentieth century is ranked last in the public priorities of the moment. But there *are* signs that the culture is changing, that the frontier sense of a natural environment of unlimited resources, all but impervious to human harm, is being replaced by an acute awareness that serious, possibly irreparable harm is being done to the environment, and that somehow the process must be reversed. This *could* lead to a new, nonexploitive technology, and thence to a new structure of economic incentives.

The federal establishment is showing signs that this cultural change is affecting its actions, and so do state and city governments. But the process needs to be raised to the level of a conscious pursuit of policy. The quality of the urban environment, a measure deriving from a humane and understanding use of the natural resources, together with the creative use of design in architecture and in the distribution of activities and people, must become a proclaimed concern of government. And here the federal government can lead. It must seek out its hidden policies. (The design of public housing projects, for example, surely has had the consequence of manipulating the lives of those who inhabit them. By and large the federal government set the conditions that have determined the disastrous designs of the past two decades. It is thus responsible for the results, and should force itself to realize that.) And it must be acutely aware of the force of its own example. If scientists (as we are told) in the Manhattan Project were prepared to dismiss the problem of long-lived radioactive wastes as one that could be solved merely by ocean dumping, there are few grounds for amazement that business executives in Detroit for so long manufactured automobiles that emitted poison gases into the atmosphere. Both patterns of decision evolved from the primacy of economic concerns in the context of the exploitation of the natural environment in ways the culture did not forbid.

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There are, however, increasing signs that we are beginning to change in this respect. We may before long evolve into a society in which the understanding of and concern about environmental pollution, and the general uglification of American life, will be both culturally vibrant and politically potent.

Social peace is a primary objective of social policy. To the extent that this derives from a shared sense of the aesthetic value and historical significance of the public places of the city, the federal government has a direct interest in encouraging such qualities.

Daniel J. Elazar has observed that while Americans have been willing to become urbanized, they have adamantly resisted becoming "citified." Yet a measure of "citification" is needed. There are perhaps half a dozen cities in America whose disappearance would, apart from the inconvenience, cause any real regret. To lose one of those six would plunge much of the nation and almost all the immediate inhabitants into genuine grief. Something of value in our lives would have been lost, and we would know it. The difference between these cities that would be missed and the rest that would not, resides fundamentally in the combination of architectural beauty, social amenity, and cultural vigor that sets them apart. It has ever been such. To create such a city and to preserve it was the great ideal of the Greek civilization, and it may yet become ours as we step back ever so cautiously from the worship of the nation-state with its barbarous modernity and impotent might. We might well consider the claims for a different life asserted in the oath of the Athenian city-state:

> We will ever strive for the ideals and sacred things of the city, both alone and with many;
>
> We will unceasingly seek to quicken the sense of public duty;
>
> We will revere and obey the city's laws;
>
> We will transmit this city not only not less, but greater, better and more beautiful than it was transmitted to us.

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The rich, the poor, and the taxes they pay

JOSEPH A. PECHMAN

THE distribution of income has always been a hotly debated subject. Whatever has happened or is happening to the distribution of income, some people will always assert that the rich are getting a bigger share of the pie than is "fair," while others will seek to show that this is not the case. Few people, however, bother to find out the facts and fewer still understand what they mean.

The same applies to the tax system. Everybody knows that there are loopholes in the federal tax laws, but few realize that there are loopholes for persons at all income levels. Even fewer have a clear idea about the effects on the distribution of income of closing the more controversial loopholes. And only the experts know the state-local tax structure is in more urgent need of reform than the federal structure.

This article is intended to put these matters in perspective by summarizing the available information. What has happened to the distribution of income before taxes in recent years, and how has the tax system modified it? What's wrong with the national tax system? What reforms are needed to make it a fairer system? What are the chances of getting these reforms? And, beyond such reforms, what would be the shape of a tax distribution that most Americans today might agree to be "fair"?

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I. The distribution of income

Despite the proliferation of sophisticated economic data in this country, the United States government does *not* publish official estimates of the distribution of income. Such estimates were prepared by the Office of Business Economics for a period of years in the 1950's and early 1960's, but were discontinued because the sources on which they were based were acknowledged to be inadequate. We have data from annual field surveys of some 30,000 households conducted by the Bureau of the Census, as well as from the annual *Statistics of Income* prepared by the Internal Revenue Service from federal individual income tax returns. But both sources have their weaknesses: the Census Bureau surveys systematically understate income, particularly in the top brackets; tax returns, on the other hand, understate the share received by low income recipients who are not required to file. Nevertheless, if used with care, the two sources provide some interesting insights.

Before turning to the most recent period, it should be pointed out that a significant change in the distribution of pre-tax income occurred during the Great Depression and World War II. All experts who have examined the data agree that the distribution became more equal as a result of (a) the tremendous reductions in business and property incomes during the depression and (b) the narrowing of earnings differentials between low-paid workers and higher-paid skilled workers and salaried employees when full employment was reestablished during the war. The most authoritative estimates, prepared by the late Selma Goldsmith and her associates, suggest that the share of personal income received by the top 5 per cent of the nation's consumer units (including families and unrelated individuals) declined from 30 per cent in 1929 to 26.5 per cent in 1935–36; the share of the top 20 per cent declined from 54.4 per cent to 51.7 per cent in the same period. The movement toward greater equality appears to have continued during the war up to about 1944. By that year, the share of the top 5 per cent had dropped another notch to 20.7 per cent, and of the top 20 per cent to 45.8 per cent.

The income concept used by these researchers did not include undistributed corporate profits, which are a source of future dividends or of capital gains for shareholders; if they had been included, the movement of the income distribution toward equality from 1929 to 1944 would have been substantially moderated, but by no means eliminated.[1]

[1] The year 1929 must have been the high point of inequality during the 1920's, so that the distribution of income in the more recent period may not have been very different from what it was in the early 1920's if account is taken of undistributed profits. Unfortunately, the available data for those years are simply not good enough to say much more.

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The movement toward equality seems to have ended during World War II, at least on the basis of the available statistics. In 1952, for example, the share of the top 5 per cent was 20.5 per cent and of the top 20 per cent, 44.7 per cent. (The differences from the 1944 figures are well within the margin of error of these data, and can hardly be called significant.)

To trace what happened since 1952, we shift to the census data that provide the longest continuous and comparable income distribution series available to us. The best way to appreciate the trend is to look at the figures for income shares at five-year intervals:

TABLE 1. *Before-Tax Income Shares, Census Data (per cent)*

YEAR	TOP 5 PER CENT OF FAMILIES	TOP 20 PER CENT OF FAMILIES
1952	18	42
1957	16	40
1962	16	42
1967	15	41

Source: Bureau of the Census. Income includes transfer payments (e.g., social security benefits, unemployment compensation, welfare payments, etc.), but excludes capital gains.

The figures indicate that the share of the top 5 per cent declined slightly between 1952 and 1957, and has remained virtually unchanged since 1957; the share of the top 20 per cent changed very little. Correspondingly, the shares of the groups at the bottom of the income scale (not shown in the table) also changed very little throughout the period.

Tax data are needed to push the analysis further. These data are better than the census data for our purposes, because they show the amount of realized capital gains and also permit us to calculate income shares *after* the federal income tax. But the great disadvantage of the tax data is that the bottom part of the income distribution is underrepresented because of an unknown number of nonfilers. Furthermore, the taxpayer unit is not exactly a family unit, because children and other members of the family file their own income tax returns if they have income, and a few married couples continue to file separate returns despite the privilege of income splitting, which removed the advantage of separate returns with rare exceptions.

There is really no way to get around these problems, but the tax data are too interesting to be abandoned because of these technicalities. So, we make an assumption that permits us to use at least the upper tail of the income distribution. The assumption is that the top 10 or 15 per cent of the nation's tax units are for the most part similar to the census family units and the cases that differ represent roughly the same percentage of the total number of units each year. Because we have official Department of Com-

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merce estimates of income (as defined in the tax code) for the country as a whole, the assumption enables us to compute income shares before and after tax for the top 1, 2, 5, 10, and 15 per cent of units annually for the entire postwar period.[2]

The tax series confirms much of what we learned from the census series, and adds a few additional bits of information besides. Here are the data for selected years chosen to represent the three sets of federal income tax rates levied, beginning with the Korean War:

TABLE 2. *Before-Tax Income Shares, Tax Data, (per cent)*

YEAR	TOP 1 PER CENT OF TAX UNITS	TOP 2 PER CENT OF TAX UNITS	TOP 5 PER CENT OF TAX UNITS	TOP 10 PER CENT OF TAX UNITS	TOP 15 PER CENT OF TAX UNITS
1952	9	12	19	27	33
1963	8	12	19	28	35
1967	9	13	20	29	36

Source: *Statistics of Income.* Income excludes transfer payments, but includes realized capital gains in full.

According to tax returns, the share of total income, including all realized capital gains, going to the top 1 per cent of the tax units was about the same for the entire period from 1952 through 1967. But the shares of the top 2, 5, 10, and 15 per cent—which, of course, include the top 1 per cent—all rose somewhat. These trends differ from the census figures which show that the entire income distribution was stable. By contrast, the tax data show that the 14 per cent of income recipients just below the top 1 per cent—this group reported incomes between $12,000 and $43,000 in 1967—*increased* their share of total income from 24 per cent to 27 per cent.

If the figures are anywhere near being right, they suggest two significant conclusions:

First, in recent years the very rich in our society have not enjoyed larger increases in incomes, as defined in the tax code, than the average income recipient. Although realized capital gains are included in our figures, they do not include nonreported sources, such as tax-exempt interest and excess depletion; correction for these omissions would probably not alter the results very much, because

[2] People with money always feel poorer than they are, and it might be useful to indicate what kinds of income we are talking about for these various categories. For the year 1967, a taxpayer was in the top 1 per cent if his income (including realized capital gains) was over $43,000, the top 2 per cent if his income was over $28,000, the top 5 per cent if his income was over $18,000, the top 10 per cent if his income was over $14,000, the top 15 per cent if his income was over $12,000.

I would assume that most of the readers of this article, and of this magazine, are included among the rich and super-rich. I also assume they will find this hard to believe.

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the amounts involved are small relative to the total of reported incomes. Even a correction for the undistributed profits of corporations wouldn't change the result very much because undistributed gross corporation profits have remained between 10 and 13 per cent of total reported income since 1950.

Second, a change in the income distribution may have occurred in what are sometimes called the "middle income" classes. These classes consist of most of the professional people in this country (doctors, lawyers, engineers, accountants, college professors, etc.) as well as the highest paid members of the skilled labor force and white collar workers. The increase in their share of total income from 24 per cent to 27 per cent, if it actually occurred, represents a not insignificant improvement in their relative income status.

Clearly, this improvement in the income shares of the middle classes could come only at the expense of the lower 85 per cent of the income distribution. But this is not the whole story. These figures contain only incomes that are generated in the private economy; they do not include transfer payments (e.g., social security benefits, unemployment compensation, welfare payments, etc.) which are, of course, concentrated in the lower income classes. Correction of the figures for transfer payments might be just enough to offset the increased share of the middle income classes. If this is the case, the constancy of the shares of pre-tax income shown by the census data is fully consistent with the growth in shares of the middle incomes shown by the tax data. And, if this is the explanation of the constancy of the income shares in the census distribution, it means that the lower classes have not been able to hold their own in the private economy; large increases in government transfer payments were needed to prevent a gradual erosion of their income shares.

II. The effect of taxes

Since one of the major objectives of taxation is to moderate income inequality, it is appropriate to ask how the tax system actually affects the distribution of income and whether it has become more or less equalizing. We examine first the impact of the federal individual income tax, which is the most progressive element in the nation's tax system and for which data by income classes are readily available, and then we speculate about the effect of the other taxes in the system.[3]

[3] Since the terms are often used loosely, it might be a good idea explicitly to define what *regressive, proportional,* and *progressive* taxation mean. A tax is *regressive* when it takes a larger proportion of a poor person's income than of a rich man's, *proportional* when it takes equal proportions of such incomes, and *progressive* when it takes a larger proportion of a rich man's income than of a poor man's.

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The Federal Income Tax

While everybody grumbles about the federal income tax, few people realize that tax rates have been *going down* for about two decades. Even with the 10 per cent surtax, the rates are lower today than they were from 1951 through 1963. Briefly, the history of the tax is as follows: tax rates reached their peak, and exemptions their low point, during World War II. They were reduced in 1946 and again in 1948, when income splitting and the $600 per capita exemption were also enacted. Rates were pushed up close to World War II levels during the Korean War, but were reduced in 1954 and again in 1964. The surtax that became effective for individuals on April 1, 1968 moved the rates only half way back to the 1954–63 levels.

The structure of the tax has been remarkably stable during this entire period, despite all the talk about closing loopholes. The preferential rate on long-term capital gains was enacted in 1942; income splitting became effective in 1948; interest on state and local government bonds has never been taxed by the federal government; percentage depletion dates back to the 1920's; and the deductions allowed for interest charges, taxes, charitable contributions, medical expenses, and casualty losses date back to 1942 or earlier. The 1954 law introduced a 4 per cent dividend credit, but this was repealed in 1964. (As a compromise, the $50 exclusion for dividends, which was enacted along with the credit, was raised to $100.) A few abuses have been eliminated from time to time, but the revenues involved have not been significant.

The single major victory for tax reform occurred in 1964, when the dividend credit and the deductions for state and local taxes other than income, sales, property, and gasoline taxes were eliminated. All told, these revenue-raising reforms amounted to about $750 million, and they were accompanied by revenue-losing reforms of $400 million (mainly the minimum standard deduction which benefitted only those with very low incomes).

Given this history, it follows that the effective tax rates at specific absolute income levels have been going down since World War II. For example, from 1947 to 1967, the effective rate of tax paid by taxpayers with adjusted gross income of $5,000-10,000 declined from 13.8 per cent to 9.5 per cent; for those in the $15,000-20,000 class, the decline was from 24.6 per cent to 14.0 per cent; and above $100,000, the decline was from 57.4 per cent to 39.5 per cent. (These figures understate actual declines because adjusted gross income excludes half of long-term capital gains that were much larger relative to total income in 1967 than in 1947.)

Although such figures are of considerable interest, they are not directly useful for an analysis of the effect of the tax on the income distribution. For it must be remembered that most people moved

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up the income scale almost continuously throughout this period; under a progressive tax, they would be taxed more heavily as a result of this upward movement. There is a case for the argument that, as incomes rise, it is only "fair" that progressive tax rates—established on the basis of an earlier income distribution that was considered "fair"—ought to go down somewhat. The key question is: how much? Specifically, has the progressive taxation of increased incomes been offset by the reduction in tax rates, or has there been a "surplus" on the side of either income or taxation?

To answer this question, the effective tax rates were computed for the top 1, 2, 5, 10, and 15 per cent of the income tax units, but in this case the full amount of realized long-term capital gains, and also other exclusions, were included to arrive at a total income concept. The data show that, on this basis, average effective tax rates were substantially lower in 1967 than in 1952 for the top 1 per cent, slightly lower for the next 1 per cent, and roughly constant for the next 13 per cent. Note also that the effective rate of tax paid in 1967 by the top 1 per cent, whose before-tax income was $43,000 and over, was only 26 per cent of their total reported income, including all their realized capital gains.

TABLE 3. *Effective Federal Tax Rates on Total Income (per cent)*

YEAR	TOP 1 PER CENT OF TAX UNITS	NEXT 1 PER CENT OF TAX UNITS	NEXT 3 PER CENT OF TAX UNITS	NEXT 5 PER CENT OF TAX UNITS	NEXT 5 PER CENT OF TAX UNITS
1952	33	20	16	14	12
1963	27	20	16	14	13
1967	26	18	15	13	12

Source: *Statistics of Income.* Total income is the sum of adjusted gross income and excluded capital gains, dividends, and sick pay.

It is a fairly simple matter to deduct the tax paid by each of these groups from their total income to obtain their disposable income. The results modify the conclusions we drew on the basis of the before-tax incomes in only minor respects. The shares of disposable income of the top 1 per cent remain stable, and the shares of the top 2, 5, 10, and 15 per cent go up from 1952 to 1967. Furthermore, the shares of the "middle income classes"—the 14 per cent between the top 1 and top 15 per cent—rise from 23 to 27 per cent on a disposable income basis, or about as much as on a before-tax basis, (Table 4).

We may conclude that the federal individual income tax has moderated the before-tax income distribution by roughly the same proportions since 1952. Thus, while tax rates at any given absolute income level have declined, the effect of progression has just about offset the decline, leaving the relative tax bite about the same in

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the top 15 per cent of the income distribution. Furthermore, similar calculations suggest that the post-World War II income tax is just about as equalizing as it was in 1941. The tremendous movement upward in the income distribution pushed much more taxable income into higher rate brackets, but this has been offset by the adoption of income splitting and the increase in itemized deductions.[4]

TABLE 4. *Shares of Total Disposable (i.e., after-tax) Income (per cent)*

YEAR	TOP 1 PER CENT OF TAX UNITS	TOP 2 PER CENT OF TAX UNITS	TOP 5 PER CENT OF TAX UNITS	TOP 10 PER CENT OF TAX UNITS	TOP 15 PER CENT OF TAX UNITS
1952	7	10	16	24	30
1963	7	10	17	26	33
1967	7	11	17	26	34

Source: *Statstics of Income.* Disposable income is total income less federal income tax paid.

It should be emphasized that the foregoing data omit large chunks of income that are received primarily by high-paid employees of large business firms. Tax-exempt interest and percentage depletion have already been mentioned. In addition, beginning with the imposition of the very high individual income tax rates and the excess profits tax during World War II, methods of compensation were devised to funnel income to business executives in nontaxable forms. The devices used are well known: deferred compensation and pension plans, stock option arrangements, and direct payment of personal consumption expenditures through expense accounts. There is no question that these devices are used widely throughout the corporate sector. But little is known about the amounts involved, and even less is known about the impact on the distribution of income.

A recent study by Wilbur G. Lewellen for the National Bureau of Economic Research concluded that, even after allowance is made for the new compensation methods, the after-tax compensation (in dollars of constant purchasing power) of top executives in industrial corporations was no higher in the early 1960's than in 1940. The more important finding from the income distribution standpoint is that stock options, pensions, deferred compensation, and profit-sharing benefits rose rapidly as a percentage of the executives' compensation package from 1940 to 1955, and then stabilized. The study did not attempt to measure the value of expense accounts, and omitted

[4] But the income tax is surely more equalizing now than it was in 1929, when the top bracket rates were cut to a maximum of 25 per cent. This means that the equalization of the distribution of income between the 1920's and the post-World War II period is even more pronounced on a disposable income basis than it is on a before-tax basis.

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firms in industries other than manufacturing. Nevertheless, the results of the study suggest that extreme statements about the possible effects of these devices on the distribution of income in recent years are not warranted.

The Corporation Income Tax

The corporation income tax was enacted four years before the individual income tax and it has been a mainstay of the federal tax system ever since. It produced more revenue than the individual income tax in 17 out of 28 years prior to 1941; today, it is the second largest source of federal revenue. The general corporation tax was reduced to 38 per cent after World War II. It was raised to 52 per cent during the Korean War and remained there until 1964, when it was reduced to 48 per cent.

Public finance experts have argued the merits and demerits of a corporation tax for a long time, but the issues have not been resolved. Its major purpose in our tax system is to safeguard the individual income tax. If corporate incomes were not subject to tax, individuals could avoid the individual income tax by arranging to have their income accumulate in corporations, and later on selling their stock at the low capital gains rate, or holding on until death at which time the capital gains pass to their heirs completely tax free. Short of taxing shareholders on their share of corporation incomes (a method which is attractive to economists, but is anathema to businessmen and most tax lawyers) and taxing capital gains in full, the most practical way to protect the individual income tax is to impose a separate tax on corporation incomes.

Some people have argued that a large part or all of the corporation income tax is shifted forward to the consumer in the form of higher prices. On this assumption, the corporation income tax is a sales tax—a very peculiar one, to be sure—and is therefore regressive. But the majority view among tax experts is that the corporation income tax comes out of corporate profits, as was intended, so that the tax is borne by shareholders. Despite the large post-World War II increases in the number of shareholders, stock ownership is still concentrated in the highest income classes. This means that the corporation income tax is, to some extent at least, a progressive tax.

The major change in the corporation tax in the last two decades has been the enactment of more generous depreciation deductions in 1954 and 1962 and of the investment credit in 1962. As a result, despite relatively constant rates, the corporation tax has declined as a ratio to gross corporate profits (i.e., profits before deduction of depreciation) from 33 per cent in 1954 to about 27 per cent in 1967. It rose in 1968 to 30 per cent as a result of the imposition of the 10 per cent surtax. The impending expiration of the surtax and repeal

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of the investment tax credit will just about offset one another, so that the post-surtax ratio will continue at 30 per cent until the continuously growing depreciation allowances will tilt it downward once again. Thus, although the contribution of the corporation tax to the progressivity of the national tax system has declined somewhat (for economic reasons that most economists regard as persuasive), the contribution continues to be on the progressive side.

Estate and Gift Taxes

In theory, estate and gift taxes are excellent taxes because they have little effect on incentives to earn income and, if effective, would reduce the inequality of the distribution of wealth that in turn accounts for much of the inequity in the distribution of income. In practice, the yield of these taxes is disappointing. Tax rates are high, but there are numerous ways to escape them. The result is that the federal government receives little of its revenue from these tax sources—about 1.7 per cent in the current fiscal year. The effective rate of estate taxes on wealth passed each year from one generation to the next must be less than 10 per cent; and the gift tax is even less effective. While these taxes are progressive, they have little effect on the distribution of wealth.

The Social Security Payroll Tax

We now turn to the features of the national tax system that, in combination, more than offset the progressivity of the federal income and estate and gift taxes. The social security payroll tax, which is levied at a flat rate on earnings up to a maximum of $7,800 under present law, was enacted in 1935 as the basic method of financing social security on the principle that the workers were buying their own insurance. This idea is doubtless responsible for the widespread acceptance of social security as a permanent government institution in this country; but the insurance analogy is no longer applicable to the system as it has developed. Present beneficiaries receive far larger benefits than the taxes they paid would entitle them to—a situation that will continue indefinitely as long as Congress raises benefits as prices and wages continue to rise. The trust funds have not grown significantly since the mid-1950's; the payroll taxes paid by the workers have not been stored up or invested, but have been paid out currently as benefits. When benefits promised to people now working come due, the funds for their payment will be provided out of tax revenues as of that future date.

Nevertheless, the insurance analogy has a strong hold on the thinking of the administrators of social security and the Congressional tax-writing committees. Every time a benefit increase is enacted, the payroll tax rates (or the maximum earnings subject to the tax) are

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raised, in order to balance out the revenues and expenditures for the next 75 years on an actuarial basis. In a relatively short time, the trust funds begin running large surpluses, which then become the justification for another round of benefit increases by Congress. This requires a further increase in rates for actuarial reasons, payroll taxes are again raised, and so on.

As a result of this process, payroll taxes have been raised seven times since the beginning of 1960. The combined employer-employee tax was 6 per cent on earnings up to $4,800 on January 1, 1960; this year the tax is 9.6 per cent on earnings up to $7,800. Most economists believe that the burden of the employer tax, as well as the employee tax, falls eventually on the workers (either by substituting for larger wage increases or inflating prices). Thus, the federal government has been placing more and more weight on this regressive element of the federal tax system.

State and Local Taxes

Although the federal tax system is progressive on balance, the state and local tax system is highly regressive. The states rely heavily on sales taxes, while the local governments rely on property taxes. Personal and corporation income taxes account for only about 11 per cent of state-local revenues from their own sources. This situation is disturbing because the state-local tax system is the growing element of the national system. Whereas the federal government has been able to reduce income tax rates several times beginning in 1954, and has eliminated virtually all of its excise taxes, state governments continue to enact new taxes and to raise the rates of old taxes to keep up with their increasing and urgent revenue needs; meanwhile, local governments keep raising the already excessively burdened property tax.

Federal tax receipts have moved within the narrow range of 19 to 21 per cent of the Gross National Product since 1951. By contrast, state-local receipts rose from 7.1 per cent of the GNP in 1951 to 11.9 per cent in 1968. Assuming that state-local taxes respond more or less proportionately to the rise in the national product (a reasonable assumption), the states and local governments must have increased rates by 68 per cent in these 17 years to push up their tax yields to current levels. The net result is, of course, that a greater degree of regression is being built into the national tax system by the states and local governments as they continue to seek for more revenues.

Parenthetically, it might be observed that the "tax revolt" which has been so much in the news of late must have been a reflection of the increasing burden of state and local taxes. The revolt is allegedly concentrated in the "middle income" classes living in the suburbs.

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In this, there is a paradox: this group probably pays a smaller proportion of its income in taxes than the poor and near poor (see below), but the taxes they have been paying, or recently began to pay, are highly visible. Their incomes have risen sharply in recent years, so that their federal income taxes are higher in dollar amounts despite the 1964 rate reduction. Six states have enacted new income taxes in the past eight years and ten states have enacted new sales taxes; many others have raised the rates of both taxes substantially. Most of the new suburbanites are now paying property taxes directly as home owners, rather than indirectly as tenants, and property taxes have also been rising everywhere. Tax morale was, therefore, generally at a low ebb when the federal government requested more taxes to finance a budget containing $30 billion to fight an unpopular war. Since the request was in the form of a surcharge on those already paying taxes, and did nothing about those who escaped, the existing inequities in the federal income tax at last became evident to large masses of taxpayers who have no difficulty in communicating their unhappiness to their Congressmen.

Summary of the National Tax System

It is not easy to arrive at an accurate estimate of the impact of the whole tax system at various income levels. Taxes are reported to different federal, state, and local government agencies. No single agency has the responsibility to compel reporting of taxes on a meaningful and consistent basis. A number of isolated attempts have been made by students of public finance to piece together from the inadequate data estimates of the distribution of all taxes by income classes. These studies were for different years, make different assumptions for the incidence of the various taxes, and use different statistical sources and methodologies to correct for the inconsistencies in the data. Nevertheless, they all arrive at similar conclusions regarding the relative tax loads at different income levels.

The most recent estimates were prepared by the Council of Economic Advisers for the year 1965. They show the distribution of taxes by the income classes of families and unattached individuals, income being defined exclusive of transfer payments. The estimates for taxes and transfers separately, and in combination, are summarized in Table 5.

The following are the major conclusions that can be drawn from these and previously published estimates:

1. Since at least the mid-1930's, the federal tax system has been roughly proportional in the lower and middle income classes, and clearly progressive for the highest classes. Federal income tax data suggest that the preferential rate on capital gains, and the exclusion of interest on state and local bonds and other items from the tax

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base, have produced some regressivity for the very small group at the top of the income pyramid, say, beginning with incomes of $100,000 or more.

2. State and local taxes are regressive throughout the income scale.

3. The combined federal, state, and local tax burden is heaviest in the very bottom and top brackets, and lowest in the middle brackets. This statement is, of course, based on averages for each group and there are wide variations around these averages for specific individuals, depending on the sources of their incomes, the kind of property they own, and where they live.

4. The poor receive numerous transfer payments (e.g., social security, unemployment compensation, public assistance, etc.) that are financed by this tax system. The net effect of transfers as against taxes is distinctly progressive, because transfer payments make up such a large proportion of total income at the bottom of the income distribution—56 per cent for those with incomes of less than $2,000 in 1965. (To some extent, this progressivity is overstated because the transfers do not always go to the same people who pay taxes, the best example being social security retirement benefits that are received only by retirees—many of whom are not poor—while $1.5 billion of the payroll tax levied to pay for these benefits are paid by the poor.) There is no reason in the abstract, why a nation should not levy taxes on and pay transfers to the same groups; but while the nation wages a war on poverty, it is surely appropriate to consider the possibility of providing additional financial assistance to the poor by *tax reduction* as well as through transfer payments.

TABLE 5. *Taxes and Transfers as per cent of Income, 1965*

	Taxes				
Income Classes	Federal	State and Local	Total	Transfer Payments	Taxes Less Transfers
Under $2,000	19	25	44	126	–83*
$ 2,000 - 4,000	16	11	27	11	16
4,000 - 6,000	17	10	27	5	21
6,000 - 8,000	17	9	26	3	23
8,000 - 10,000	18	9	27	2	25
10,000 - 15,000	19	9	27	2	25
15,000 and over	32	7	38	1	37
Total	22	9	31	14	24

Source: *Economic Report of the President*, 1969. Income excludes transfer payments, but includes realized capital gains in full and undistributed corporate profits.
*The minus sign indicates that the families and individuals in this class received more from federal, state, and local governments than they, as a group, paid to these governments in taxes.

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III. Reforming the national tax system

The preceding discussion indicates that the agenda for reforming this country's tax system to correct its regressive features is lengthy and complicated. It involves reconstruction of the tax systems at all levels of government, and the development of new forms of intergovernmental fiscal relations. State and local governments need to rely more heavily on income taxes, relieve the poor of paying sales taxes, and deemphasize the property tax. At the federal level, the most important items on the agenda are to alleviate the payroll tax on the poor, to deliver—at last—on promises made by both political parties to close loopholes in the income taxes, and make the estate and gift taxes more effective.

State and Local Taxes

There are no easy solutions to the state-local problems, given the political constraints under which our federal system operates. At the state level, the trend is for moderate income and sales taxes—34 states already have both, and the number increases every year. Six states have adopted simple per capita credits against income taxes for sales taxes paid (with refunds for those who do not pay income taxes) to alleviate the sales tax burden on the poor. This device eliminates the regressive feature of the sales tax and makes it more acceptable on grounds of equity. Progress on the adoption of state income taxes has been slow, but there has been a new surge of adoptions by the states in the past couple of years as governors and legislators have realized that they cannot get along without the growth-responsive revenues from an income tax.

The states are also beginning to take a more responsible attitude toward their local governments, although the situation is admittedly bad in many parts of the country. More of the states' own revenues should be allocated to local governments through grants-in-aid to prevent the development of city income and sales taxes that tend to drive wealthy taxpayers and businesses to the suburbs. An ideal arrangement, that is already in operation in Maryland for income tax purposes, would be to have statewide income and sales taxes along with modest "piggyback" local taxes—all collected by the state government and subject to state control so that individual communities will not get too far out of line with their neighbors. (As a long-run goal, the federal government should collect state-local, as well as federal, income taxes on the basis of a single return.)

The local governments need to improve local property tax administration to remove the haphazard way in which the tax applies to properties of equal values. The states can help by providing technical assistance and also by forcing the communities to meet minimum standards of administration. Consideration should also be given to the development of new local revenue sources to take some of

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the pressure off the general property tax. The best alternatives are the "piggyback" income and sales taxes already mentioned, always with the credit or refund for sales taxes paid by the poor.

In addition, it is time to tap the high and rising land values for some of the urgently needed local revenues. The National Commission on Urban Problems, which was chaired by former Senator Paul Douglas, has estimated that land values rose from $269 billion in 1956 to $523 billion in 1966, or about $25 billion a year. This tremendous increase in wealth was not created by the landowners but by society as a whole. This is, of course, the basis of the old "single tax" idea that was oversold by the zealots as a complete and final solution to the nation's tax problems, although correct in principle. The revenue potential of special taxes on land values or on increases in land values is modest, but the approach has merit even if it will not solve the financial problems of our cities and suburbs by itself. It would also discourage the hoarding of land for speculative purposes and thereby encourage more efficient use of land in and around the nation's cities.

But there is no hope for the states and local governments, whatever they do on their own initiative, unless the federal government cuts them in on its superior tax resources. It is true that federal grants to states and local governments have increased rapidly in recent years—from $5 billion in fiscal year 1958 to an estimated $25 billion this year—but the need is even greater than that. To satisfy this need, more money will have to be allocated to the categorical grants already authorized for such programs as education, health, welfare, and housing. Also, a federal-state-local income tax revenue-sharing system should be established to moderate the huge disparities in fiscal capacities of the fifty states and to give governors and local officials unrestricted funds that can be used to help solve their own particular problems. The Nixon administration's proposal, based on a plan devised by a Johnson task force, is a good—though modest—beginning.

Mayors and county managers are suspicious of revenue sharing because they have little faith that the states will distribute the funds fairly. To answer this criticism, various formulas have been devised to require the states to "pass through" at least a minimum percentage of the revenue-sharing grants. Disagreement over the details of the "pass through" should not be allowed to delay the adoption of an idea that will relieve some of the fiscal pressure at the state and local levels and, at the same time, provide revenues from a progressive tax that otherwise would be raised mainly on a regressive basis. Ultimately, the federal government should allocate 2 per cent of the federal individual income tax base to revenue sharing, which would amount to $8 billion at current income levels and as much as $12 billion in 1975.

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The Payroll Tax

Much has been said about the need for removing the poor from the income tax rolls, and Congress seems to be prepared to remedy this anachronism. But the more urgent problem is to remove the much heavier payroll tax burden of the poor. The federal income tax bill of the families and individuals who are officially classified as poor is only $200 million a year, as compared with the $1.5 billion they pay in payroll taxes. In addition, the regressive feature of the payroll tax at the higher income levels should be moderated immediately and ultimately eliminated entirely.

Several different approaches might be taken to achieve these objectives.

First, part or all of the payroll tax could be converted into a withholding tax for income tax purposes. No formal change in the payroll tax need be involved; at the end of the year, individuals would receive credit against their income taxes (or a refund if they are not income tax payers) for the amount of payroll taxes paid.

Second, contributions from general revenues might be made, on the basis of a fixed formula, to the social security and other trust funds. Such a possibility was foreseen in the earlier days of social security.

Third, the social security system might be combined with a liberalized and modernized public assistance system or some variant of a negative income tax. The negative income tax payments to the aged in such a system would be financed out of general revenues.

But whatever is ultimately done about the payroll tax as the basic revenue source for social security financing, the poor should be relieved of paying this tax as soon as possible. The principle of a minimum taxable level under the income tax—soon to be raised to the poverty levels—should be carried over into the payroll tax. The Internal Revenue Service is already proficient at handling tens of millions of refunds per year under the income tax; the additional payroll tax refunds would not be an excessive burden.

Federal Tax Reform

As this was being written, Congress was working hard to complete a tax reform bill. The details of the final legislation are still unclear, but it might be useful to list the most important issues that must be settled, now or later.

1. Revision of the treatment of capital gains is the highest priority item. Profits from sale of assets held more than six months are taxed at only half the regular rates up to a maximum of 25 per cent, but even this tax may be avoided indefinitely if the assets are transferred from one generation to another through bequests. In the case of gifts, capital gains are taxed only if the assets are later sold by the

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recipient. As a result, billions of dollars of capital gains are subject to low rates or are never taxed.

Capital gains receive favored treatment for two reasons: first, full taxation in a single year of a large realized gain accumulated over many years would be unfair, unless the impact of the graduated income tax rates were moderated; second, too high a rate on capital gains might "lock" most security holders into their present portfolios. The first of these problems could be solved by averaging capital gains over the period they were held. The "lock-in" effect would be moderated by such an averaging provision, and also by taxing capital gains when assets are transferred, either by gift or at death. Both changes would reduce the advantages of holding on to assets whose values had risen.

A complete reform of the capital gains tax would raise perhaps $8 billion in additional revenues annually, mainly from the top 15 per cent of the income population. But the more likely package—including a lengthening of the holding period from six months to a year and elimination of the maximum 25 per cent tax rate (but not the exclusion of half of long-term capital gains)—would yield only about $700 million a year.

2. The toughest issue involves percentage depletion for oil, gas, and other minerals industries. These allowances are similar in many respects to ordinary depreciation. The difference is that the amounts written off as depreciation are limited to the cost of the asset, but percentage depletion can — and does — substantially exceed the amount invested. In addition, an immediate write-off is permitted for certain capital costs incurred in exploration and development, thus providing a double deduction for capital invested in these industries. Most economists who have studied the matter have concluded that present allowances are much too generous.

If the preferential treatment for all the minerals industries were entirely eliminated, revenues would be increased by $1.6 billion a year. If the oil depletion allowance is reduced from 27 per cent to 20 per cent and the other allowances are scaled down proportionately, as seems possible at this moment, additional revenues would amount to about $400 million a year.

3. The tax exemption of interest on state and local government securities is unfair because it benefits only the wealthy. It is also inefficient because the wealthy benefit from the full amount of the interest differential for the tax exemption, which is set by the market at the point where the marginal (and lower income) investor is encouraged to buy tax-exempts. According to one study, the federal government loses $2 of revenue for every $1 of interest subsidy received by the states and local governments. If state-local bond interest were taxed, the revenue could be used directly to help the states and local governments. The estimated revenue gain would be

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small initially because any legislation that might be enacted would apply only to future issues and a considerable part of the new revenue would be returned to the states in the form of a "sweetener" over and above what the present tax exemption is worth to them.

4. The most irrational and expensive provisions are the deductions for charitable contributions, interest payments, medical expenses, state and local taxes, and other personal expenditures that cut out billions of dollars from the tax base. These deductions are designed to improve the definition of income on which taxes are to be based; in fact, many of the deductions are merely subsidies for particular types of personal expenditures that hardly merit government encouragement.

Deductions for state income taxes do protect taxpayers against excessive rates. There is also some justification for continuing the deduction for sales and income taxes as a device to encourage further state use of these taxes to raise the revenues they desperately need. But the same rationale does not apply to property taxes;[5] and there is certainly no excuse for deducting gasoline taxes, which are levied to pay for benefits received by highway users. The present method of computing the deduction for charitable contributions is also questionable. Limiting the deduction to contributions in excess of, say, 3 per cent of income would encourage larger-than-average gifts to charity and save $1.5 billion of revenue each year. In addition, Congress should repeal the unlimited charitable deduction for those whose taxes and contributions together exceed 80 per cent of their income for eight out of ten consecutive years. This provision has permitted many wealthy people to escape tax entirely by donating appreciated assets on which capital gains tax has not been paid but which are deductible at their full value (including the gain) against other income.

A series of reforms along these lines might bring in revenues in the neighborhood of $5 billion a year. But Congress will probably do very little in this area—except perhaps to eliminate the unlimited charitable deduction which will bring in $50 million annually and to raise the standard deduction (which will add to the erosion

[5] I have omitted the favored tax treatment of homeowners from this list of major tax issues for obvious practical reasons. An individual who rents a house and invests, say, $20,000 in securities yielding 5 per cent is taxable on the $1,000 of interest and dividends he receives. Another who invests the $20,000 in an identical home is not taxable on its rental value (which is income to him, even though he does not actually receive any cash) and deducts his property taxes and mortgage interest. These benefits are worth $8 billion annually to homeowners, but they are sacrosanct. I know of no Congressman who would publicly support elimination of the deductions for property taxes and mortgage interest, let alone the inclusion of the rental values of owner-occupied homes in taxable income. Encouragement of individual home ownership—and, increasingly, apartment ownership—is deeply imbedded in the American political grain, even though its rationale is not nearly as cogent as it used to be.

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of the tax base—at a cost of $1.4 billion—and do nothing to refine the taxable income concept in a manner that would improve interpersonal equity).

5. The federal income tax has been particularly solicitous of the aged. Taxpayers over 65 years of age have an additional exemption of $600, pay no tax on their social security or railroad retirement pensions, and receive a tax credit on other retirement income if their earnings are below $1,524. These benefits are worth more than $3 billion a year. There is every reason to help the aged through public programs, but the tax system is a bad way to do this because it gives the largest amount of relief to those who need it least. It would be better to eliminate these deductions and use the revenue to increase social security benefits for all aged persons. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations recommended a more modest approach that would limit the income tax relief to low-income aged, but not raise any additional revenue.

6. Income splitting was enacted in 1948 to equalize the tax burdens of married persons living in community and noncommunity property states. (The former had already been able to split their incomes for tax purposes.) But the provision introduced an unfair discrimination against single people, and reduced taxes by an estimated $10 billion a year. There are ways to eliminate this discrimination without introducing the old community property problems, but the large revenue loss—which goes almost entirely to married couples with incomes above $10,000—is probably irretrievable. This year, Congress seems to be in a mood to extend half the advantages of income splitting to single people aged 35 years or older and this will cost $650 million a year.

7. A few years ago, the Senate refused to accept a relatively simple House plan to withhold income tax on interest and dividends. Instead, they required information returns by corporations and financial institutions, a copy of which would go to the taxpayer. There was some improvement in the reporting of interest, but not nearly enough (dividends were never underreported very much). The introduction of withholding is the only practical method of recovering the estimated $1 billion of tax that is now lost annually through the carelessness, inadvertence, and dishonesty of taxpayers (mainly in the lower and middle income classes).

8. Although some income tax avoidance will be eliminated by the new legislation, the final bill will not close all the loopholes. As a safeguard to prevent a few wealthy people from taking advantage of the special provisions that would remain, two reforms are now being seriously considered by the Congress. The first would require the allocation of personal deductions allowed to individuals between taxable and nontaxable income sources. Thus, if only half of a taxpayer's income is subject to tax, he would be entitled to only half his

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deductions. The second would introduce a minimum income tax at half the ordinary rates on an individual's total income (including all nontaxable sources) or require an individual to pay tax at the full rates on at least half his total income. These revisions would add $800 million of tax revenue a year if the income definition included all sources of income. But they are not a substitute for comprehensive reform, but they will be needed until all the income tax loopholes have been plugged—and that is not likely to happen very soon.

9. The corporation income tax would not be in bad shape if the depletion allowances were modified, but a few technical reforms are also needed. Corporations should not be allowed to reduce their taxes by splitting up into a large number of smaller corporations. (Each corporation has a $25,000 exemption against the corporation normal tax, which is worth $6,500 for each corporation.) Banks and other financial institutions have overly generous allowances for additions to reserves for losses on their loans; these should be made more realistic. Real estate operators should not be allowed to deduct depreciation at accelerated rates and then, when the property is sold, taxed at the capital gains rates on their profits (which is partly the result of the excessive depreciations). These revisions, which are incorporated in this year's reform bill (except that the real estate loophole was kept open for residential construction), would add close to $2 billion a year to the corporation income tax yield. In addition, the $100 deduction for dividends under the individual income tax—worth about $200 million a year in lost revenue—is silly and should be repealed.

10. Taxes on property transferred from one generation to the next are avoided in two ways. First, wealthy people put money in trust funds for their wives, children, and grandchildren that are taxed when they are set up but not when the income passes between generations or when the trusts terminate. It is possible to escape estate taxes for two or three generations in this way. Second, since gift tax rates are much lower than estate tax rates, wealthy individuals can reduce the taxes on their wealth or eliminate them entirely by systematically distributing the assets over a period of years through gifts.

Avoidance through gifts can be reduced by combining the estate and gift taxes into one tax. (An integrated tax would reduce the avoidance through gifts, but not eliminate it entirely, because an individual could earn interest on any tax he postponed.) The trust loophole is more difficult to close, but methods have been devised to tax trust assets once every generation. Another improvement in the estate and gift taxes that would lower rather than raise revenues, would be to permit husbands and wives to transfer wealth freely between them without tax; under present law, half of these transfers are taxable.

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The Prospects

The long list of needed revisions in our federal, state, and local tax system should convince anyone that the reforms now being contemplated will not make a significant change in the progressivity of the system. Congress could, if it wishes, increase the yield of the present tax system by $25 billion a year, an amount that would be sufficient substantially to relieve the tax burdens of the poor and low-income nonpoor and to lower tax rates clear across the board. Instead, the revenue to be gained from this year's tax reform bill—a Herculean effort by past standards—may be in the neighborhood of $3 billion a year and much of this will be used to reduce the taxes of the "middle" income classes by what amounts to little more than a pittance, while the poor continue to bear much heavier tax burdens.

According to the Council of Economic Advisers, total taxes of those with incomes below $2,000 amounted to $7.3 billion in 1965, of which $4.2 billion were state and local taxes and $3.1 billion were federal. Those with incomes between $2,000 and $4,000 paid another $11.5 billion consisting of $6.8 billion federal and $4.7 billion state-local taxes. The total tax bill of $18.8 billion of those with incomes below $4,000[6] suggests what regressivity really means in a country collecting taxes amounting to about 31 per cent of its GNP.

The classic objection against an attack on tax regressivity has been that there is simply not enough income in the higher classes to do the job. Would a substantial reduction in regressivity require confiscatory rates? To appreciate one of the significant magnitudes involved, suppose the federal government decided to refund all general sales, payroll, and property taxes on housing paid by those who are officially classified as poor. (The remaining taxes are selective excise taxes levied for sumptuary purposes or in lieu of user charges, which could not be refunded in any practical way. After this year, the poor will not pay any federal income taxes.) These refunds would amount to about $4 billion—perhaps three-quarters of the total tax burden of the poor and one-sixth of the burden of those with incomes below $4,000—less than what this year's tax reform bill may give away in higher standard deductions and rate reductions.

What a progressive tax system would look like

It might be thought that such a proposal—to lift three-quarters of the tax burden of the poor—is too timid. Why not go further? That indeed could be done, but only as part of a larger redistribution of the tax burden. After all, it is both inequitable and politically

[6] It will be recalled that the income definition we are using for 1965 excludes transfer payments. Hence, this $18.8 billion of tax is paid both by poor and nonpoor families and individuals. The poor alone pay about 30 per cent of this amount.

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impossible to create a noticeable "tax divide" between the poor (a fluid concept, in any case) and the rest of society. To make the tax system progressive, it would not be enough drastically to reduce the tax burden of the poor; the burdens of the near poor and others at the lower end of the income scale would have to be cut simultaneously. Indeed—again on principles of equity and political feasibility—the relief should be diffused upwards until it benefits, say, the lower half of the income distribution (or, more technically, those receiving less than the median income, which is now in excess of $9,000).

There are a number of ways of modifying the tax system to redistribute the tax burden in this way. The most straightforward—and perhaps even the most practical, given the federal system of government in this country—would be to give taxpayers credits against the federal income tax for a declining percentage of the major taxes they now pay to federal, state, and local governments, except for income taxes. Suppose we make refunds to the poor for the general sales, payroll, and property taxes they pay and permit others to claim credits against their federal income taxes for 75 per cent of these same taxes if they are in the $2,000-4,000 class, 50 per cent in the $4,000-6,000 class, and 25 per cent in the $6,000-8,000 class. (Obviously, refunds would be paid to those with credits larger than their federal income taxes.)[7]

Let us further assume that the taxes paid by those with incomes between $8,000 and $10,000 remain the same, and that the revenues needed to pay for the relief below $8,000 would come from those with incomes above $10,000 in proportion to the taxes they now pay. Again, we need not be concerned with the details of how this can be done. It would certainly be more equitable to close the major federal income tax loopholes first and then raise whatever additional revenue is needed by an increase in the rates above $10,000. Either way, the ratio of total taxes to income for any specific income class could be set at the same figure, although the burden *within* each class would be distributed much more equitably if the loopholes were closed first.

It turns out that, in 1965, the credits (and refunds) would have reduced taxes for those with incomes of less than $8,000 by $19 billion, and this would have required an increase in the taxes paid by those in the $10,000-15,000 class from an average of 27 per cent to 32 per cent and by those above $15,000 from 38 per cent to 46 per cent, or an average tax increase of about a fifth. The resulting effective rates of tax in this system compare with the rates as they were in 1965 as follows:

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[7] In practice, we would probably vary the credits for families of different size, but this is a refinement which need not concern us here.

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TABLE 6. *Taxes as Per cent of Income, 1965*

INCOME CLASSES	PRESENT TAX SYSTEM	ALTERNATIVE TAX SYSTEM
Under $2,000	44	13
$ 2,000 - 4,000	27	14
4,000 - 6,000	27	19
6,000 - 8,000	26	23
8,000 - 10,000	27	27
10,000 - 15,000	27	32
15,000 and over	38	46
Total	31	31

Income includes capital gains, but excludes transfer payments.

A glance should convince anyone that this tax system would by no means eradicate taxes at the lower end of the income scale. Most people would regard tax burdens of as much as 13-14 per cent for those with incomes below $4,000 and 23 per cent for those between $6,000 and $8,000 as much too high. Yet, the idea of relieving tax burdens for the lower half of the income distribution even in this relatively modest way is clearly impractical; Congress would face a revolt if it tried to raise taxes on incomes above $10,000 by an average of 20 per cent.

Perhaps we exaggerate the difficulties by using 1965 figures? Incomes have risen substantially so that there is much more income to be taxed above $15,000. But state and local taxes have also risen and the degree of regressivity in the tax system has been aggravated. On balance, the rise in incomes has probably been more powerful, but not enough to alter very much the general conclusions that we have reached from the 1965 data.

The prospects for making the tax system progressive are more discouraging when one notes the way Congress usually behaves when it reduces taxes. On the basis of past performance, one can predict with certainty that Congress will not limit income tax reduction to the lowest income classes. In 1964, when federal income taxes were reduced by an average of 20 per cent, incomes above $15,000 were given a tax cut of 14 per cent. This year, much more than the revenue to be gained from closing the loopholes and repealing the investment credit may be given away in tax rate reductions. Of course, these actions reflect the pressures on the Congressmen. The influence of the groups arrayed against a significant redistribution of the tax burden is enormous, and there is no effective lobby for the poor and the near poor.

It may be that, at some distant future date, the well-to-do and the rich will have enough income to satisfy not only their own needs, but also to help relieve the tax burdens of those who are less fortunate. In the meantime, the tax system will continue to disgrace the most affluent nation in the world.

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Being in and being out

CHARLES FRANKEL

WHAT is the difference between being "in" and being "out"—between serving an administration and standing on the outside of it, heckling more but enjoying it less? In the past few years, I have made this transition twice, once going in, and once going out. I don't feel like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, but I do know that I have gone through a couple of transformations.

Some of the differences are obvious. No longer being in the government, I see my old friends more often. I can talk more freely, I have more independence of movement, my working day is mine to arrange, and my income is improved. The difference between being in and out of government, in a word, is like the difference between being in and out of jail.

But there are other differences too. As everyone knows, crossing the lines from the government to the academic community these days is like leaving besieged Troy and moving to the tents of the Achaeans surrounding it. Large numbers of scholars and intellectuals talk about government as though it were a kind of contamination: people in government, it is suggested, are tangled in a web of loyalties, misdeeds and double talk that destroy their objectivity and honesty.

The author was Assistant Secretary of State for Educational & Cultural Affairs, 1965 to 1967. Much of this article is taken from his forthcoming book, *High on Foggy Bottom: An Outsider's Inside View of Government*, which Harper and Row will publish in November.

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And in return, government officials in increasing numbers are coming to the conclusion that the intellectual community, so-called, is overrated and misnamed.

What does a professor of English know about migrant workers? What does a biologist know about Southeast Asia? Yet, at an explosive moment in history, such men make ignorant and careless statements that stir up people's feelings, and make it harder for everybody to be reasonable. From the point of view of the government official, even informed intellectuals appear too often to hold forth on foreign or domestic policy without paying attention to the complexity of the facts or the narrowness of the alternatives that the official actually faces.

Of course, neither all scholars nor all government officials hold these views, and many would state them in a gentler and more qualified tone. Yet I do not think it needs to be argued that they are the pacesetting styles—the ideological equivalents of miniskirts and sideburns—in academic and governmental circles. Yet "estrangement" is not the only word to use to characterize the relationship between the world of the intellectual and the world of the official. It is not possible to carry on the business of government in the United States today without relying on scholarship and scholars. And the influence of professors and students on political affairs is one of the significant new phenomena of our time. One of the defining features of the "new politics," whether of the "New Left" or of the moderately left-of-center variety, is the active participation of people from the academic scene. The relationship between government and academia is one that mixes dependence and distrust. The members of the two worlds are having trouble living either with each other or without each other.

In large part, of course, this situation is the consequence of the war in Vietnam. The attitudes I have described reflect the feelings of members of the academic community toward a particular administration, and the reactions of the members of that administration to the attacks upon it. When the costs of the Johnson administration's stubborn obsession with Vietnam are finally added up, the hostility between the government and the academic community will turn out to be one of the major items. But the difficulties also run deeper. Tensions existed before Vietnam, and, in a less aggravated form, they will probably exist afterward.

Practical men have long harbored the suspicion that professional intellectuals are simply not with it, that they are too abstract, too indecisive, too disturbed by the abuses of power to have anything useful to say about its uses. On the other side, there is an ancient intellectual tradition of the intellectuals—given first expression by Plato, enshrined by religion and poetry, celebrated every day in classrooms, chapels and campus demonstrations—which holds that

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bullies and cynics run the world, and that if only men of knowledge and principle could take over, the cities of man would cease from ill. These long-standing attitudes contain stereotypes and misconceptions; but they also reflect genuine differences in the situations of people who are "in" and people who are "out."

It may be useful, therefore, to look at some of these differences, and to ask what they imply for the relationship between the "insider" and the "outsider," and particularly between the *professional* insider and the *professional* outsider—between the man involved in the day-to-day practice of politics and government, and the man whose career commits him to the study and criticism of government and society. How do these differences help explain the tensions between people in these two situations? Is it possible to do anything about them? Should we even try?

For what they are worth, here are some of my reflections on these questions, based on my own experience of the difference between being in and being out.

Scholarly freedom, official constraints

The first set of differences have to do with the external environment. The insider and the outsider face different objective conditions for thought and action.

One great difference is that the scholar or intellectual is incomparably richer in the range of options open to him than the official or politician. He can move between universities, choose among scores of ideas, try this, that and the next publisher or patron, attach himself to one, two or more intellectual coteries, or to none. When we speak of the "detachment" of the scholar, what we have mainly in mind, I think, is not that he lacks attachments, but that these are loose and plural.

In contrast, the official has only *this* government to work in; the politican has only the electorate he has. They have a choice, but the choice is to stop being what they are, and doing what they are doing. A man who wants to be a diplomat is not like a man who wants to be an economist. Essentially, he has only one potential employer—the government. Obviously, while this does not prevent him from playing, in his mind, with all sorts of ideas or initiatives, it greatly limits the scope of the ideas or the initiatives on which he can hope to build a career. He can push out from the existing government "consensus" here or there, but he cannot push out in too many directions all at once. He is limited by what exists in a way that the scholar or intellectual is not. For the sake of direct power and influence, in sum, there is a sacrifice of independence.

Another reason why the scholar has more options is that he does not have to take as many things into account in making his deci-

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sions—whether it is to endorse an idea or to write a letter to the newspaper—as the official does. Within limits, he can take his problems one at a time, restrained only by considerations of consistency (and not always by these). When the official makes a decision, on the other hand, it is usually part of a cluster of decisions. If the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs is working to reduce objections in Congress to East-West trade, the Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs has to follow policies in his domain that will not make his colleague's job harder. If the Commissioner of Education finds that Congressman Jones's support is indispensable to the legislation for which he is struggling, he may have to ask himself, before he seeks Congressman Jones's help, how far he is ready to go along with some of the Congressman's pet peeves. And he may decide, when he has finished thinking about this possibility, that his cherished legislation is not worth the cost.

The difference is between being able to focus undistractedly on the "essence" of an issue, and having to pay attention to all the "accidents" that surround it. For the official, personalities, timing, mood, make an immense difference. And equally important to him are the practical relationships between issues that may seem to have nothing logically to do with one another. In government, I found myself listening to Congressmen's objections about the architectural design of embassies overseas—something over which I myself had no control—when I had gone to them to talk about the development of an exchange program between our Peace Corps and similar organizations in other countries. And it was plain that the State Department would have to back down on one of these items if it was to have its way on the other. I could give a hundred other such examples. The scholar, in contrast, can neglect such adventitious and perhaps slightly comic considerations. In looking at what the government is doing—say in the field of taxation—he can focus on the problem as one in economics or in social equity; he can ignore the underbrush of "irrelevance" through which the official has to cut, and which is, for the official, exceedingly relevant.

I do not point this out in order to add my voice to the tired refrain that the outside scholar is "impractical." The impracticalities are often inside the government, jamming the works. There is good reason why the scholar should not try to take the official's view of a problem. It would help if he understood the spot the official is in; but the scholar makes his best contribution by exploring problems free from their accidental features. Otherwise the limitations of the official's perspective might well be forgotten.

Another difference between being "in" and being "out" is that the insider, who must act, can only act through a given machinery of action. In the State Department, for example, he works through a system of representation at a distance. If he has an idea for an AID

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program in India, he has to try that idea out by working through the embassy and the AID mission in that country. And if he receives a negative answer, he cannot be sure that the answer is the one that he would have received if he had been on the spot to make the proposal himself. It may reflect only the views toward the proposal of the American representatives on the scene, or their misunderstanding of it, or an Indian reaction caused by adventitious or temporary circumstances.

The official in Washington then has to make a double decision. First, is his idea important enough to justify his giving up other things and going out to India personally to explore the issues? Second, what will his appearance on the scene do to the status and confidence of the American representatives on the spot? Again and again, there are good ideas on which an official and a disengaged outside observer might agree, except for one consideration: the machinery of action available to the official is not capable of handling the idea. It calls for a reform of the machinery itself, and the official, caught in a tangle of daily problems, has neither the time nor the power to effect such a change.

Perspective in time

This brings up still another feature of official life which marks it off from life outside. The difference between being in and being out, it is usually said, is that the insider knows more than the outsider. He has at his disposal all the facts which the government with its vast facilities for obtaining information, can put before him. This is, unquestionably, an important half-truth. But the other half of the truth is equally important: the insider may not know, or can easily forget, certain kinds of fact the outsider knows.

What do I mean? I have in mind three characteristics of the government's information and reporting system: its short-range, bureaucratic focus; its inherent tendency to optimism; and the mixture of factual and political judgments that go into evaluating its products.

The material in government reports falls broadly into two categories. The first consists of studies of the broad question at issue, and projections of trends that are two, three, five or ten years away. In most respects, it is similar to scholarly studies of the same problem, and usually leans heavily on such studies. The second is short-range: it tells about events day-to-day as they unfold, deals in meetings, personalities, and shifts of power or opinion that may or may not be permanent. Its main purpose is to keep people on the top informed about the progress of the specific programs for which Congressional authorization has been received.

Naturally enough, the portions of such reports that are underscored for special attention are those that deal with "crises," existing

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or feared. These are the matters that stick out from these reports like buck teeth, and, to the busy official, life usually seems like an almost unbroken series of efforts to straighten buck teeth as quickly as possible. Probably, only a small proportion of these "crises" are genuine crises. Most, considered in and for themselves, are not likely to have a profound and enduring impact. They mean trouble only if the final judgment on the success of what one is doing will be made tomorrow, and in the light of one's difficulties today. Unfortunately, however, the official usually has to live between today and tomorrow.

Congressional appropriations are voted each year. In this timeframe, small things bulk large. The official tends to concentrate on the short-range issues, and to put the long-range reports on the back of his desk, and at the back of his mind. So the American government can take comfort from the number of hamlets secured, or the statistics of people reached by Revolutionary Development teams, and its spokesmen can say that outsiders are unaware of the progress that is being made. But what is on the outsiders' minds is a kind of question with which the flood of short-range, bureaucratic reports do not deal: for example, if the government in Washington is still perceived as a meddling and alien presence by many people in Mississippi or Alabama, are its representatives likely to have a quick or profound impact, except negatively, in Vietnam?

The pollyanna problem

Moreover, there is a kind of inbred tendency, in government reports, to support existing policy. We possess an adversary system of government, and an adversary press, and an international ideological struggle is going on. Under the circumstances, reports tend to have a self-defensive function. They accentuate the positive; they give the official what he needs to defend policies that are under attack.

Indeed, even if these conditions were not present, government reports would probably still tend to emphasize the good news. What is a man down the line to say when his superior asks him how the official policy is working out? If he says that the policy is failing, the blame will probably be put on his own incompetence or lack of commitment to it. The chance that the boss will conclude that policy is mistaken is, at any rate, not a safe premise on which to act. Moreover, the report goes back through channels, and people all the way along the line read it. The man writing the report can guess the reactions if he writes a negative one. What is he trying to do? Destroy everybody's morale? Hurt the reputation of the entire organization? Such reflections may be only half-conscious. But they affect what people in government say to each other.

To some extent, this situation can be corrected if people at the

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top make it plain that they want hard criticism. But making that fact plain takes time: the first reaction is usually incredulity. And it also takes a major effort at cleaning out the channels of communication. A proportion of the positive thinkers have to be removed, and replaced by negative thinkers. And this, of course, takes the official right back to the problem of wrestling with the received machinery.

Indeed, the entire process of transmitting and evaluating information inside a government is complicated by the fact that it has an uneliminable *political* ingredient. When an official receives an appraisal of a situation, the question he must ask, in deciding what to do about it, is not simply whether this appraisal is accurate. He cannot look only at what it says. He also has to take into account who says it. Few communications in government are purely descriptive: they are part of a system of authority; they have power behind them, or don't; they come from a man whose advice you have to accept because it would be trouble to replace him, or from an organization whom the official is trying to encourage, or from an agency with which, perhaps, he has already had too many disturbing disagreements. His acceptance or rejection of a communication, therefore, cannot be based simply on a judgment about "the facts." It is also a political judgment. A camel, the saying goes, is a horse put together in committee. The "truth" in government is often a camel. In determining the truth, the independent facts are not neglected; but the various members of the committee also have to be conciliated.

The "will to believe"

These observations take us to another kind of difference between being "in" and being "out." It is a difference in the psychological stance of the individual towards events. Whether a man is commenting on events or making decisions about what to do in relation to them, he is involved in making predictions about the future. He makes judgments about the direction in which events are tending, or the likely consequences of doing this or doing that. And most men who are reasonable recognize, whether they are in government or not, that social and political affairs are full of accidents and unpredictable contingencies, that human knowledge is limited, and that when one looks ahead to the future more than one possibility exists. Yet there is a difference, subtle but significant, between the man who thinks he might have some leverage on events and the man who is looking at them as an outside observer.

I recall talking, in the spring of 1965, with a Senator who subsequently became extremely vocal in his opposition to U.S. policy in Vietnam. At that time, he was already concerned. But he said that he thought that a quiet behind-the-scenes effort to persuade the President to try a different course was likely to have better results

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than a public attack upon the administration's policy. And in support of this approach, he produced a number of general propositions about the nature of Washington politics, and the character of the existing administration. All of these had considerable truth to them. But there were other propositions, equally persuasive or more, that he could also have produced, and that would have led to the reverse conclusion. The Senator, as the saying goes, was hoping against hope.

I do not wish to argue the question whether he was "right" or "wrong" on this specific issue. The question I want to raise is more general: Was he predicting, or was he hoping? Was he engaged in hard-boiled, dispassionate analysis of the relative probabilities, or was he indulging in wishful thinking? The answer, I think, is that you cannot say: the line can't be drawn that neatly, the alternatives posed by these questions are not the pertinent alternatives. He was making a decision. At one and the same time, he was predicting *and* determining where to put his efforts. He thought that he ought to try to make his point without causing public commotion, and ought not to admit that he was licked until he had made a real effort. And when I say, "He thought," I do not mean that he necessarily would have put it in these words. I describe a mood as much as an act of conscious calculation, an acceptance of a responsibility inherent in his situation as much as a move in a game of chess.

Committing oneself to a course of action depends on what one believes about a situation. A man who looks at the evidence will not undertake a course of action for which all the probabilities spell failure. But if there is room for doubt, he will, as an active agent, resolve the doubts in favor of the course he thinks preferable. To this extent, what one believes is not something independent of one's commitments. It goes along with commitment. Faith is not the prelude to effort. Effort makes for faith.

After I entered the government, I found dozens of other individuals similarly "hoping against hope." Vietnam was not the only issue, and the phenomenon, I think, is not a phenomenon special to any particular administration. What I describe is a governmental state of mind. It is not, indeed, special to government as such: it is a phenomenon of involvement, of engagement, in any field. It characterizes the citizen who works for a political candidate against whom the odds are heavy, or the professor who calls for reason and moderation in the middle of a campus demonstration.

We are dealing with what William James called "the will to believe." A man in the grandstand at the races can study the dope sheet, and decide that Gigolo is a good 3 to 1 bet against Ballet Dancer. But the jockey who is riding Ballet Dancer, though he may know the odds, has to say that Ballet Dancer has a good chance, or else he won't ride the horse seriously. The same is true in govern-

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ment. A sensible man in government knows that he will accomplish much less than he wants, and will probably pay more for these accomplishments than he ever realizes in advance. But a man who does not want to cash in his chips goes on hoping. To some extent, he has to be a believer. And being a "believer" is not just a matter of giving one's passive assent to an abstract proposition; it is a matter of pulling oneself together for action.

Here again we have a source of the misunderstandings, I think, between the "insider" and the "outsider." The mood is different, the stance towards events, the terms in which they are thinking. Such misunderstandings show up regularly, for example, in interpretations of why someone on the inside has finally decided to leave. There is a tendency for the outsider to assume that something specific happened to make him finally see the light, that he had a revelation, a conversion, a *crise de conscience*. Of course, people often do leave over specific issues. But if the people I have known are a fair sample, they more often leave over an accumulation of things. And they do not make the decision in the flush of new knowledge or conviction. They have simply grown tired. The outsider asks, "What made you decide to leave?" But all the insider can say is that the decision didn't feel like a sharp decision. He had left himself drifting out. His faith and hope had got used up; all he had left was charity for those still trying. He had simply come to think that perhaps he could get a rest, and do more good, and recover his hope, on the outside.

Indeed, there is more than just a difference in emotional tone, in willingness to believe, between what a man says about events when he is on the inside, and what he may say about them from the outside. The two statements belong to different logical categories. They cannot be judged by the same standards; the evidence that supports them is different, and what they communicate is different.

When a man is involved or engaged, when he is inside government or thinking of going in, he will say, "X may happen, if I try to do something about it." To this, the outsider may say, apparently contradicting him, "No, X will not happen, whether you try or not." But this is only a partial answer to the first statement. The considerations to which one would appeal to justify it are not exactly the same as those to which one would appeal to justify the insider's. For what does it mean to call the outsider's statement "correct" or "right"? Basically, it means that events will corroborate its truth. But this is not all that is involved in justifying the first statement. Even if events go against the speaker, even if he fails in what he sets out to do, it is still perfectly sensible to say that he was right to say what he did, and right to have made the effort. His statement, though it is a prediction, is something more: it is a disguised decision. The justification of a decision is not the same as the justification of a prediction.

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Friends and factions

Finally, we come to another set of differences that I would describe as differences in moral codes. It is necessary to be careful, however, in describing this difference.

It is commonly said that one difference between being in and being out is that the official is inevitably caught in a tangle of practical attachments, while the scholar, in contrast, is happily detached. This distinction will not wash. The man inside a government makes friendships, develops debts to other persons, gets caught in one faction or another, and is under an oath of confidentiality, expressed or implied, on many issues. But all this is true of any working scholar. The university world is also honeycombed by friendships, debts, factions, and confidences which are nobody's public business.

I do not point to this obvious fact in order to imply that views which become dominant in the academic world have no more claim to truth or objectivity than those that come to be accepted as official doctrines in government. Although I may be prejudiced, I think that, on the whole, scholars and trained observers outside a government are in a better position to assess the merits of its policies objectively than are the people who are directly responsible for these policies. But respect for the facts requires it at least to be recognized that, within the scholarly community, considerable social pressure can develop in favor of one view or another. With respect to Vietnam, for example, it simply has to be admitted that, within the university world, the courageous dissenters are not those who disapprove of government policy, but those who approve of it. The difference between being in and being out cannot be described as a difference between the presence and absence of loyalties and pressures that color one's views.

Nor can it be confidently described as a difference in the amount of rational thought that goes into the selection of one's loyalties. It would accord with the conventions to think that academics are more "rational," and perhaps it is true. Unfortunately, however, I have not worked out a precise scale of "rationality" that I can use for settling this question. I was impressed, in the government, by the degree to which people tried to address themselves to the issues. I have been depressed, in academic life, by the degree to which intellectual loyalties—and jobs, promotions, favorable reviews, and the acceptability of ideas—go with sentiment, fashion, or simply to old cronies. No doubt, my different emotions in the two situations have reflected my different expectations. But on the whole, I think that the comment, "No comment," would be wisest in relation to this question.

However, there is an identifiable difference of importance between the two worlds. It lies in the way in which people consciously go about sorting out their commitments. In deciding where one will put

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one's vote or influence in academic life, one pays more exclusive attention, at the level of conscious thought, to the truth of one point of view as against another. In contrast, while people do not neglect this consideration in political life, they also give conscious attention to the question of which point of view, and, by implication, what group of allies, have the best chance to accomplish something worthwhile. The unprincipled man, of course, settles for success alone. But the principled man accepts a point of view, or lines himself up in a camp, that seems to him to provide the best available combination of intellectual correctness and probable success.

I stress the fact that I am talking about what goes on consciously. What goes on unconsciously may well be different. More academicians go where the money or current intellectual popularity is than one would suppose from listening to commencement addresses. And more politicians go with principle alone than one would suppose from the solemnity with which they regularly announce that they have to be practical men. One of the most powerful and politically astute men in the House of Representatives called me one day to ask why I was allowing a particular individual to be dropped from the federal rolls. I replied by asking a question: Did he think that this individual was worth X thousand dollars a year to the taxpayers? He answered: "Mr. Secretary, I was hoping that you wouldn't put the question to me in quite that way." And that was where the discussion stopped.

What is "responsibility"?

Yet a difference between two conscious codes of behavior is a difference. It affects the surfaces of life and the arguments people use. Most to the point, it leads to different interpretations of words like "responsibility." A "responsible" scholar is one who checks the evidence, who is punctilious in portraying the views of those with whom he disagrees, and who tells the truth as he sees it. A "responsible" politician or official, in contrast, has to pay attention as well to the virtue of prudence. This does not mean that he has a right to be dishonest. It merely means that he has a moral obligation also to think about succeeding. Too many people and too many destinies depend on him to excuse his wasting his efforts or the world's hopes on empty causes. Don Quixote is tolerable, and even admirable, but this is because he had only one follower, Sancho Panza, who had to take the lumps.

This, I think, is one source of the tension between scholars and officials. They exchange charges of "irresponsibility" in part because each group has a different moral code, and inappropriately applies it to the other. It is a little like a conflict between two cultures. There

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is unavoidable friction in a situation in which, for one group, the central virtue is veracity, while, for the other, the central virtue is prudence. For while scholars do not have to be imprudent, and officials do not have to be liars, there is a tendency for veracity to lead to one, and prudence to lead to the other.

Indeed, the main cause of the moral conflict is not that we have two codes that are wholly different. On the contrary, the two conceptions of "responsibility" cannot be entirely separated. Neither professional code is neat and watertight. At the edges, they fade into each other, producing moral ambiguities and dilemmas. The conflict between the academic and governmental worlds is very often simply the reflection, transposed and magnified, of the moral conflicts of individuals within each of these worlds.

For the fully responsible official or politician cannot define "responsibility" entirely in terms of his special professional code. Though he must think about succeeding, he must also think about the limits of success. If the special rules by which he lives become wholly discontinuous from more generally shared moral standards, if explanation, excuse and rationalization are constantly required to defend the policies and behavior of people in government, the reserves of moral authority on which government depends are depleted. And this insufficiency of a professional code, standing by itself, applies as well to the scholar's and intellectual's code.

The scholar is a citizen and moral agent: fulfilling his responsibility to tell the truth, in all its variousness and complexity, is not an easier task for him than for other human beings. Selection and emphasis play a part, and the circumstances and consequences of his utterances thus become relevant in determining what he should say and how he should say it. And in fact, the occasion of the discussion, the nature of the audience, the physical and social situation, commonly do affect what scholars say, whether they are in a classroom or writing a letter to a newspaper. In a professional journal, I might devote an entire article to a disagreement I have with Professor X over a specific issue and hardly mention the fact that on most issues I think he is right. Before a lay audience, these priorities would probably be reversed. In this sense, at least, the scholar's utterances involve political or social decisions. The test of efficacity or probable success also applies at deeper levels of scholarly activity. In part, I have in mind the problem which President Kennedy described when, a month before his assassination, he said: "Scientists alone can establish the objectives of their research, but society, in extending support to science, must take account of its own needs." The conceptions of "social utility" prevalent among scholars are likely to be broader than conventional ones, and they also know enough to know that the potential social utility of a piece of research cannot be measured by the degree to which it is directly concerned

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with practical issues. Scholars, therefore, have to make their own judgments, including the judgment whether they should seek government support for what they are doing. But they are not exempt from the obligation to measure, in their own terms, the social utility or disutility of what they are doing, or to consider the probable uses and abuses to which their work may be put. This involves their making a judgment about the forces at work on the political scene.

However, we do not confront the "political" element in scholarship only when we consider the relationship of scholarship to government, or the possible uses to which the fruits of scholarship may be put by society. "Political" elements—calculations of probable success, considerations of prudence—are present within the system of scholarship itself. They affect the selection of subjects to be explored, the way in which inquiries are constructed, the development of ideas. In all the sciences, people choose between one proposed theory and another partly in terms of the comparative practicability of the different experimental procedures involved. And particularly in the social sciences, people formulate their inquiries in terms of fundamental (though usually unexpressed) bets about what is possible in human affairs. Most studies of urban problems, for example, assume that population is not going to decline from its present level, that present and future generations are not going to discard the culture and resources of industrialism, and that planning for a society of small towns and farms would be a waste of effort. Most studies of political processes take it for granted that rivalry and conflict between different groups are uneliminable from the political scene, and that the ideal of a "common humanity" is not going to win an unequivocal triumph in the foreseeable future.

Such bets control the evolution of scholarly inquiry. They fall in the same general category as the politician's or official's effort to combine principle with efficacy. The chief difference is that the scholar can work in a longer time-dimension than the official. He can sit back and hope that in twenty, fifty or a hundred years his ideas will be vindicated. The official does not have that leeway. The arguments and tensions come—in the scholar's life, in the official's, and in the relations between the two—mainly over how long or how short the time-dimension should be.

"In-and-outers"

Where do these considerations leave us? Are the tensions between the scholarly and official worlds avoidable? My own conclusion is that the answer has to be both Yes and No. The tensions are not avoidable, because, if they were to disappear, neither the scholar nor the official would be in the kind of working situation in which he is at present, and neither would be serving the social function he now

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serves. Indeed, the tension is not something to be avoided: it ought to be accepted as the mark of a society in which the scholarly and intellectual life is free, and the official life organized and relatively stable.

But at the same time, the heatedness of the conflict, the distrust and discussion at cross-purposes which mark it, can be modified. Two devices, I think, can be employed. The first is the study and recognition of the differences in the conditions of thought and action between being in and being out. To the extent that these differences are better understood, and to the extent that people on the two sides of the fence keep them in mind, there is likely to be a more useful kind of communication.

The second device is to encourage the "in-and-outer," the man who, though he retains his roots in the academic community, nevertheless acts as a consultant or adviser to government, or serves in an administration at one time or another. I do not argue that all scholars interested in political or social affairs should adopt this dual role, or even that a majority should. Certainly, I do not argue that any administration, no matter what, has a call on a scholar's services. Moreover, I am aware that there is some substance in existing fears that individuals who try to be both insiders and outsiders may contribute to the erosion of the scholarly community's autonomy. Nevertheless, the risks involved in complete separation of the scholarly community from active participation in government seem to me to be greater than the risks involved in active cooperation.

The deeper problems

It is important that we understand the full dimensions of the problem with which we are dealing. It illustrates political, moral and intellectual dilemmas that belong to the special nature not simply of this era, or of American society, but of Western liberal civilization.

One of the animating ideals of liberal civilization is that, despite human passions, and despite the limitations imposed on every individual's point of view by his membership in a particular occupation, class or nation, objective social knowledge and disinterested social criticism are possible. This belief marks off Greek civilization from others in the ancient world. It is a source of philosophy and of the conception of rule of law, and it lies behind the entire enterprise we know as social science. Moreover, this belief in the possibility of independent inquiry and free, unbought criticism has not been a gospel of political withdrawal. For most of Western history, the notion has persisted that such enterprises are of practical use to a society and its government. The professional student of society and politics, though he stands outside the struggle of competing forces, is a political actor. He contributes a fund of fact, arguments, and value

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judgments from which an effort has been made, at least presumptively, to strain out special pleading. He thus provides one of the ingredients conducive to reasoned compromise and the intelligent resolution of social issues.

Yet this idea is complex in theory, and ambiguous in practice. It is complex in theory because it is plain that scholars and intellectuals are not a race of detached and disembodied spirits, and cannot be turned into such a race, despite the hopes of Plato and legions of people after him that a properly conceived education might turn the trick. If the ideal of objective social analysis is to be defended as a valid one, the argument is not that students of society are, as individuals, free from prejudices and blind spots. The argument is that the exacting machinery of scholarly inquiry and the process of mutual criticism tend to produce, over the course of time, a collective product, known as knowledge, which is at least relatively free of special bias. No one, obviously, can say that this process ever completely achieves its goal. On the other hand, there are achievements of the social sciences, from studies of voting behavior to the development of prognostic tests of learning ability, which indicate that the view that all social science is disguised partisanship is unjustifiably cynical.

At this point, however, we come to another problem which complicates the issue. It relates to the practical organization of the scholarly or intellectual community's affairs. If we are careful enough in selecting the issues for social inquiry, a reasonable claim can be made that scholars, by criticizing one another's work, can move toward objective knowledge. But with respect to at least one very large set of issues, it can be argued that scholars as a group may be shut off from an appropriate avenue to the facts. This is the area of active, practical, governmental decision-making. Is it possible that scholars who look at this process from the outside, and who lack direct acquaintance and genuine emotional involvement with it, are incapable of passing informed and pertinent judgments on it?

I do not think a categorical answer to this question is possible or necessary. Astute and honest observers who have never been active in politics and government have shown themselves capable of saying true and useful things about these enterprises. But there is also enough on the historical record of this and other societies to suggest that an intellectual or scholarly community will be seriously incapacitated in its understanding of public affairs if it contains no people who have had direct, practical experience in government and politics. It would be in the position of anthropologists discussing cultures in which none of them had ever been. At the best, such a community would be bookish. At the worse, it could be unconsciously sectarian or militantly self-righteous. The scholar-practitioner is probably as necessary to the development of social and political science as the clinician to psychology or the poet to the criticism of poetry.

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The higher synthesis

This conclusion, though I think it is hardly a novel one, is nevertheless worth emphasizing. The argument that the scholar should take part in public affairs is usually put on the ground that public affairs need him. The argument that he should remain disengaged is usually put on the ground that scholarship should not be distorted in the service of Caesar. But the truth is that service by scholars in public affairs is also potentially a service to scholarship. Paradoxical though it may seem, the ideal of a neutral, detached social science probably requires that at least some social scientists, in some phase or aspect of their activities, be partisan and attached. Social scientists, above all others, should be aware of the existence of professional deformations, of what Veblen called the "trained incapacity" to recognize certain kinds of facts. The participant-observer inside politics and government is probably essential to the correction of such bias. It is instructive to realize how many of the figures who have made the greatest contributions to political thought have, at some time in their lives, been political practitioners: a brief list would include Plato, St. Augustine, Locke, Turgot, Mill, Marx, Michels, Max Weber, and Keynes. On the record, political passion is conducive to intellectual achievement in political studies.

Obviously, there will be ambiguities if a man goes in, and ambiguities when he comes out. Going in, he risks losing his independence of judgment to an operating system. Coming out, he risks trimming his thoughts in order to keep his lines of connection with the old boys in good shape. But the ambiguities are also present for the man who thinks of himself wholly as an outsider. Eros, passion, concern, indignation, are not easily expunged from the human breast. The posture of detachment is usually unconvincing and unappealing; worse still, it is usually an exercise in self-deception. For most people, celibacy is not the way to get sex off their minds. Intellectual celibacy is an equally unpromising path to social or political disinterestedness.

Moreover, a social ideal is at stake. Liberal civilization calls for the maintenance of social enterprises through which a civilization tries to tell the truth about itself, and render a rational judgment on its doings. But democratic civilization rests on the cognate ideal that the division between those who govern and those who are governed should be reduced as far as possible. They occupy different situations, but they ought to be on the same wave-length. They should be able to talk to each other, and to understand each other. This hope cannot be a very lively one if there is no movement back and forth between those who think and those who do. The central question is only the question whether those who move back and forth will have the capacity at once to adjust to these different situations and to remain in character. But this is no different from the problem of anyone trying to lead an integrated and rounded moral life.

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Publish or perish —a defense

J. H. HEXTER

To academics, or at least to this particular academic, one of the most fresh and fascinating aspects of the student revolt is the extent to which it is directed against Academia itself. A generation ago, student revolt rarely took that odd turning—perhaps because students did not really give enough of a damn about Academia to bother. For me, the most interesting episode occurred a few years back, not among the large and rackety academic demimonde on the shores of San Francisco Bay, but rather in the ordinarily tranquil environs of New Haven. That at Yale University—Yale, of all places, with its broad, well-padded bottom, its ancient reputation for unassailable complacency, its undergraduate body about one half out of plush private schools—should witness a continuous seventy-two hour vigil of protest against a refusal to grant a permanent position on the faculty to a thirty-two-year-old associate professor, and that such a demonstration should elicit the support of a considerable fraction of the undergraduates—this was revolutionary indeed. It was evidence of a concern about education in general, and their own education in particular, rare among the sons of Eli in the good old days of the Whiffenpoof rampant.

That particular revolt failed. Despite a bit of static in the administrative circuit through which the case passed, Yale's message came through loud and clear: however talented a man might be

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as a classroom teacher, the Yale faculty would not grant him a permanent position unless in its view he had already published work of considerable distinction and unless prospects were favorable that he would continue to do so. The message was immediately translated into a slogan long current in the academic world but never before so widely publicized outside it: Publish or Perish.

In view of the subsequent fortunes of the victim, the wording of the slogan seems a little melodramatic. He is said to have received thirty-four job offers at other institutions, and he now holds the position of chairman of a department and a full professorship —with tenure—in one of the very best colleges in the United States. Yet Publish or Perish was indeed the message. Lest any doubt it, the Yale faculty reiterated its stand quite firmly and unambiguously less than a year after the initial eruption. As a sequel to that affair, a faculty committee—the majority of whose members did not have permanent appointments—investigated the whole area of appointment and promotion policy. They solicited and considered advice and suggestions from anyone at Yale who cared to offer them. They worked hard and conscientiously and deliberated with care through a long summer. Their report was singularly free of that smog of academese and ambiguity with which so many university committees manage to conceal from the consumer not only their conclusions but their premises. The report was unanimously endorsed by the Academic Establishment—the Boards of Permanent Officers of Yale College and the Graduate Faculty of Arts and Sciences—those favored beings who are surrounded by the mystic aura called Tenure. On the issue which generated the committee's investigation the report was unequivocal: "As a university, Yale's future will be determined by the extent to which she is able . . . to keep and to attract distinguished scholars. An insistence on excellent undergraduate teaching as a condition for tenure, without a rigorous adherence to scholarly criteria, could lead to a deterioration in Yale's scholarly contribution and hence its national and international stature as a university." Of the one concrete suggestion that ran counter to this position, the committee made short work. "The Committee received a number of suggestions for the establishment of Teaching Professorships. It rejected these because it is convinced that original scholarly work is the surest proof of intellectual distinction and the surest guarantee that intellectual activity will not cease."

So, after the tumult, the Academic Establishment flatly reiterated the position it took in the first place—Publish or Perish. "Perish," as has been pointed out, is a somewhat hyperbolic description of the actual situation. As an eminent official of the university has put it: "Yale does not say 'Publish or Perish,' it only says, 'Meet Yale's current standard of productive scholarship as

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reflected in the printed word or go elsewhere; take a position in an academic institution that does not demand such evidence of scholarship.' In the long run you may well be happier in such an institution." Even the most inveterate faculty Blue at Yale is faintly aware of the existence of other institutions, purportedly academic, at which other men somehow stumble through their allotted span of years.

Still that is not quite the point. The point is the twenty to forty great universities that maintain the "hard line" on publication. For a variety of reasons they are the most desirable places at which to teach. They have prestige and confer status. They also tend to provide the lushest fringe benefits—retirement plans, medical insurance, summer grants, leaves with pay. Moreover, they offer the less heavy teaching schedules—six to nine hours rather than nine to fifteen. They invariably get the best students and usually pay the best salaries. These great universities are the pace-setters; where they lead, the rest of Academia follow, especially on the rare occasions when, in a solid phalanx, they all move in the same direction. And in the matter of Publish or Perish they so move.

This is especially alarming for the man who may love to teach but does not care to write. For at almost any university or college to which he retreats, a starry-eyed young dean or president may show up with the dream that he can exalt old Somnolent U. into the Big Twenty or Forty. This troublesome character pays exorbitant salaries to a few young "hot shots" brought in from outside, who publish at the drop of a hat; and he suggests that those who would enjoy a like shower of gold do likewise. The unfortunate classroom teacher, who is not interested in publishing and had no reason to think his university cared either, finds himself shafted again. Thus in higher education in America the classroom teacher, however excellent, who refuses to present the appropriate offerings before the brazen idol of publication set up by the great universities, finds fewer and fewer places to hide, and those places more and more dingy and repellent.

The students' case

On the academic front, therefore, it is against the formidable and serried array of the great universities that the student revolt has chosen to give battle, and the students have well identified one true issue in their conflict with the Academic Establishment. The university, they say, is a teaching institution, and they have come to the university to be taught. But, they go on to observe, those who teach them well know that, if they devote themselves wholly to teaching and neglect to write for scholarly publication, they will shortly face a door marked, "This Way Out." Conse-

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quently instead of giving the students the full attention which is their due and his duty, the typical member of the university faculty directs far too much of his energy to research and writing.

As infuriating to the students as this system is, the Establishment's refusal to adopt the straightforward measures which would reform the system is more so. All that the universities need do, the students claim, is reward teaching on a parity with publication of research—and not only by retaining nonpublishers, but by advancing them at the same rate as their publishing colleagues. Then, knowing that entire and sole devotion to teaching is not merely the way to academic suicide, young academics will summon up the courage to refuse complicity in the publication racket, and the balance, now absurdly out of kilter between devotion to teaching and devotion to research-with-a-view-to-publication, will be redressed.

The problem of evaluation

It is at this point that the Academic Establishment has a chance to edge in with a mild observation. "Teaching rewarded in proportion to its merit? Ah, yes, of course! And now, tell us, how do we go about evaluating merit in teaching?" And then the Academic Establishment smiles gently, and the smile is the smile on the face of the tiger. By long experience the Establishment knows that, while the proponents of a system of equivalent rewards wrangle over the right way or ways to evaluate teaching, it will be able to go on enforcing its own pet rule of Publish or Perish. It knows that it can go on enforcing that rule forever, because the wrangle will never end.

The problem of evaluation cannot be shuffled aside; it is at the very heart of the matter. It is not enough to say that teaching ought to be rewarded; it is not even enough to separate the good teachers from the bad, supposing even that operation to be feasible; it is necessary to *rank* teachers according to their merit. This is unavoidable, because there is no way to reward differential merit in teaching until the operation of differentiation is performed. With respect to scholarship evidenced in publication, that operation is performed in the academic marketplace by methods too intricate to describe here. Despite an occasional notorious aberration, scholars would agree that the mechanism through which the pecking order gets set in the various fields of learning is on the whole reasonably satisfactory; it distributes differential rewards in reasonable—although surely not perfect—correlation to differential merit in published scholarship. Until the proponents of rewards for meritorious teaching can come up with a method of scaling those rewards approximately as accurate as the current method for establishing the pecking order in

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published research and scholarship, they will have to put up with the obduracy of the Academic Establishment.

What is good teaching?

The problem is complex. Many variables go into the process of teaching as currently conceived, and there is no agreement as to the relative values to be assigned to the variables. To be sure, out of debate, discussion, letters to the editor, picketing, sign-carrying, and so on, that has accompanied the Student Revolt against Academia, it is possible to derive a reasonably concise definition of what *the students* (and many of the professoriate) think of as "teaching." As currently conceived, teaching only takes place at the point of direct confrontation between teacher and student; the only common element among the various forms of activity that are designated as "teaching" is that they occasionally bring face-to-face a person designated as a teacher with persons designated as students. If we give a somewhat extended definition to the term classroom, teaching then becomes "classroom performance." This definition itself, however, creates some difficulties in evaluating teaching.

The most familiar form of classroom performance takes place in the lecture. There the teacher addresses a group of students numbering somewhere between one (1) and 2,000 for approximately 50 minutes on a subject concerning which he is presumed to know more than they. A second form of teaching is carried on by discussion. There are two major subtypes of teaching by discussion. In the first, a large lecture class is broken down into smaller groups, usually somewhere between 10 and 20. Having heard a number of lectures, members of these smaller groups—sometimes called quiz sections—meet with a teacher to discuss their substance along with such reading as has been assigned. In the second kind of discussion group there is no formal lecturing. The whole course is conducted on the basis of discussions between the instructor and the students.

A third form of face-to-face performance occurs in the research seminar. A small group of students work under the supervision of a single instructor, ordinarily meeting once a week for a couple of hours. The student works more or less independently, on a topic of more or less his own choice; he reports his progress to the rest of the seminar; and the final product of his effort, his seminar paper, is subjected to rigorous criticism both by his fellow students and by the seminar instructor. Another form of face-to-face instruction is the supervised, individual, independent research that the graduate student does in fulfillment of his final requirement for a doctorate, the doctoral dissertation. Finally in some fields there are postdoctoral groups or teams working together to solve related sets of problems under the direction of a man who heads up the project.

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Suppose that there were an accurate way to rate excellence of teaching within each of these categories. How are the judges to weigh the relative claims to rewards of *A* and *B* under the following circumstances? *A* rates excellent as a lecturer in a class in which he teaches 2,000 students, poor in a quiz section with 10 students, and poor in a seminar with 8 students. He is so terrible at direction of dissertations that he has no students in that category. *B* rates poor in a lecture in which he teaches 80 students, excellent in a quiz section with 10 students, excellent in a seminar with 11 students, and excellent in the direction of the four students preparing dissertations for him. Is *A* or *B* the better teacher? Clearly it depends on the multiplier one chooses. On a 20 (excellent), 10 (good), 0 (poor) scale, if we make the number of courses the multipliers, *B* scores 60; he is three times as good a teacher as *A*, who scores 20. If we make students the multiplier, *A* is 80 times as good as *B*. On the first basis of calculation, *B* averages Excellent-Minus; on the second Poor-Plus; on the first *A* averages Poor-Plus, on the second Excellent. Which, then, is the right multiplier?

Surely, it may be argued, the man who year-in, year-out, teaches 2000 students excellently must be given the edge over the one who teaches 25 excellently. But why? If we simply apply to teaching the applausometer standard, this is so; and it seems undemocratic to do otherwise. The trouble is:

1) The applicability of that standard is precisely what is in question. To build it into the system assumes what is to be proven, a procedure known unfavorably as question-begging.

2) We are trying to decide, not what is democratic, but what is just; and the two can be made identical only by fiat.

Consider an extreme example. Suppose *C* is a superb biochemist, but so shy that, face-to-face with more than one person at a time, he becomes incoherent. He has directed 50 doctoral dissertations in 25 years, and that is all the "teaching" he has done. During the same span, in large lectures *A* has taught 50,000 students excellently, while *C* was teaching only 50. Our applausometer calculus of happy customers registers a 100,000 per cent superiority of *A* over *C*. But it turns out that eight of *C*'s students win Nobel prizes in the sciences, and all eight ascribe their achievement in some measure to *C*'s teaching. This dramatic evidence of *C*'s pedagogic proficiency becomes available only after he has been teaching for years, perhaps only after his retirement or his death. Is *A* the better teacher?

Who should judge? how?

So far we have assumed that at least it is possible within each category accurately to rate teachers on a scale from excellent to poor. But just how do we go about doing this? *Who* decides whether a

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teacher is good, bad, or indifferent? The students, that is the customers, perhaps; but *which* customers—*D*, or *C*, or *B*, or *A*? *D* is a fine fellow; a future good citizen; respectful, unassuming, conscientious, and quite, quite stupid. He can be taught only by some pedagogic equivalent of the Chinese drip torture. *C*—gentleman *C*, he is called—is ingratiating, bright enough to do excellent work, and lazy enough not to try; in order to satisfy the requirements of the university and to continue to receive regular drafts from father (while avoiding one from Uncle Sam), he absorbs enough to get by. In his view, an excellent teacher is one who provides entertainment not markedly inferior to that purveyed in the neighboring movie palace or discotheque. *B* is competent; he works hard and steadily; he is 100 per cent reliable; his feet are on the ground, his mind not far above it. He likes a good steady-going teaching performance; but erratic flashes of brilliant light from the lecture platform upset him. He wants to be instructed, not to be disturbed or perplexed. Finally there is *A*, mercurial, arrogant as Lucifer, bright as a button, slightly unbalanced, with a mind like a razor and the manners of a hog. With fine impartiality, he is contemptuous of all who imagine they might have anything to teach him. How do we judge whether a man has taught excellently a mixed class of *D*'s and *C*'s and *B*'s and *A*'s? By answers to a questionnaire? Such answers might indicate whether *D* and *C* and *B* and *A* got the kind of teaching they *wanted*. But in three out of four of those cases—*D* is the exception—the best teaching for them would have been a kind that they did *not* want, and that they probably would have given a low rating in a questionnaire.

If this seems unpromising, we might consider an alternate procedure—a canvass of the opinion of the A students. Because it is largely composed of former A students, surely the professoriate will accept their evaluation? Unfortunately there are problems here too. Who are the A students? How many A's make an A student—all A's?, three quarters A's?, half A's? And is an A in Home Economics equivalent to an A in Boolian algebra? To anyone familiar with the proceedings of academic bodies, the potentialities for a proliferation of hair-splitting latent in these questions conjure up a vision of committee meetings stretching from here to eternity.

And of course this is only the beginning. *Which* teachers is our A student to judge? Is he to judge only those splendid fellows who exhibit their attunement to real merit by awarding him an A, or is he also to judge the egregious louts who manifest their ineptitude by giving him a C? And *when* is he to judge them? By moderately high standards, I was an A student as an undergraduate. In my sophomore year I had a brilliant teacher who really made the past come alive to me. Francis of Assisi, Martin Luther, Queen Elizabeth, Thomas Hobbes, Oliver Cromwell—either they were really ordinary fellows, or a bit crooked, or a little queer in the head, just like folks.

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Naturally, of course, their opinions were funny and out-of-date because they lived in the benighted ages before science and democracy and toleration and liberalism. It was refreshing to be told, by someone who really knew how to debunk, what those fellows were like, and at the end of the year I would surely have given that teacher an enthusiastic A. As it happened, I took another course from him the following year. By that time the glamor had faded. The jokes were the same jokes, and the second time around they were not very funny. That second time around, I would have rated this teacher B rather than A—not bad, but not good enough to deserve a special reward for meritorious teaching. Today, after forty years of fairly ardent pursuit of historical understanding, my judgment may be presumed to be better than it was when I was nineteen. I now think that this teacher deserved neither an A nor a B but an F. He was a traitor to his vocation; he unscrupulously disfigured the past. He did nothing to enable us to understand and respect the great dead who were so much superior to what we ever would be, thus by an inch or so enhancing our own stature. Instead he transfigured giants into pygmies and afforded us adolescents the gratifying illusion of looking down on them. Given the inordinate self-righteousness of bright adolescents, it is hard to imagine a pedagogic device better calculated to appeal to them. It is also hard to imagine a pedagogic device better calculated to firm up their hold on immaturity.

In this case, the C and D students might have rated my teacher more justly. His wit, though not very lofty, still sailed right over their heads. They resented his jibes at ancient superstitions and pieties, which they were loath to reconsider or renounce. And, anyhow, he made fun of them. So for peculiar reasons the C and D students would have arrived at an evaluation of his teaching that corresponds with my current one, while forty years ago as an A student I made the opposite evaluation.

The professors' interest

In any case, the vociferous demand of some leaders of the Student Revolt for a student role in the deciding on academic advancement of their teachers is not about to get anywhere. It runs contrary to the vested interest of the professoriate. And for obfuscation, foot-dragging, and sabotage when its vested interests are at stake, the professoriate has incomparable gifts. It could allow the students a role in the apportionment of academic rewards only at its own expense. And while some professors are momentarily foolish enough to court popularity by uttering sweet nothings about taking council with students on the merits of faculty members, the corporate professoriate is not going to surrender lightly such power as it has.

To allege that the professoriate is protecting a vested interest may

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seem invidious. It is not so intended. Few institutions or human arrangements survive or remain stable unless some men have a vested interest in their survival and stability. Granted the faculty's vested interest, is their control of the distribution of academic rewards more or less desirable than any likely alternative? To the extent that undergraduates take over the choice of *who* should educate them, they also choose *how* they shall be educated. And, contrary to the opinion of the students, it is not the duty of the faculty simply to provide the kind of education students want. Indeed, few young people between the ages of 17 and 21 know what kind of education they want. That a considerable number of such young people are pretty sure they do not want the kind of education they are getting is only mildly disturbing. It has ever been thus. Whatever students think they want, the professoriate has to give some consideration to what the larger community needs. About their capacity wisely to judge the current and future needs of the community, they are—and should be—fairly humble. Still, they see no group better equipped to do the job—not students, not state legislatures, not boards of trustees, not federal bureaucrats, not philanthropic foundations, not university administrators.

Dilemmas of classroom evaluation

Suppose, then, that student evaluation of differential merit in teaching is useless and that the Academic Establishment's opposition to it will in any case frustrate its effects. Still, it is absurd to deny the importance of teaching in institutions putatively dedicated to the dissemination of the higher learning. Nor can the Establishment readily deny that teachers should receive rewards at least roughly proportional to their aptitude in performing this important function. So somehow effectiveness in teaching *should* be one of the determinants of the way the academic salary-and-status pie is divided. It is all very well to reject student claims to a hand on the knife that cuts the pie; but someone has to cut it, and who then is left to do the job?

The most obvious answer is the faculty itself. But I must now report that I have no confidence whatever in my own competence to evaluate the teaching of my colleagues, let alone the competence of my colleagues to evaluate my teaching. With more than a quarter of a century of teaching experience under my belt, I do not feel any great assurance that I know whether or when my own performance as a classroom teacher is good, bad, or indifferent. There are times when I have a finger-tip sense that I am doing pretty well and others when I feel I am doing very poorly; but I am not at all sure that my finger-tip sense is accurate. It may all be a matter of classroom geography—whether the most conspicuous occupant of the front row is a sour-looking youth with a facial set indicative of supreme bore-

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dom or a starry-eyed young female who has managed to train her face to express rapt interest while her mind is occupied elsewhere. The fact that some students voluntarily come back for more after having had one course with me provides me with no assurance, because I have as little confidence in the judgment of such students as I have in my own. If, after twenty-five years, I am so doubtful about the measure of my own ability, just how sure can I be about the ability of my colleagues?

And how do I find out about my colleagues' teaching? Do I prod students with questions about it? Leaving aside the moral problem of the propriety of encouraging students to gossip to me about their academic betters and my colleagues (although I do not see how one can actually leave aside such a problem), to what end do I prod them, since I do not trust the accuracy of their appraisal? Do I go around to the classes of my colleagues and observe them? The imagination boggles. In a large department the time required for systematic classroom visitation would be enormous. And unless I much mistake the character of my colleagues, they would take kindly neither to visiting nor being visited. They would feel, with reason, that direct faculty evaluation in order to provide rewards for teaching would provide splendid opportunities for a reversion to the jungle in matters of academic politics, in those institutions and departments where such a reversion has not yet taken place. So this is one the faculty had best duck.

But if not the faculty, why not the university administration? There is always some administrator heroically prepared to leap into the breach. If he does, one can envisage three alternative outcomes, all in varying degrees bad:

1. The administrator quickly discovers that he has undertaken a hopeless task. He then a) scuttles the job (happiest outcome, but a waste of his time), or b) maintains a small staff to pretend that he is doing the job (a waste of time and considerable money).

2. The administrator takes a long time to learn that he has undertaken a hopeless task. Meanwhile he spends an inordinate amount of time and money on experiments, consultations, statistical studies, etc., *ad nauseum*.

3. The administrator actually thinks he has solved the problem, in which case a) he presents it to the faculty for suggestions, approval, and implementation (a most unfortunate course, since the faculty simply hacks his brainchild to bits before his very eyes, and forever after distrusts his judgment), or b) he tries to effect his proposals for evaluation without faculty consent (sheer disaster that can only end in his resignation, or the permanent embitterment and departure of a considerable part of the faculty, or both).

So the administrators had better duck, too.

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The other way of teaching

Exploration of means to evaluate teaching seems to lead, by a circuitous and thorny path, into the Slough of Despond. But really there are no grounds at all for despair. While we have been pursuing the bluebird of evaluation-of-university-teaching, he has all along been at home and doing reasonably well. In the great universities, the work of evaluating faculty members as teachers *is* currently being performed, and being performed more accurately than it would be by any of the disastrous procedures hitherto canvassed. The standard for this evaluation is: Publish or Perish. In effect the faculty member is rewarded *as a teacher* on the basis of the scholarly community's evaluation of his published work.

The advantage of Publish or Perish is that it breaks through two parochial and absurd assumptions: 1) that all university teaching goes on in the classroom, and 2) that all the teaching that goes on there is a pure act of creation on the part of the classroom teacher. The second proposition was never correct. Even when Thomas Aquinas was bringing illumination to youthful minds by lecturing to students at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century, he owed a good bit of what he taught to Holy Writ, Aristotle, St. Augustine, and a number of lesser lights. The first proposition began to lose force at some time between the middle of the fifteenth century and the early decades of the sixteenth. During that period, pedagogues discovered that the process of printing had made books so cheap that students could buy them, and that if they bought them and used them under appropriate conditions, and with appropriate sanctions for failure to read and master their contents, *they learned things without actually having to be told them.*

The invention of printing is not so recent that I lay myself open to the charge of radicalism in attempting some cautious explanation of the educational effect of the existence and use of printed books. More recent, to be sure, is the Paperback Revolution; but even the effects of this phenomenon should by now be sufficiently obvious. As one watches hordes of young people moving from class to class laden with vast stacks of paperbacks, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the reading and study of printed books probably play a considerable part in education, and that the instructors whom they meet face-to-face in the classroom expect students to do much of their learning by reading books. And, of course, if students learn from reading books, then conversely books, or more precisely the authors of books, teach students. To omit from our evaluation of teaching all the teaching done by the living writers of books from which students learn is an oversight that we can no longer permit ourselves. We must take into account the impact of printing on the pedagogic process.

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Not only do students read books at the behest of those who instruct them in the classroom; the classroom teachers themselves read and have read a far greater number of books. The classroom teacher acts mainly as a mediator between the writers he has read and the students in the classroom whom those teachers teach through his mediation. If he performs this act of mediation very badly, then he may block or impede the communication between the writers he has read and the students whom they instruct with his assistance. Only rarely will his classroom teaching be superior in quality to what is in the books from which he has learned. I can never hope to teach my students anything about Renaissance diplomacy half as good, or wise, or sound as what I read in Professor Garrett Mattingly's book on the subject. At best what I say in class will be a boiled-down version of what I learned from that book.

A little hard data is in order here. I have been a classroom teacher since 1936. In that time, on a fair estimate I have taught about 5000 students face-to-face. In the past three years I edited one book, contributed a large section to another, and wrote a third. All are for the use of college students. The combined sales of the three are already more than 100,000 copies and the end is not yet in sight. Therefore, in the past three years I taught 2000 per cent more students by publishing than I have taught face-to-face in thirty-three; and I will be teaching many more. Whether I taught better I do not know, nor can I think of any way to find out. Teachers who have graded the examinations of students they have taught are unlikely to be sanguine about the pedagogic effectiveness of either publication *or* confrontation, although the two exhaust the options.

Besides the three publications directly aimed at college students and personal profit, I have over the years published several books and articles aimed at neither. They are all the sort of thing that the students, educationists, and muddy-minded reporters of educational news contemptuously refer to as mere scholarship or mere research. Through these publications I am sure I have taught better than I have in the classroom. They represent the most intense and precise effort I am capable of in that pursuit of the truth about the past, which is my calling. Unlike the publications aimed directly at undergraduates, which only gathered together knowledge retrieved by other historians, they explored areas not hitherto investigated or cleared up confusions left by earlier explorers. To some degree these works of scholarship improved and increased the available knowledge of the past. College teachers read such works and other scholars incorporate their findings in their own studies. Thus, scholarly efforts of this kind teach a host of students who will never have heard the names of the men who wrote them. It is mainly works of this kind that academics are required to publish, or perish; and it is in the publication of such works that those who publish well do their best

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and most important teaching. In his "mere research and scholarship" a man provides the most reliable measure of his worth as a teacher.

Writers of books, then, teach students through the books they write and students read, and through the books they write and classroom teachers read. Once we add to our problem of evaluation of teaching the ingredient of book learning, once we accommodate our minds to the novel idea that, in most of higher education, books do most of the teaching and the best teaching, the whole problem changes in character. Teaching by publication emerges as qualitatively superior to almost all face-to-face teaching of undergraduates; in substance the former can be strikingly original, in substance the latter is bound to be in the main derivative.

There is also another sense in which the scholar who teaches by publishing is likely to do a better job qualitatively than the one who teaches face-to-face in the classroom—better especially than the academics who achieve the widest reputation as great classroom teachers through their proficiency in lecturing. The great publishing teacher does a more important job than the great lecturing teacher because he leads students along the path where their future chances of further learning lie, while the latter is likely to divert them from that path. From the time that the student enters primary school to the time he leaves college, he acquires the kind of knowledge that schools purvey decreasingly from the spoken word and increasingly from the printed word. After he leaves the academic community, the college graduate will usually acquire most of his further increments of knowledge from the printed word. His whole school education is a long process of weaning to prepare him to continue to feed himself at the table of knowledge rather than to rely on some mother figure in trousers to nurse and nourish him with a flow of spoken words. Unless this process has been brought to completion by the time he graduates from the academy, prospects for his future education are dim, for they will depend mainly on what is called self-education, which is actually education by independent reading of books. Some of the most beloved and dedicated lecturers have actually impeded the educational process by developing in their admirers a resistance to this traumatic but essentially indispensable process of weaning.

Some familiar fallacies

It may not have escaped notice that my discussion of teaching-by-publishing has a large built-in bias. What is involved is the assumption that the published works of scholarly research are near the level of Garrett Mattingly's, that they are usually intellectually nourishing to both teacher and student. In fact, such examples of teaching-by-publishing are hardly typical or characteristic or normal or ran-

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dom samples—would to God they were! Below them on the scale of teaching-by-publishing descend the rest of the species, down to the hideous, enormous, trivial mass near the bottom. To teach less or worse in the classroom, except by standing mute, than by publication of this sort is impossible, since it virtually teaches nobody anything. And yet in sheer volume the so-called scholarly work clustered near the lower end of the scale of teaching effectiveness massively outweighs the scholarly work at the upper end. In this matter, the criticism of those who do not publish is fervently and powerfully supported by those who teach most and best by publishing. It is the most conscientious among the latter group who suffer most from the masses of printed nonthink that the enforcement of the publish-or-perish principle pours into channels of learned communication. It is such men who futilely and carefully sift through the darksome sludge in time-consuming (usually time-wasting) quest for the precious nugget of learning that is so rarely there.

If the principle of publish-or-perish drives men who might profitably spend their time in preparing to teach their classes into the unrestrained effluxion of pseudoscholarly glop, would it not be better to relax that pressure so that they would devote their efforts to classroom teaching? As posed, the question encases a fallacy familiar in economics: that of the perfect transferability of resources. It assumes that all resources invested in one particular enterprise can and will fully and freely be transferred to an alternate and better enterprise—for example that if the chromium on cars were banned, all the capital invested in it could be transferred to the production of Shakespearean plays or bourbon whiskey. This is not so. Those who devote themselves to the production of scholarly nonthink lest they perish would not necessarily divert all or even any of the energy so deployed to improving their classroom teaching. They could find other ways of wastefully disposing of their time—and they do, as any citizen of Academe knows.

Even less plausible is the belief that academics who publish necessarily neglect their classroom teaching, and face-to-face with students teach worse than those who do not publish at all. Of this there is not a scintilla of credible evidence. Indeed the notion bears marks of *prima facie* improbability. It suggests that those who, by publishing, give some overt evidence of continuing engagement with the discipline to which they are presumed to have dedicated their lives are less concerned with how they teach it in the classroom than those who have provided no such evidence.

The university's responsibility

Suppose that somehow it were possible to demonstrate that a particular academic in a great university, one who gave no credible

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indication that he ever would publish, was a classroom teacher superior to a colleague who was teaching by publishing. Should the responsible colleagues of those two men choose the latter over the former? Ought they, indeed, be faced with such a choice at all? Ought they not to feel free to keep both men as valuable members of the academic community of which they are a part, each with his important contribution to make? In inverse order the answers to these questions are 3) they ought not to feel free to keep both men; 2) they ought to be faced with the choice; 1) they ought to choose the man who publishes over the man who teaches well in the classroom. To give these answers is not to banish the nonpublishing teacher from plying his trade; at the probable rate of expansion of what passes for higher education, there will be a place for him somewhere; *but that place is not in a great university.* To think that it is, is gravely to misunderstand the prime function and prime obligation of a great university in the United States in the latter half of the twentieth century. It is indeed to think of those institutions in a framework appropriate perhaps to American higher education in the 1880's, but increasingly anachronistic now for almost a century.

Through most of the nineteenth century, the United States was almost wholly parasitic on Europe for the advancement of learning. Insofar as American higher education depended on knowledge and understanding generated in that century, it was massively the importer of such knowledge and understanding, while it produced very little of it for export or even for domestic consumption. Slowly at first, more conspicuously after World War I, and at a helter-skelter pace since World War II, the terms of trade have shifted. Over the whole frontier of knowledge, the current contributions of the United States to its advance varies from the impressive to the overwhelming. The whole world depends heavily on knowledge that is generated in the United States. And here the vital centers of the advancement of learning are the great universities. More and better than any other institutions, they provide the indispensable resources and conditions for that advancement—the laboratories, the libraries, the leisure to write, so that the scientist and the scholar can teach by publishing what they have discovered.

In a land of over 200,000,000 inhabitants, there are places on the faculties of the great universities for less than .01 per cent of the population. A considerable number of those places are necessarily occupied by young people in the process of acquiring the skills which sooner or later will enable them to teach by publishing. A much smaller number are occupied by rather old men no longer likely, for the rest of their professional lives, to do much more teaching of that kind. The academic places occupied in a great university by men who publish nothing might otherwise be occupied by men

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who do teach by publishing, men who with full access to the resources of a great university would teach more and better by publishing. With few exceptions, a great university could replace every faculty member who has taught nothing by publishing, and promises to teach nothing that way, with a new appointment who has taught by publishing already or who shows some promise of doing so in the future. Actually, great universities sometimes do rather more than this. After a scrutiny of the evidence, they replace those who *have* taught by publishing with men who, they believe, have so taught better and more, or who show promise of doing so. For them to do other and less than this would be a gross abdication of responsibility at once fiscally imprudent, economically wasteful, and morally delinquent. It would be particularly reprehensible for them to do what many of the young people involved in the student revolt demand. A great university cannot rightly offer a man a position that provides him with a life-long claim on both its financial assets and its scholarly resources without consideration of the alternative possible investment of those assets. It certainly cannot do so just because undergraduates proclaimed him to be a popular, a great, or a charismatic classroom teacher.

Classroom teachings

Here it may be well to bury, with hopes that he may rest in peace, an old and rather seedy bogey man, the fear that the emphasis on scholarly production is such that soon all the best scholars will entirely cease to teach in the classrooms, preferring to spend all their time on research which receives more generous rewards. This supposes that given the option, many teachers-by-publishing would choose to do no classroom teaching. I know of no reason to believe that this is so. There are indeed a few such teachers. If the value of their teaching by writing is high enough, they should probably not be inflicted on students in a classroom or have students inflicted on them; some alternative provision that would not diminish their value should probably be made for them, not because they have "earned" it, but because there is no gain in punishing them or the students by a forced and fruitless contact. There may also be a very small number of academics so obsessed with one-up-manship that temporarily at least they would find some assuagement to the anguish of their crumpled egos in the "privilege" of not teaching students face-to-face. Few scholars, however, would find such a privilege a privilege at all. The very ancient combination of scholarship and face-to-face teaching has about it an element of economic necessity, but this is not the whole of it. For most scholars their teaching-by-writing and their classroom teaching stand in symbiotic relation: each profits and grows in excellence from the practice of

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the other. From their classroom teaching the vast majority derive varied satisfactions: the excitement of present human response, an opportunity to try out their ideas, a chance to ham it a bit, an immediate direct sense of achievement and accomplishment, a change of pace, a relaxation of the total responsibility for their every word and statement that the printed page imposes, contact with the young and eager, and so on. To me the notion that a large number of the better teachers-by-writing are engaged in mass flight from classroom teaching seems improbable. If I were in quest of men who would relish the nonprivilege of not teaching, I should seek not among the luminaries but among the dimmer bulbs of Academia.

The built-in check

There remains one small point to settle. The publish-or-perish standard admittedly generates an inordinate amount of trivial printed busywork. Can nothing be done, should nothing be done to reduce this muddy flow of words?

The answer, I think, is that not too much should be done. It is very easy for lucky, gifted men to condescend to the best efforts of others less gifted than they. But much that they have achieved, many of the able works they have published, would have been impossible or of less worth without the prior published efforts of men no less serious, no less dedicated, but simply less richly endowed than they. Published work that is less than first rate is not necessarily worthless.

Still, a considerable amount of such work is as near worthless as makes no difference. What is worse, young scholars, sensing the pressure to publish, choose busywork with a quick sure yield of publication rather than tackle something more important, more daring, but more risky. At least so it is said; and if it is true, it is not well. But the testimony of scholars who say they have to do less well than they can, in order to speed their way up the greasy pole, is a little suspect; it indicates an unbecoming obsession with poleclimbing; while allegations on such matters by those who have published nothing are even more than a little suspect.

In fact, current academic practice does incorporate some sanctions against the worst consequences of publish-or-perish. There are depths to which even the worst scholarly journals will not sink, so that the most disastrous scholarly efforts are in fact never published. Moreover, there is a hierarchy in scholarly publications, from the rockbottom journals to the best in every field, from the vanity publishing houses to the "good addresses," and within the several disciplines the pecking order of standards is known. Finally, opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, the gerontocrats who uphold the publish-or-perish standard can and do read. At the

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point where they are about to pass on the grant of tenure to a colleague, and thus possibly saddle themselves with him for life, they read with considerable care. If, as is sometimes the case, the professoriate in a large department feels unable accurately to evaluate the published work of a junior colleague at a crux of his career, they seek the council of extramural experts; and in some universities resort to such counsel is a matter of course, a regular required step in the procedure of appointment or promotion to the higher academic ranks. A widespread illusion among the ill-informed to the contrary notwithstanding, what is published is not merely weighed and the number of pages counted. It is read and to the best of their ability judged by the professoriate. To require such judges to read a very large amount of fatuous prose devoted to trivialities on matters that are of no intrinsic interest to them is not a sure way to win their approbation and support. The belief that mere quantity of publication is the sole criterion for the distribution of rewards in academia would not long survive attendance of the meetings at which such distributions are decided. At such gatherings I have never heard it said, "Promote A. He has published 43,263 words more than B." What I have heard is:

1. "He could have got that whole damn book into two articles."
2. "What is left after you take the padding out?"
3. "He published that same piece twice as articles and in two different books. Plenty of mileage."
4. "I'd feel easier about recommending him if he hadn't published that last book."
5. "A young man in too big a hurry."

It is not always that way, nor are the judgments so expressed always the last word in wisdom or even justice. Still such remarks suggest that an immediate indulgence in publication is not necessarily the most prudent ploy for ambitious young academics. If they but knew it, there already exists a rule that might restrain their zeal for bursting into print for print's sake, a counterpoise to Publish or Perish. It is Publish *and* Perish.

The special issue on *The Universities* (Fall, 1968, no. 13), which has been out of print, is now available in a revised and expanded edition under the title *Confrontation: The Student Rebellion and the Universities*. It includes articles by Daniel Bell, John H. Bunzel, Nathan Glazer, Irving Kristol, Seymour Martin Lipset, Samuel Lubell, Talcott Parsons, Roger Starr, and Nathan Tarcov. Copies may be obtained for $5.95 from Basic Books, 404 Park Avenue South, New York, N. Y. 10016.

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Youth unemployment —a tale of two ghettos

EDWIN HARWOOD

SINCE the early 1960's, the nation's unemployment rate has dropped precipitously in most cities; yet youth unemployment remains high, especially among Negro teenagers. Why this should be so has been a puzzle to scholars and public officials. In Houston, where I studied the Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) over a one year period (between July, 1967 and August, 1968), the general unemployment rate had dropped to 2 per cent in the spring of 1968. A glance at the help-wanted ads of the metropolitan dailies revealed shortages of unskilled as well as of semiskilled workers. Yet youth unemployment seemed unaffected. The only possible explanation appeared to be that city youngsters could not adjust to the labor market because of (a) inadequate education, (b) lack of knowledge about jobs, of (c) the difficulty of getting to distant suburban businesses. One possibility we failed to contemplate: that

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many lower class youths, both white and black, are unemployed or subemployed for the same reasons that many middle-class college dropouts are: they can afford to be, and they prefer to be.

A white ghetto

Earlier on, when I was doing research on Appalachian migrants in a northside Chicago slum in 1965, it turned out—thanks to the heavy demand for semiskilled workers—that most of these migrant families were making a good economic adjustment. Most of them were earning $90 to $130 a week in Chicago; they had earned $35 to $40 a week back home, when they could find work. Some were intensely hostile to the news media because they were continually depicted as poor and unemployed. They were not affluent by any means; but neither were they poor or unemployed. (Some men felt they had to show me their pay stubs to prove they earned as much as they claimed—just in case I happened to be a reporter and not a student researcher!) The documentaries I saw on TV described these same Appalachians in the customary jargon of the urban crisis: "festering despair," "uprooted," "jobless." To be sure, there were depressed slum residents in this ghetto, but these were the elderly poor, the disabled, the alcoholic derelicts, and many were native Chicagoans. Since these people had lots of leisure, their presence in the slum was more visible during the day, when TV documentaries are filmed. But I suspect that, in any case, the documentaries were intended to educate the public to the fact that white Anglo-Saxon protestants can be just as lower class as southern Negroes, and that the facts about this particular ghetto were a secondary consideration.

Inadequate formal education was no handicap to the Appalachians, though most had less than ten years of formal schooling in the rural border states. Nobody at the plants had cared whether they had a high school diploma, either because most semiskilled industrial jobs do not require much education or because, in a tight labor market, employers have no choice. However, the really interesting fact is that *adolescent Appalachians worked just enough to get by.* The boys wrinkled their noses at the mention of Neighborhood Youth Corps jobs, or at day labor jobs paying $1.25 to $1.50 an hour. They thought these latter fit only for "wineheads." As the NYC representative working in the neighborhood put it:

> The kids in the Youth Corps have to have something wrong with them. The normal kid isn't going to work for $1.25 an hour, 30 hours a week. So the ones who can't get the better paying jobs, kids with police records or emotional problems, are the ones we get.

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Since the southern white teenagers knew they could get jobs anytime they chose, it is reasonable to think that Chicago's labor shortage actually increased their indiscipline *because they felt just as secure when not working as when they did work.* Some took a distinctly cavalier attitude towards jobs. Most worked a few weeks at a stretch to earn enough to support their street corner activities, pay for room and board, and buy occasional luxury items. The reason they, and not the older men, were subemployed is simple: the boys did not have to support families.

Unemployment among married men in this ghetto was low. Among unmarried youth, it was high. No complicated explanation is necessary. For these unmarried southern boys, it was fun to socialize in the coffee bars, shoot pool, and gather in neighborhood service centers, whose activist staff could parade them before curious visitors as proof of "how the society's economy had failed the southern white." Most of these boys knew about the available industrial jobs, and how to get them. A boy could work as a service station attendant in the neighborhood for $1.65 an hour, but he also knew that if he wanted to make big money he had to get to the suburbs. It did take more effort: arrangements with car pools had to be made and one had to get up earlier in the morning. But the married men were doing it, and the boys could have easily followed suit, had they wished to.[1]

There is another consideration. So long as lower class youth find "action," of one form or another, on the streets, they may continue to opt for leisure despite government efforts to move them into jobs. It is possible that some government and privately-sponsored projects by offering a new "action," actually increase the likelihood that youths will choose the pavement over the plant. I witnessed this phenomenon in the northside Appalachian ghetto. No more than a handful of southerners were attracted to a community union run by student radicals. It was mostly the disabled, the elderly, and the alcoholic who attended meetings. However, after student and ex-student organizers got to know youths who hung out in one of the centers, they taught them the new "action" of group picketing against local landlords and district police stations. Though one

[1] Francis Caro, *The Neighborhood Youth Corps and the Community* (mimeographed), U.S. Department of Labor, September 1966, pp. 37-38. Caro came to the same conclusion on the basis of a study he conducted on Milwaukee's NYC. "Since there is currently a persistent demand in the city for unskilled workers, youth unemployment requires some explanation. An initial question might be raised as to the extent to which nonworking youth actually seek employment. . . . The small number of male youth served by the out-of-school NYC program suggests that the project is not substantially making an impact on this problem group . . . disinterest in working for as little as $1.25 an hour, dislike for menial labor, and reluctance to accept the discipline required for steady employment probably all contribute to keep nonworking male youth out of the NYC."

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might think collegiate radicalism culturally alien to youths who liked to joke about "niggers" and "faggots," it was the novelty of the action that counted and not the content of the ideology. In addition, young intellectuals were an added novelty to them because they knew big words and had abstract thoughts about life and society. Boys would ask to be taught big words which they would then practice on one another in grotesque contexts. After the students got to them, one youth who had known me for a long time collared me in the center. He explained that my coat and tie were "bourgeois." Youths were open to mobilization for the same reason some alcoholics and elderly poor were: they had time on their hands.

The experience of the NYC

The enrollment in the urban NYC provides symptomatic data on the job prospects of ghetto youths, and especially of Negro youths who often predominate in city NYCs. Enrollment statistics tell us clearly which youths want or need government-subsidized employment. It is reasonable to assume that those who do are the ones who have fewer or less favorable options in the private sector.

From the start, Houston's NYC program for school dropouts was overwhelmed by female applicants, who came to make up between 75 and 80 per cent of the total enrollment. Negro females alone made up close to 60 per cent of the enrollment and a majority had one or more small children to support. Statistics on turnover show that boys who did enroll stayed less time, on average, than females. Some researchers have argued that this is because NYC jobs are usually better suited to girls, which is true, but this was not the case in Houston, where many good training jobs were obtained specifically for boys. These training jobs often went begging because of the low and unstable male enrollment, Moreover, when the Manpower Development Training Act (MDTA) was introduced, the special courses for boys in welding and auto mechanics had to be dropped because the counselors could not guarantee that enough boys scheduled for the courses would still be enrolled when the courses got underway.

It is also significant that, of the small number of males, over half were 16 or 17 years of age, although any qualified youth between 16 and 22 was eligible. (The distribution of females, by comparison, was more even; only 28 per cent were as young as 16 and 17.) The sharp decline in male enrollment at age 18 supports the findings of our Appalachian ghetto in Chicago. Boys break the age barrier at 18 and can then get the better paying blue collar jobs, if they want jobs at all. The female, by contrast, is not affected as much by this age barrier, because many of these blue collar industrial jobs are not open to her regardless of her age.

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If we look at the projects for youths still in school, we have a good, controlled comparison. Unlike the out-of-school program, the in-school projects had equal numbers of males and females, and a heavy backlog demand for admissions among both sexes. Yet the training jobs offered were not as good as those provided by the out-of-school sponsors. Most appeared to be makework jobs in school libraries and recreational facilities; jobs which school youths took for 10 hours a week after school or on weekends. In contrast, the NYC projects for dropouts offered many semiskilled training jobs in places like universities and medical research centers—for example, PBX operator, offset printer, film processor, X-ray technician, nurses' aide, animal surgery aide, orderly, clerk-typist, to mention just a few. Why then was it so hard to enroll young men?

Clearly, boys still in school find unskilled jobs paying $1.25 an hour attractive, because those are the only jobs they can get, so long as they remain in school. Male dropouts, on the other hand, have a wider range of job choices in the private sector. One NYC job counselor received numerous calls from firms for youths 18 and older; no high school diploma was required. The jobs, some starting at $2 and more per hour, went unfilled because he didn't have the male trainees to graduate into these jobs.

NYC counselors expected equal enrollments of males and females, on the reasonable assumption that ghetto poverty did not discriminate between the sexes. They subsequently vigorously defended, against all evidence and experience, the thesis that males had the same demand for the program: "We know the boys are out there." They explained the discrepancy by arguing that the Negro woman had always been able to get some kind of job in the city, but the Negro man had always been discriminated against and relegated to menial work paying too little to maintain a stable working-class family life. The counselors reasoned that even though better opportunities had opened up for males, the traditional pattern of male dependency on the female had become too ingrained. Some came right out and said this: "We know the boys are around because we see them driving up on payday to pick up the girls."

Wanting to correct this situation, the counselors took extra trouble to enroll youths. After all, the federal contract did call for an equal division of training slots between the sexes. Though girls were often kept waiting because the female quota was filled, any qualified young man was immediately accepted. A special field recruiter, with good contacts in the neighborhoods, was hired to bring in youth. Of several hundred contacted only a handful showed up to enroll. He knew why. Most males wanting work could earn more than $1.25 an hour.

The application forms filled out by entering trainees showed that some adolescent females had worked for as little as $.60 and $.70 an

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hour in ghetto cafes and laundries, or as babysitters. Carhop, busgirl, waitress, hospital worker—all these jobs netted only from $35 to $40 a week for many girls. The applications filled out by males showed they were already earning, or had previously earned as much or more than the NYC wage. Thus it is not surprising that youths experienced less satisfaction with the program and were frequently heard to complain about the NYC pay.

In truth, the Houston NYC was not fighting youth joblessness but something else. As concerns the females, it was fighting itself: the pay scales and working conditions it offered were usually superior to those available outside. Girls working as trainees in hospital dietary and laundry departments frequently were offered full-time jobs by their supervisors, but rejected them when they learned that they would have to take a slight cut in pay and work a 40 hour week. Some females who had taken a special home nursing course were found jobs in private nursing homes. Counselors should not have been surprised when these young women sought to be readmitted to the program; they were being offered $1 to $1.15 an hour at the nursing homes. Adolescent females who were graduated into blue collar jobs at several upholstering and furniture companies and at one rag manufacturing concern started at $1.60 to $2 an hour; but most returned to the NYC seeking to be readmitted. They said the work was too hard, the buildings were stuffy, and they had to stand on their feet all day. Factory discipline was uncongenial to them. Working in a day care center, by contrast, had given them opportunities to socialize with friends, play pop records on the center phonograph, listen to transistor radios and take short shopping excursions to nearby stores during lunch. Though the work was menial (involving cleaning up after the children), the job was not as arduous as factory work. Since these graduated trainees were willing to take a cut in pay to reenroll in the NYC, they must have viewed the community service jobs offered by the NYC as having fringe benefits not available in industrial jobs. The leniency of the counselors toward absenteeism due to child-rearing responsibilities —children had to be taken to clinics or baby sitters turned out not to be available on a certain day—was a fringe benefit of the program. So was the 32 hour week. As concerns the young men, what the NYC was fighting was, quite simply, the fact that those who wanted work in the first place could get better paying jobs elsewhere.

Perhaps Houston was unique. In depressed rural areas and cities facing industrial decline, young males may well have been attracted by simple work experience at $1.25 an hour. Nationwide, male enrollment in Fall, 1966 was approximately equal to female, which suggests the Houston experience may not be broadly representative of the overall NYC effort.

The fact that Houston's tight labor market provided jobs for

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ghetto youths and adults alike radically altered the original mission of the NYC. The directors and counselors realized that if their program was to succeed, i.e., enroll the requisite number of youths, they had to provide something that was *better* than the jobs the youths had had before or could now get on their own. Thus not only did the program compete with private employers of the unskilled, it also began giving preference to "workstations" that would provide training in jobs with higher status than unskilled work. Counselors also soon came to rank employers in terms of their prestige and the quality of the training offered.[2]

One gets the impression that federal policy-makers viewed the NYC as a kind of local conservation corps, akin in respects to the Civilian Conservation Corps set up under the New Deal in the 1930s. School dropouts could be put to work in parks and other recreational facilities, or in school libraries, and thereby make a contribution to local educational and beautification efforts at no cost to local taxpayers. One project had started out by allocating approximately 100 of a total of 200 training slots to the County Flood Control Department, on the assumption that half the enrollment would be male and that NYC should adhere to the policy of placing youths in noncompetitive jobs on conservation and beautification projects. For a short while, several dozen boys hacked away at the brush and weeds that had sprouted up along the drainage canals. This was hot, heavy work and there was high turnover in the project. A perceptive counselor explained that any boy who wanted outdoor physical labor could do much better than $1.25 an hour. Very soon, the staff shifted *all* their training jobs to indoor workstations that were better suited to the large numbers of females seeking to enroll.

The shift from simple work experience to vocational training for higher-status jobs resulted from the NYC's need to compete with the employers who were opening up unskilled jobs to youths. The tight labor market provided another unanticipated boon to the NYC. Many nonprofit agencies were less resistant to accepting low income youths as temporary workers because they had their own manpower shortages. Hospitals, especially, were short of workers. An agency like the Red Cross or YWCA could not compete with private industry for the best clerical workers, because they couldn't afford to pay as much, and the tight labor market added to their difficulty. Many of the municipal agencies also paid low wages relative to

[2] However, the elimination of menial workstations was limited by the fact that many girls were too deficient in education or intelligence to cope with semi-skilled office work. A girl who functioned at the fifth grade educational level could not be made over into a clerical worker in six months time, or even a year. Since they enrolled, and had to get something, jobs providing only "work experience" were kept open for them. But even in this case, counselors preferred agencies that would hire at least some of these "low level" girls after their time in the NYC expired.

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private industry, and this favored the female NYC worker in gaining access to the job market. Since the prestige corporations could insist on a typing speed of 60 or 70 words per minute for clerical workers, which very few NYC girls, even those upgraded by the MDTA clerical courses could match, the municipal and nonprofit agencies were the second best alternative for girls graduating into permanent office jobs. These agencies could not insist on the high standards set by private businesses.

Thus, the counselors' effort to open up large numbers of white collar training jobs in nonprofit and government agencies was rational. The NYC acted as a benign "trojan horse." If these agencies had been *obligated* to hire trainees after their six month to one year stint, probably very few would have wanted to cooperate with the project because they would not have wanted to hire lower class females, many of them Negro. However, as trainees, many girls had a chance to prove their ability to handle the clerical work given them. Some got permanent jobs at their agencies, or, when an agency did not have sufficient funds to hire, supervisors would contact friends in other agencies until a job was found. The NYC gave the intelligent and motivated Negro female the chance to move from unskilled service work to a semiskilled office job at the occupational periphery of middle-class society. The rise in status was accompanied by a rise in earnings, from the $200 she earned previously to perhaps $275 to $300 a month.

NYC counselors were right in assuming that they could do something for the motivated Negro female who had at least ten years of schooling, good grooming, and typing experience. Some brighter girls who enrolled would have succeeded on their own, no doubt, had they graduated from better high schools or had they prevented the pregnancy that made it necessary to leave school. Still, NYC was there, and it helped.

But because the morale of counselors depended on getting youths into better jobs, and not just into any job, the mission of the NYC was distorted from what both policymakers and the public had expected. Not work experience but upward mobility—mainly for Negro females—became the guiding ideal for the out-of-school programs.

Negro unemployment reconsidered

Just four years ago, Herbert Gans wrote:

> All the available evidence indicates that since the Civil War, Negro male unemployment has almost always been higher than female. The gap has been widened further in recent years, especially in the cities as job opportunities have increased for women, while decreasing for men, due to an ever-shrinking supply of unskilled and semiskilled work and the continuing racial discrimination in many trades. Since Negroes

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are moving to the cities in large numbers, the trends which Moynihan reports are likely to continue in the years to come.[3]

Elliot Liebow's study of Negro streetcorner men in the early 1960's supports the widely-held assumption that Negro males fare poorly in the urban job market. Most men, he concluded, could not find jobs paying enough to support families.[4] However, Washington, D.C., the scene of his study, is unique among large American cities in having very little light or heavy industry, and this alone might account for the restricted job opportunities he found.

Though it is still popular to think that Negro women fare better than men, the most recent evidence indicates that the opposite is true. The expansion of blue collar jobs, already in progress when Gans and Liebow wrote, has speeded up the Negro male's entry into industry to the point where his economic position is *superior* to that of his female counterpart. These gains in the relative position of Negro males are noted in the April 1968 *Manpower Report of the President* which reports that Negro females had a higher unemployment rate than males.

It is the Negro female who is handicapped, and who therefore finds the NYC an attractive alternative to unskilled service work. She is less likely to possess auto transportation than her male counterpart, and this cuts down on her range of job choices. Her child-rearing responsibilities make her less reliable. If her absenteeism is acceptable to those who employ unskilled service workers, this may simply be because they take whomever they can get in a tight labor market. They pay the lowest wages.

The point needs stressing: it is not simply that young Negro males do better than females, all other things being equal; they do better even when they have less education. "No experience necessary" the Houston newspaper ads for shoptrainees read—jobs that started at $2.35 an hour. Some of the better-educated girls enrolled in the NYC to get office work and raise their status. But the most that those fortunate enough to land clerical jobs could earn was $275 to $350 a month. Many males, by comparison, could earn this much with less education; most can earn more after passing the age barrier to semiskilled jobs. Since semiskilled industrial jobs generally pay higher wages than semiskilled office jobs, and much more than menial service jobs, one should expect the job-oriented Negro male to be doing better than his female counterpart. And this explains why females were clamoring to get into the NYC, whereas youths kept aloof.

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[3] Herbert J. Gans, "The Negro Family: Reflections on the Moynihan Report," *People and Plans* (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1968) p. 310.
[4] Elliot Liebow, *Tally's Corner* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 50-51.

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On the basis of my experience and research, I would suggest to public officials and others who are concerned about youth joblessness that they try out a new set of assumptions:

1. Many boys are underemployed and subemployed because they value leisure as much as money, which leads them to seek only as much work as is needed to get by with enough of each.

2. Because many youths support only themselves, their preference for underemployment may be based on a reasoned calculation of self-interest. Why should we expect ghetto youths to settle down at age 17 or 18 to the discipline of a year-round-full-time job that, in effect, denies them the leisure for "identity-building" we extend to college youths?

3. For male youths who want the better-paying industrial jobs, it is age not education that is the main barrier. It is child labor laws and insurance regulations, not ghetto school systems, that should be looked into.

4. Poverty in the ghetto may not discriminate between the sexes and the ages—all live in the same substandard housing and come from low income families—but job opportunities and earning power do. Ghetto youth cannot be considered a homogeneous group, all of whom are equally handicapped in getting jobs because all share low levels of education. Antipoverty efforts like the NYC have begun to adjust to this fact. In 1969, the decision was made to restrict NYC to youths 18 years or under because they have the most difficulty getting adult jobs, and to emphasize more useful vocational training with the MDTA program.

5. Just as poverty youths cannot be lumped together, neither should all cities with ghettos. Houston is not Washington, D.C. The above conclusions may only apply to metropolitan areas with substantial heavy and light industry, and those enjoying a healthy rate of economic growth in the past decade. On the other hand, they may have wider application. One would like to see some serious research that would settle this point.

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Social forecasting —the state of the art

OTIS DUDLEY DUNCAN

A "state of the art" report on social forecasting should, in all honesty, be quite brief. Such an art, in the sense of a coherent body of precepts and practices, has not yet been developed. It would be misleading to claim that social forecasting is carried on in a continuous and concerted fashion as one could claim in regard to, say, economic or business forecasting. The contrast is readily verified by comparing the articles on (sociological) "Prediction" and "Prediction and Forecasting, Economic" in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. So prevalent is the latter activity, in fact, that the practice and performance of economic forecasters are now considered worthy of formal statistical analysis.

It is a banal observation that many kinds of social forecasting are routinely carried on in an implicit way. The very possibility of social organization rests on our ability to anticipate correctly, in a large proportion of instances, the behavior of others. Society, from this point of view, is an intricate reticulation of expectations and commitments concerning future actions and reactions. Thus, I have fairly little hesitation in forecasting that most of us will be reporting

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our incomes to the government in April 1970, just as we did in April 1969. Parents, at least some of them, save money now because they expect their children to be in college ten years hence. The round of social activity and the progress of the human life cycle are no doubt less strictly patterned and regular than some astronomical phenomena. But a social calendar is useful and is used for somewhat the same reasons as is an almanac.

The knowledge of the future that is a minimum requirement for organized social life has to do with commitments already undertaken or implied, or with intentions already expressed or assumed. There is legitimate concern with the fallibility of such expectations, that is, with the extent to which anticipations may be falsified by the operation of contingent factors. For some purposes, as for the calculation of insurance rates, the degree of fallibility may be expressed in terms of probabilities. Recurrent contingencies, despite their contribution to life's uncertainty in individual cases, may themselves have a kind of statistical pattern. In this event, the assumption of persistence of pattern may serve as an adequate basis for anticipating in the aggregate that which needs to be anticipated only on an aggregate basis.

Something quite different, of course, is conveyed by the more tantalizing connotation of social forecasting, which has to do with the anticipation of social *change*. Even in the case of social change, however, some kinds of gradual and progressive alterations of social arrangements are, under certain conditions, so monotonously repeated that a forecast of their continuation becomes routine. The expectation of continuous change then comes to be "built into" the social fabric; whole industries are predicated upon the assumption of more or less regular and expectable "growth." Such expectations may, of course, prove to be erroneous at one time or another. Indeed, perhaps the most interesting, severe, and significant challenge to put to any presumptuous discipline of social forecasting would be the demand that it anticipate the changes in the accustomed patterns of change.

Population projections: a parable

"... fear skepticism far less than credulity."

—Bertrand de Jouvenel

There is one exception to the opening statement that an art of social forecasting has not yet been formulated. That exception is, indeed, instructive, for the production of demographic forecasts has gone on long enough for us to have materials with which to begin an inductive study of the behavior of forecasters. I do not

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tarry over the interesting "prehistory" of this subject, which is documented in various studies. Table 1 offers a compressed summary of the "reputable" or "scientific" population forecasts that have dominated our changing conceptions of the demographic future during most of this century.

The supposition that the curve of the future is implicit in the record of the past was, of course, most forthrightly acknowledged in the work of Pearl and associates with the logistic curve. Extrapolations to 1920 and beyond were based on a beautiful fit of the formula to decennial census counts for 1790 to 1910.

TABLE 1. *Projected Population, in Millions, of the United States, According to Selected Calculations: 1920-2000.**

PROJECTION		1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
1. Pearl (logistic) (asymptote = 197)		107	122	136	149	159	168	175	180	185
2. Whelpton		...	124	138	152	163	171	...	...	186
3. Thompson and Whelpton	High	...	...	133	147	160	174	187	...	...
	Low	...	...	132	137	138	135	128	...	...
4. Census (Whelpton)	High	...	...	...	148	162	177	...	...	...
	Medium	...	...	...	145	153	160	164	165	163
	Low	...	...	...	145	150	152	...	...	...
5. Census (Zitter and Siegel)	High	...	...	...	...	181	219	273	...	...
	Low	...	...	...	...	179	203	231	...	...
6. Census (Siegel)	High	...	...	...	...	...	209	250	300	361
	Low	...	...	...	...	...	205	228	256	282
(Observed)		106	123	132	151	171	...	...	...	...

*Sources: 1. Raymond Pearl, **The Biology of Population Growth** (New York: Knopf, 1925). 2. P. K. Whelpton, "Population in the United States, 1925-1975," **American Journal of Sociology,** 34 (September 1928), 253-270. 3. U. S. National Resources Committee, **Population Statistics 1. National Data** (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), estimates of future population prepared by Warren S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton. 4. U. S. Bureau of the Census, **Forecasts of the Population of the United States, 1945-1975,** by P. K. Whelpton, assisted by Hope Tisdale Eldridge and Jacob S. Siegel (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947). 5. U. S. Bureau of the Census, "Illustrative Projections of the Population of the United States, by Age and Sex, 1960 to 1980," by Meyer Zitter and Jacob S. Siegel, **Current Population Reports,** Series P-25, No. 187, November 1958. 6. U. S. Bureau of the Census, 'Projections of the Population of the United States, by Age, Sex, and Color to 1990, with Extensions of Population by Age and Sex to 2015," by Jacob S. Siegel, **Current Population Reports,** Series P-25, No. 381, December 1967.

Among the attractive features of the logistic, as compared with other formulas that had been proposed, was its "rational" stipulation of an upper limit (approached asymptotically) to population growth.

Whelpton's introduction, in 1928, of the "component" method of forecasting marked a radical departure in technique from Pearl's logistic, and set the pattern for all subsequent official forecasting in this country. In simplest terms, the method requires the separate construction of future series of births, deaths, and migration balances which are then combined by demographic accounting formulas

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to secure both a projection of total population and its composition or makeup in terms of age, sex, color, and possibly other characteristics. Although in the initial presentation only one series of future populations was provided, it became customary in subsequent applications to prepare and publish several alternative projections, embodying a variety of assumptions concerning the future course of fertility, mortality, and migration. The exhibition of these alternatives was no doubt intended to reinforce the emphasis on the "empirical" character of the projections, as contrasted to the putative "rational" basis of the logistic. In any event, despite variation in terminology—figures on future population have been variously termed predictions, forecasts, projections, illustrative projections, calculations, or estimates—the "reputable" forecasters always stressed that their results were no more than a consistent deduction of the consequences of their assumptions. Nevertheless, in the discussions of the derivation of their assumptions, there was always implicit, and usually explicit, a quest for "reasonable" or "likely" anticipations of the future course of the vital rates.

Despite the completely different technique and somewhat variant philosophy underlying the first component projections as compared with the use of the logistic, the two techniques as initially applied yielded virtually indistinguishable forecasts for as long as seven decades ahead. The logistic curve, however, did imply a specific maximum population, while in 1928 Whelpton did not venture to project an upper limit on growth.

The 1930's and after

In the early 1930's, demographers began to contemplate seriously the possibility that population size would reach a maximum and then undergo a decline within the foreseeable future. The shift in mood is apparent from the fact that the projection made ten years earlier had, by 1937, come to look like a "high" alternative. The accompanying "low" alternative showed population numbers reaching a maximum by 1955 and beginning a decline thereafter. Discussion accompanying the numerical results, moreover, tended to suggest the credibility of incipient decline. Projections incorporating this feature were again issued in 1947, despite considerable upward revision of both "high" and "low" alternatives.

To speculate *ad hominem,* it seems that the prospect of incipient decline had gained a firm hold on the imagination of the demographer. Moreover, despite the general tendency to regard the prospective cessation of growth as a "pessimistic" outlook, it is clear that the pre-eminent American student of future population during the 1930's and 1940's, P. K. Whelpton, was persuaded of the desirability of an imminent stabilization of population size. In his 1947

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report, Whelpton adduced arguments tending to show that the U. S. was not below its long run economic optimum population. He observed, moreover, that slackening of growth would be favorable to the interests of conservationists and that it might lead to improvement in the quality of the population.

Whereas by 1940 it was clear that the most reputable forecasts of the 1920's had erred on the high side, in 1950 it was plain that the demographic work of the depression and war period had issued in understatements of future population. The achievement of a new orientation was powerfully assisted by the stinging critique of the economist, J. S. Davis. He averred:

> For years demographers, biologists, economists, and other specialists have held the firm conviction that population "trends" are reliably predictable. Emphatically, *they are not.* . . .
>
> Two of the persistent errors in this field are: (1) the willingness of the specialists to attempt to comply with urgent requests for estimates or forecasts that cannot be reliably made—many such demands should be resisted; (2) the tendency of users of such estimates and forecasts to ignore the qualifications with which they are hedged. Three other errors have been important in the past three decades. One has been the tendency for those who make estimates based on assumptions to come to put faith in the results, ignoring their own awareness of the basic uncertainties. Another is the tendency to believe in a sort of trend magic; the very term "population trend" is deceptive and dangerous. A third has been a conservative bias in connection with future births, deaths, and net in-migration. . . .
>
> [T]here is now ample reason for rejecting, for the calculable future, the entrenched convictions that our population is approaching a peak from which a decline is more probable than even stability at that level. The grounds on which the former conviction was based have collapsed. No population peak of any size, at any date, is either in sight or safely predictable.

Although Davis's language was especially emphatic, his observations were not extreme by comparison with those of such critics as Dorn (1950), Hajnal (1955), and (Glass 1967)—all of them eminent demographers, by the way.

The critics of demographic projections were clearly successful on one score. The assumption of a movement to a zero growth rate in the foreseeable future was eliminated in projections prepared in the 1950's and 1960's. Nothing the critics said, however, appeared to diminish the "willingness of the specialists" to accede to demands for frequently updated forecasts. Indeed, with the advent of the electronic computer it has become possible to calculate more elaborate projections as well as to experiment with new devices for deriving assumptions, notably the "cohort-fertility" approach used in the most recent Census Bureau projections.

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The merit of this approach is not that it discloses the secret of what the future holds, but rather that it displays the mechanics of the projection in such a way as to make more evident exactly what is being assumed. The basis for calculating future births in these projections is the average number of children expected to be born to each cohort of women during its entire reproductive cycle, supplemented by an expected pattern of distribution of these births over the reproductive years. Thus the high pattern of fertility is taken to be one for which the mean number of births per woman completing the reproductive cycle is 3.35, while the low pattern calls for 2.45 children per woman. The latter figure, by the way, is not as low as the historic minimum of 2.3 reached by cohorts of women born between 1905 and 1915. Whereas the Whelpton projections had (implicitly) contemplated a further decline below that benchmark, the current projections make no allowance for such a decline. Apparently it is no longer interesting to contemplate even the hypothetical possibility that the American woman can breed at a mere replacement level. Accordingly, all alternative series in the official projections now show very substantial future growth with no cessation thereof in sight.

Prophets, partisans, and demographers

We are led, then, to certain observations on the behavior of demographic forecasters.

First, this species is in no way immune to the operation of social forces that distort the vision of other investigators. In particular, there is a strong element of the fad or social pressure operative here. It is magnified by the very fact of the high prestige and widespread acceptance of population projections. When the forecaster sees his results being adopted in many quarters and hears them coming back to him in the transmuted form of economic anticipations and the like, he can hardly resist the temptation to believe.

Second, sheer fascination with mechanics is the enemy of an imaginative approach. One cannot read Raymond Pearl without developing strong empathy for his purely esthetic response to the smooth symmetry of the logistic curve. For a demographer, the description of the procedures of a cohort-component projection has its own beauty—although in this case the outsider can less readily appreciate it.

Now, it should not be necessary to insist that there *is* real value in the work on population projections, entirely apart from their utility or disutility as the basis for forecasts. The logistic curve is, in fact, a most instructive model of growth, and equally so whether or not it applies in particular empirical instances. The component projection is, indeed, a useful way to convey insight into the mechanism

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of population change. One can see how, for example, future growth tends to be "built into" current age structure (itself the consequence of past growth) and thus capitalize on the resolution of the paradox that the crude birth rate may be rising while age-specific or cohort fertility is declining. Nevertheless, neither didactically illuminating models nor analytically incisive projection procedures are guarantees of forecasting accuracy. To the extent that the demographer has confused the two kinds of things, to that extent has he been mesmerized by his own devices.

Third, in person and collectively the demographer is not immune from the psychology of habit. Orientations useful for envisaging illuminating assumptions at one point persist into a period when they no longer have utility. While, in principle, the assumptions underlying a set of projections can be revised drastically at any time, there is a reluctance to give up that which has become familiar and comfortable through reiterations.

Davis's critique of the mentality of demographic forecasters could become pertinent again—*mutatis mutandis*—at any time. The upward curve of population cannot continue forever. When it breaks, will there be the same perplexity and equivocation on the part of the professionals that we witnessed in the late 1940's and early 1950's?

Apart from their reputation as prophets, demographers should be solicitous of their role as partisans of the open society. Just now, they are rendering a one-sided service. It is all to the good that they keep open the ugly possibility of "explosive" growth, with the nation moving rapidly toward the half billion mark shortly after the turn of the century. Should they not, at the same time, start now to state the demographic conditions under which a stationary state can be reached and chart for us some alternative time paths to that state, however unlikely (for the moment) such a prospect may seem? Before we shall bring a halt to population growth we must begin to believe that its cessation is a conceivable state of affairs. It can as easily be portrayed by demographic methods as can any situation of uninterrupted growth. If we keep always before us the alternatives of explosive growth and the transition to a stationary population, we will neither be bemused by the apparent inevitability of Pearl's logistic adjustment nor surprised by the unexpected change when it occurs, as it surely will.

Social trends and technological influences

One of the few systematic and explicit statements on social forecasting appears in William F. Ogburn's study, *The Social Effects of Aviation* (chapters 3 and 4). The work as a whole is an effort to portray future progress in the technology of aviation, the probable

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uses and applications of this technology, and the impact of these upon a variety of social institutions and organizations. Among other things, Ogburn offered a "forecast of forecasting."

> The following study is a somewhat pioneer effort. . . . The ability to look ahead with some success is particularly important in a changing society. The best way to learn to do anything is to go ahead and try it. . . . What is needed is many social scientists working at the problem of forecasting the future as well as scientists writing histories of past events. With many social scientists working on the future, we should gradually accumulate a set of useful procedures. . . . In the course of time, with others working on forecasting, a tradition of usages will be built up, and we shall know better how to do it.

Perhaps to encourage the attitude of "getting one's feet wet," Ogburn began his discussion of forecasting with the observations that much forecasting is in fact carried on in planning and the conduct of everyday life and that rough approximations are useful for many practical purposes. There follows an exposition of "prediction by measurement," in which it is assumed that the problem is to extend into the future a time series established for the past. Extrapolation is stated to be more reliable in regard to the *trend* or general tendency of the series than in regard to the *fluctuations* around the trend, and to be more reliable, moreover, for the first few periods in the immediate future than for more distant periods. It is noted that "carrying curves forward is not an objective method even when it is done by means of a mathematical equation." Alternative mathematical formulas may provide about equally good fits to past data but yield widely differing extrapolations for future dates. In making an extrapolation, moreover, the forecaster will take into account the expected operation of limiting factors and other influences that may well cause the trend to bend up or down. In any event, extrapolations must rest on the assumption of the absence of major disturbing factors: "The logic of prediction is that the universe will be much like the universe of the past. If some greatly upsetting factor occurs, such as a war or a revolutionary invention, the conditions are so changed that extrapolation is hardly worth trying."

In discussing the problem of forecasting in the absence of statistical time series, Ogburn suggests that one proceed by imagining what such series would show if they did exist. Thus, the forecaster would first mentally estimate the past trend and then consider the prospect of its continuation. Warnings are given about the several kinds of bias that may easily distort thinking in this situation: "Try as we may to prevent wishful thinking, there is nothing so effective as plenty of data to correct it. But in cases of scarcity of data, one way of trying to reduce the error is to reduce the emotional element

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in thinking." In particular, Ogburn notes the danger of being too conservative, insofar as social pressures operate to discourage forecasters from making "wild" statements.

It is interesting that Ogburn was so clearly aware of the conservative bias in forecasting, for several of his own forecasts seem to have erred on the conservative side. His projection of air passenger traffic was seen to be too low within about five years of its publication. His discussion of the future of jet propulsion seems, at least in retrospect, to have been overly cautious. In another field, that of technological influences on the future of the family, Ogburn thought in 1955 that it would take "many years" for a physiological contraceptive to become widely used, and was unwilling to forecast that such a technique would become important within a quarter of a century even though he expected it to become so at some indefinite time in the future.

Turning from the abstract consideration of forecasting procedure to the substance of social forecasts, we recall that Ogburn laid emphasis on two closely related concepts: social trends and the social effects of inventions. The foundation for his use of these concepts was laid in the classic volume, *Social Change: With Respect to Culture and Original Nature* (1922; new edition, 1950). This work develops thoroughly the thesis of cultural accumulation via invention, diffusion, and progressive augmentation of the culture base. It also gives the first exposition of the famous "cultural lag" concept, which provided a diagnosis of the social problems that arise when one part of culture—often, but not always, technology and scientific knowledge—changes in such a way as to require an adaptation by other parts of culture, but such adaptation is delayed or impeded by inertia and resistances.

Continuity in change?

The specific application of the trend concept arose first in Ogburn's research on social correlates of the business cycle. Here, removal of the trend component from economic time series was undertaken as a preliminary step in the measurement of economic fluctuations; and the latter were then correlated with such social indicators as unemployment, immigration, strikes, marriages, births, deaths, suicides, and liquor consumption. There was no formal attempt to develop such correlations into forecasting models.

Trends themselves were the focus of interest in the several annual symposia on *Recent Social Changes* edited by Ogburn (published in *American Journal of Sociology,* 1928-35 and 1942) and in the monumental *Recent Social Trends* (President's Research Committee, 1933), of which Ogburn was research director. In initiating this work, he clearly had in mind the potential utility of trend studies for

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anticipating future problems. A statement written in 1928 was perhaps more prophetic than the author realized:

> The social sciences ought to render aid in these times of change and uncertainty. Unfortunately, as sciences, they are young. Indeed, their achievements in the exact measurement of the relationships of social phenomena are meager, too much so for much reliable prediction. Nor do we know that the social sciences will ever attain the state of accurate prediction in the whole realm of sociology. But one generalization does stand out sharply in our social and historical studies. It is that there is a continuity in cultural change; one event grows out of another. An invention is a co-ordination of existing elements. Discoveries are based on previous knowledge. Miracles do not occur, and revolutions are few. The greater our knowledge, the rarer are unheralded changes. Indeed, sudden, dramatic, and complete changes are decidedly the exception. The principle of continuity in social change is very reassuring. Our various studies of statistical time series show a very important thing, namely, that the measured trend of events and phenomena is the best guide that we yet have for the prediction of the future. Knowledge is the antithesis of mystery and uncertainty. And the knowledge of what has occurred and of what is happening is the safest guide we have. With more complete statistics and with better measurement we shall attain fuller knowledge of what is happening to us and where we are going. Only with these shall we be in a position even to begin to speak of control.

Later statements reiterated the theme of continuity in change, and Ogburn actually went so far as to claim in 1957 as his "discovery" the principle "that social trends seldom change their direction quickly and sharply." Therefore, "the projection of a trend line into the future has some trustworthiness and tells us with some degree of probability what the future will be." A further implication is that planners and others concerned to influence future changes are generally well advised to note that "success is more likely to come to those who work for and with a social trend than to those who work against it. . . . As the materials with which the architect works are stone and steel, brick and glass, the materials with which the statesman works are social trends."

The tie-in of social trends with the effects of invention arises from the observation that progressive technological changes are the basis of many persistent social changes. A number of different inventions may have convergent effects. This observation may partially explain the persistence of social trends, for if they are the product of many influences, each of them of relatively small import by itself, then a trend will not be readily altered by changing only one or two of these influences. Thus, Ogburn expected the advent of the helicopter to influence urban decentralization; but many other technological factors were seen as contributing to suburbanization.

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In the effort either to catalog past effects of inventions or to anticipate future changes due to existing or anticipated technology, Ogburn recommended a sequence of inquiries. First, consider the uses of the invention and the immediate changes in individual habits or institutional practices that are required for these uses to be practical. These changes, more or less concurrent with the adoption of an invention, are termed primary influences. There follow from them the derivative influences, coming into play via more or less lengthy chains of causation and often subject to considerable delay. While derivative effects are more numerous than primary influences, and second order derivative effects are more numerous still, the magnitude of the successive effects tends to be attenuated. Thus, the invention of the tin can may have contributed to the reduction of the labor of housekeeping, thereby facilitating women's emancipation from the home, and ultimately have led by this route to a reduction in the birth rate. But this particular influence on the birth rate, small as it must have been by comparison with the aggregate of other influences, would be difficult to demonstrate conclusively and could form no large part of the explanation of the decline in fertility.

Quite aside from its theoretical merit, therefore, the concept of derivative effects of inventions cannot be a powerful tool in forecasting. Although the book on aviation records a large number of past and potential effects of the technology, Ogburn conceded that few of them are due entirely to the airplane. By the same token, when reasoning from effect to cause, as in the attempt to infer or anticipate changes in the family, it is admitted that effects of technological change are but one source of past or potential changes in family life. Hence, an account of "Technology and the Future of the Family" (Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1955, chapter 12) "is not an attempt to describe the family of the future" but merely an effort to foresee the effects of inventions on the family. It is maintained, however, that there is an advantage in focusing on the technological factor. Whereas moral, religious, and ideological factors not primarily due to technology and science are difficult to project into the future, enough is known about recent and prospective inventions to make it worthwhile to conjecture their forthcoming effects: "For the next twenty to fifty years, probably most of the inventional influences that will change the family will come from inventions already in existence."

In summary, it is quite apparent that Ogburn envisaged a close working relationship between technological forecasting and social forecasting. Indeed, the former was seen as providing part of the basis of the latter. Technological forecasts would be examined for their bearing upon social trends so as to provide aid in the extrapolation of these trends. Since technological change was largely

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treated as an exogenous factor with respect to social change, it follows that Ogburn's scheme does not offer a major contribution to the art of technological forecasting proper. He was, however, not inattentive to the impact of social factors on technology. On the one hand he saw "demand" as an influence both on invention itself and on the adoption of inventions. On the other, he discussed various categories of social "resistances" to adoption. I think it is fair to say, however, that he did not actually contemplate a composite social-technological model in which technology becomes an endogenous variable subject to feedback from social factors which themselves responded earlier to technological changes, even though he would have freely conceded the possibility of such interactions.

Three forecasts: I. The IQ paradox

I wish now to mention three historically important social forecasts which may serve to illustrate the variety of possibilities and difficulties in this field. Perhaps these examples will show that forecasts may have considerable intellectual and social value quite apart from their accuracy as prognostications.

The first is the forecast of a decline in the intelligence of the general population which has been rather widely discussed for several decades, both in the United States and in Great Britain. The forecast was derived from the juxtaposition of several observations: that measured intelligence of both children and adults varies inversely with socioeconomic status; that the lower social strata generally have larger families than the higher; and that within strata, as well as in the population as a whole, children's intelligence test scores are inversely related to number of siblings. If the dull are outbreeding the gifted, the intelligence of future generations is expected to shift downward by comparison with the present generation, whether the transmission of intelligence between generations is genetic, environmental, or a combination of both. Lorimer and Osborn (1934), for example, presented one illustrative calculation on which an average decline of 0.9 IQ points per generation would be expected. They cited another estimate by the psychologist Lentz (1927) of a change of 4.4 points in median IQ's in two successive generations. Whereas the former calculation was derived only from class differences in IQ scores, the latter takes account of variations among individual families according to size.

How seriously such a forecast might be taken was illustrated by the discussion of Robert C. Cook (1951), who restated it quite bluntly: "Competent scholars who have had the patience to separate the grains of verified fact from the mountainous chaff of mere opinion and faulty methodology are agreed that today's differential birth rate makes a decline in intelligence inevitable." Cook

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went on to argue at some length that a perceptible drop in average IQ would bring a complex modern industrial civilization to the brink of disaster: "Each new technological development in our society demands more intelligence, rather than less." Indeed, he went so far as to contemplate the very "destruction of modern technological culture requiring a high level of ability to operate its complex machinery."

It should be noted that the projection of a declining trend in intelligence was not based on the actual observation of such a trend over some period in the past. Instead, the projection was a derivation or inference. Actually, there was not the degree of unanimity of qualified opinion concerning this inference that Cook implied. Some competent psychologists and geneticists expressed strong disagreement while others supported it with equal vehemence. By the early 1950's, there was, moreover, an accumulation of considerable evidence showing an actual *increase* in measured intelligence in both the British and American populations. Tuddenham (1948) calculated, for example, that the median test score for World War II enlisted soldiers was distinctly superior to those of World War I, even after adjusting for the change in educational level. The monumental inquiry of the Scottish Mental Survey Committee (1949) found an increase of about two IQ points in the average score of the population of eleven-year olds as of 1947 by comparison with the same age group in 1932. In these and other studies reporting similar results, the investigators were careful to note that the observed increase could well be due to environmental improvements. In this case a rise in average test scores might occur concurrently with an actual deterioration of the genetic basis of intelligence, with the environmental effect masking the genetic effect.

The true explanation, though anticipated in some of the discussion in the early 1950's, was not actually established for another decade. I quote the summary of their study by Higgins, Reed, and Reed (1962):

> This is a study of 1,016 families in which IQ values for both parents and one or more of their children were available. It is the first *large* sample with IQ data for both parents and offspring. IQ values were also at hand for the unmarried or the nonreproducing siblings of the parents. The inclusion of these siblings allowed us to resolve the old paradox presented by the failure of the general intelligence level to decline in accord with the large negative correlation (−.30) between intelligence and the number of children in the family.
>
> The explanation of the paradox is that when the single or non-reproductive siblings of the parents are included the negative correlation disappears. The higher reproductive rate of those in the lower IQ groups who are parents is offset by the larger proportion of their siblings who never marry or who fail to reproduce when married. Thus, the

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IQ level of the whole population should remain relatively static from one generation to the next, or at least not drop rapidly.

Independent confirmation of these results was shortly reported by Bajema (1963).

There is, of course, more to be learned about the intricate mechanisms that give rise to these several kinds of findings. The utility of the original forecast was perhaps in lending a sense of urgency to the scientific quest and in stimulating investigators to exercise their imagination in seeking a resolution of the paradox.

The vision of a "nation of congenital morons" that Cook had conjured up on the basis of the forecasted dysgenic trend may perhaps be regarded as an example of a "developmental construct," as that notion was presented by Lasswell (1941). Lasswell urged social scientists to "consider alternative versions of the future, making explicit those expectations about the future that are so often buried in the realm of hunch." A "picture of the probable," not a "dogmatic forecast," will "stimulate the individual specialist to clarify for himself his expectations about the future, as a guide to the timing of scientific work," for it is "rational for the scientist to give priority to problems connected with the survival of democratic society."

II. The garrison state

Where Cook and others perceived a threat to survival in the prospect of an erosion of the supply of mental ability, Lasswell foresaw a movement toward a world of "garrison states." This construct was presented as "frankly imaginative though disciplined by careful consideration of the past." Emphasis was placed on a configuration of developments and their synthesis into a "total" picture of the future, as contrasted with the "itemistic" analysis of particular trends. Thus, a comprehensive portrayal of the garrison state subsumes a number of specific forecasts, and it is difficult to do justice to the construct in a brief summary. By the same token, some of these forecasts can be seen—nearly three decades after the fact—to have been wide of the mark, or at least premature, while others appear to have been inspired by remarkable prescience.

Present-day critics of the "military-industrial complex" will surely not wish to argue that Lasswell erred in anticipating the emerging "supremacy of the specialist on violence, the soldier" and in foreseeing that the military elite would come to cultivate expertness in the skills of civilian management. Thus, the studies in military sociology of the last few years may be seen as a response to Lasswell's insistence that "we need more adequate data . . . about the trends in the skill pattern of dominant elite groups in different parts of the world."

Lacking essential qualifications for the task, I do not feel it would

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be appropriate for me to attempt a point-by-point assessment of Lasswell's forecast. The interested reader will wish to consult the author's own restatement and defense of it, written two decades later, as well as the critical remarks of Samuel P. Huntington, who concludes that such "images of increasing military power in the United States were . . . at best only partially true." One difficulty in any assessment is that the original forecast was offered in the context of a discussion of "world politics" and the ramifications of the development toward the garrison state were seen as subject to considerable variation from one nation to another. Thus, Lasswell's "developmental construct" is in some ways like a Weberian "ideal type," which cannot as such be verified or disproved but can only be used with greater or lesser success for heuristic purposes.

I do wish to comment on one aspect of the fate of Lasswell's forecast. In teaching a course in social change for undergraduates, I have found it difficult to get them interested in Lasswell's argument. If I read their attitude correctly, it is along the lines of "What else is new?" I suppose that if one lives in a garrison state from infancy to adulthood, the forecast that such a thing will come to pass is not very newsworthy. This diagnosis of the undergraduate reaction may be relevant to the theme of cohort analysis alluded to later in this paper.

III. Class stratification

Like the two forecasts already described, Sibley's forecast of the future emergence of social classes in America was not a mere trend extrapolation. For one thing, he did not, writing in 1942, have actual measurements of social stratification at hand. Hence, he had first to infer what the past trend had been. He then engaged in some analysis of the forces producing that trend, estimated their probable strength in the foreseeable future, and issued his forecast on the basis of their estimated impact on the trend. The forecast, moreover, was not unconditional; instead, he was concerned to point out a mechanism that might be brought into play to counteract the projected trend and thus to falsify the forecast. Although the student of social stratification today has much more information to go on than did Sibley, there has hardly been any improvement on the general strategy of his procedure.

Summarized in his own words, the argument went as follows:

> Not universal equality nor near-equality of status but a high rate of vertical mobility has been the most important demographic basis of this nation's tradition of classlessness. The long-existing favorable balance of vertical circulation of individuals in American society, i.e., the excess of upward over downward moves, has diminished and seems likely to be further reduced. Development of class consciousness will

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> be likely to occur unless our social institutions are so readjusted as to produce a large amount of compensating up-and-down movement of individuals. The educational system, which is the chief American institution explicitly conceived as a mechanism for facilitating the ascent of talented individuals, must become more highly selective of individual merit if the loss of certain dwindling sources of upward mobility is to be offset.

Three factors were identified as having created in the past a net balance of upward over downward mobility. First, technological progress and economic growth continuously reduced the proportion of jobs requiring low degrees of skill applied to physical production while increasing the proportion demanding educational qualifications and the exercise of intellectual skills. Thus the proportion of white collar workers had grown continuously at the expense of the proportion of manual and farm workers. As to the future, Sibley was concerned that technological unemployment might come to assume large proportions, and that the economic stagnation of the 1930's might return upon the close of World War II. Hence, it was regarded as quite uncertain that this past source of mobility would continue to work in the same way.

Second, the tide of immigration during the latter part of the 19th and the early part of the 20th centuries was shown to have been a powerful factor in vertical circulation, inasmuch as most immigrants, being unskilled, entered the occupational structure at the bottom, inducing an upward shift on the part of native workers. But this flow of immigrants was checked by World War I and subsequently limited by statutes. Sibley did not foresee a resumption of this influence on upward mobility.

Third, the differential birth rate prevailing during the historical period with which Sibley was concerned tended to create a "vacuum" at the top of the occupational structure, thus inducing upward movement from the more prolific lower strata. Although Sibley was not in a position actually to show a reduction in the intensity of fertility differentials, he reasoned on the basis of European experience that such a reduction might well occur in America. (In fact, this subforecast was borne out by fertility statistics from the 1950 and 1960 censuses.) In short:

> The last three decades have seen one of the three sources of the movement, namely immigration, choked off, once for the duration of a war and later seemingly permanently. Another source, differential fertility, may conceivably be drying up. The future of the third source, technological progress, depends upon the not-yet-demonstrated ability of the nation's leaders to readjust political-economic institutions so as to produce a genuine "economy of plenty."

But even if these factors should work toward an increase in rigidity of the social structure, it was possible that their effects might be

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offset by the improvement of the mechanism of social selection on the basis of ability. For if the less able offspring of high status families were exposed to fair competition with the more able offspring of low status families, compensating streams of upward and downward movement would ensue in such a way as to maintain the rate of vertical circulation. Sibley did not venture a forecast of whether this would occur. Instead, he contented himself with showing that existing inequality in educational opportunity was sufficiently great that its rectification could well have the effect under consideration. Specifically, he demonstrated that boys whose fathers had high occupational status had much better chances of continuing their education than boys of the same measured ability levels from less advantaged occupational backgrounds. Hence "it is evident that the American educational system is far from being as effective as it might be in counteracting tendencies toward social stratification." In conclusion:

> If we propose to preserve the American faith in freedom from social-class barriers to individual achievement, some institutional changes must be planned and effectuated in order to offset the previously discussed diminution of the favorable balance of vertical circulation. Educational institutions appear to offer the most promising field for such changes. If the changes are made well enough and quickly enough, they may forestall the onset of an acute case of class conflict and indefinitely postpone the death of a leading American ideal. If not, our social arteries are likely to become sclerotic.

A complete evaluation of Sibley's forecast would require too great a digression into problems of concept and measurement in the analysis of stratification trends; I have fully discussed these issues elsewhere. One can, however, state that Sibley's forecast of increasing rigidification and declining rate of vertical circulation has not—at least, not yet—been borne out by events. Indeed, it appears from Natalie Rogoff's research that Sibley was also in error in supposing that there had been such a trend in the decades immediately preceding the time of his study.

One can also comment briefly on the component parts of Sibley's forecast. First, contrary to his guarded or even pessimistic outlook (which was shared by many at the time), rapid economic growth did persist after World War II, and changes in the occupational structure favorable to upward movement continued. Second, although immigration operated in about the way that Sibley expected, the role previously played by immigration has been assumed, for the last two or three decades, by an accelerated movement off farms. Inasmuch as that movement is now nearly spent, Sibley's conjecture becomes relevant once more. Third, although Sibley's anticipation of diminished fertility differentials was correct, this was the least important element in his forecast, and the least adequately analyzed

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one. As to the impact of the educational system, it is difficult to say exactly what has happened. One thing is clear: the impact of social class origins on educational opportunity is still clearly visible. The most recent data on the relative roles of personal ability and parental socioeconomic status in educational attainment (U. S. Department of HEW, 1969) look very much like the data for the late 1920's that Sibley studied. On the other hand, it is also clear that the educational system introduces much variation into occupational achievement that is independent of family background and thus, on balance, is a force inducing openness rather than rigidification of the stratification structure. Combining this observation with the strong suspicion that schooling has come to have a larger role in occupational selection in recent decades than in the past (Blau and Duncan, 1967), we surmise that the educational system has indeed functioned as a "counteracting tendency," though not exactly in the way that Sibley anticipated it might. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the diagnosis offered by Sibley still holds good: the educational system has a long way to go in becoming as effective as it might be in effecting equality of opportunity.

A significant point about all three of the forecasts just described—declining intelligence, the garrison state, and rigidification of the social structure—as well as the forecasts of population decline summarized earlier, is that they do not become uninteresting or irrelevant just because they are wholly or partially inaccurate for the period immediately following their formulation. The tendencies that might issue in the realization of any of these prospects remain latent even if held in check by other tendencies whose influence is preponderant for the moment. If so, what really matters is not whether the forecasts in question are "right" or "wrong," but rather that they focus concern where it should be focused. I am told that the slogan for the 1970 census will be, "We need to know where we are so we will know where we are going." One might well reverse the proposition: *we need to know where we may be going in order to understand where we are.*

Futurism

I shall not attempt a comprehensive review or evaluation of the mushrooming intellectual and social movement that is conveniently labeled "futurism," but some casual observations are offered on the basis of a limited sampling of its literature.

First, there is much excitement about the purported novelty of these efforts. As befits the subject matter, the futurist spends little time looking backward in order to establish the credentials of his intellectual ancestors. There is clearly an urgent need for good historical work on the development of futurist ideas; one suspects it

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would be easy to establish a filiation to the 18th and 19th century concepts of "progress." An interesting beginning of such historical work is the late Arthur M. Schlesinger's essay on "Casting the National Horoscope" (1947). He sampled a "rich and abundant literature of conjecture" dating from colonial times, which he noted has been neglected by historians. I find it salutary that Schlesinger juxtaposed the modern work of "scientific" demographic forecasters with the popular 19th century prophecies of the Millennium.

Second, one has the strong suspicion that much of the futurist literature, when it touches on specifically sociological issues—as distinct from technological change—is really not much more than a rhetorical stance for discussing *present* social problems. As such, it is a perfectly legitimate and time-honored device. Schlesinger records, for example, that much of the controversy between North and South in the period preceding the Civil War was conducted in terms of "secular prophecy." One need not, therefore, impute to all futurist writing a serious intent to forecast. The "scenario" (as it sometimes is now called) may only be an exceptionally dramatic way of presenting an issue that is ready to be confronted now.

One way to see this is to observe how modifications of purported long-term forecasts occur within short periods of time. One member of the Commission on the Year 2000 learned how events can catch up with forecasts. In a 1967 article, Daniel P. Moynihan wrote:

> These notes were originally written in February 1966, at a time when the continuity of American government seemed almost a fact of nature. Now, in the early summer of 1967, one learns that the approval of only two state legislatures is required in order for a national constitutional convention to be convened. . . . the possibility that a convention will meet and will go on to draft profoundly important innovations is altogether real. Nothing is fixed.

The author of this instructive confession leaves us wondering whether he came to realize that the perceptive analysis written in 1966 was really about 1966 and not about 2000.

Third, to judge from fragmentary and secondary accounts, the futurist methods of foreseeing are not so very different from those that Ogburn prescribed in more prosaic language some time ago. (See, for example, the summary of Burnham Beckwith's *The Next 500 Years* in the October 1968 issue of *The Futurist.*) There is the same emphasis on continuity of trends and on trend extrapolation as the basic method of forecast, and the same treatment of technology as the exogenous prime mover of social change. We need not assume that there is a direct derivation of futurist forecasting techniques from Ogburn's work on social change; common social and intellectual influences may account for the resemblance between them.

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Fourth, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the extent to which futurist inquiry is in fact governed by explicit and communicable methods. The title of Daniel Bell's essay, "Twelve Modes of Prediction" (1965), may arouse the prospective reader's anticipation of reading a balanced assessment of forecasting techniques. But the author quickly tells us that he will "not be concerned with relevant methodological tests of adequacy." Indeed, he concedes at the outset that the work of developing a logical classification of approaches and a specification of their appropriateness for different kinds of problem remains to be done. What he has given us, therefore, is a kind of sampling of conceptual schemes current in political sociology, the exposition of which is enlivened by occasional remarks about the problems involved in trying "to anticipate certain likely occurrences." I wish to quote two of these remarks, one of which I strongly endorse while the other I find misleading.

Prediction or explanation?

The "function of prediction," Bell says, "is not . . . to aid social control, but to widen the spheres of moral choice." He might have added that for prediction to function in this way, it is important that it *not* be believed implicitly. For, as Bell is well aware (see his discussion of Marx), when a piece of social analysis, complete with a picture of the future, commands implicit belief, it becomes an ideology, making intellectual and moral prisoners of its believers. The notion that there is a "law" of social evolution or social development which controls the future course of events has proved to be one of the most powerful intellectual weapons used by modern enemies of the open society, as Karl Popper has argued so eloquently.

The other and less fortunate remark in Bell's paper that I note here is, "The function of conjecture is not prediction but explanation." This, again, is a point on which philosophers have spoken, and the issue suggested by the remark is one that deserves a much more careful and philosophical discussion than can be attempted here. There is some danger of misunderstanding what Bell is trying to say, but elsewhere he asserts, "Ultimately, all useful prediction is a function of tested theory." I surmise that Bell is endorsing the view usually associated with the name of Carl Hempel that there is a "structural equality of explanation and prediction," although a "pragmatical difference between the two" is conceded. I do not believe that this position has survived the criticisms of such philosophers as Sheffler, Rescher, and Kaplan.

Not only is it misleading to equate prediction with explanation; it is a mistake to slight the important difference between prediction and forecasting (or "conjecture," if one insists on that ambiguous term). A (scientific) prediction is a *conditional* statement of what will hap-

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pen, assuming the validity of a relevant set of scientific laws and given observations which define the initial or exogenous conditions under which these laws are expected to operate in a given instance. A *ceteris paribus* clause is always an implicit part of the prediction. If it is habitually omitted, as in predictions of future positions of bodies in the solar system, that is because it is taken for granted. Many commentators have pointed out that astronomical predictions attain high accuracy as (ostensibly) unconditional forecasts because the system to which they pertain is, in fact, virtually isolated from outside influence—the *ceteris paribus* assumption happens to hold in fact. Even in the other "exact" sciences, such a favorable situation cannot be expected to occur unless imposed by experimental control.

A forecast, by contrast—if the well-developed enterprise of weather forecasting may serve as a paradigm—is unconditional and may issue only partially, if at all, from a set of specified laws. Contrary to Bell, much "useful prediction" (i.e., forecasting) is not "a function of tested theory" but is a more or less dubious application of analogy or mere empirical generalization, lacking in strict theoretical justification. Thus one might well be justified in expecting inflation to occur in the economy of a country entering upon a war, for it has been observed in the past that inflation accompanies war. But this is a different thing from having a theory that stipulates the sufficient conditions for inflation to occur, from which one may derive the prediction that if these conditions hold, there will be inflation.

It is worth noting, moreover, that prediction and forecasting are on a different footing with regard to the matter of corroboration by the outcome of events. An incorrect prediction, if it can be shown that the conditions stipulated for it did in fact hold, tends strongly to disconfirm the scientific theory from which the prediction was derived. An incorrect forecast may merely mean that something happened that was not anticipated. Even worse, a correct forecast provides little basis for confidence in the success of the next forecasting effort. To be sure, a sufficiently long statistical record may establish that one forecaster or forecasting procedure has a reliably better record than another. But this affords a basis for evaluating forthcoming forecasts only if the future is part of the same statistical universe as the past. Perhaps this holds true in meteorology, but in social affairs precisely this condition of continuity is contingent.

This digression on issues better discussed by competent writers on scientific method may be justified if it suggests that it would be advisable for students of the futurist movement to analyze carefully the basic methodological questions that are raised by a concerted effort to see ahead.

In the work of the Commission on the Year 2000 (1967) relatively little attention has been given thus far to problems of method. The Commission has provided us, instead, with an interesting collection

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of wise essays on various social problems, some of which are explicitly oriented toward the future while many of them are really about the urgent problems of the present, as I had occasion to note above. There was evidently little disposition to respond to the challenge of one of the Commission's members, Fred Iklé, who observed, "Unless we have some way of gauging the quality of predictions, all our efforts to forecast, conjecture about, or anticipate the future must remain essentially dilettante." Iklé's own paper is valuable for the observation that much social "prediction" is used primarily for entertainment, while another large category concerns prognostications without predictive validity that merely resolve a current indecision. The forecasts which are to be taken seriously are those that include an evaluation of alternative courses of action. Forecasts may be in error, in the sense that they do not serve our purposes, when they omit the statement of such alternatives. Another type of error, distinct from the mere failure to anticipate what comes to pass, is that of miscalculating what values will prevail over the forecast period. Thus Iklé seems to be arguing that an otherwise self-fulfilling prophecy could come to be self-defeating, given a shift in values.

De Jouvenel

In a number of ways, Bertrand de Jouvenel's book, *The Art of Conjecture* (1967), contrasts favorably with the progress report of the Commission on the Year 2000. The latter is a symposium, many contributions to which were obviously prepared in haste and under the control of no sufficiently forceful guiding conception of the collective task, whereas de Jouvenel's book is the work of a single mind, a disciplined and witty one. There is no dilettante toying with futuristic "scenarios," but rather a humane exposition of what modern social science looks like if one tries to assay its capabilities for formulating forecasts. A moderately well-read professional social scientist will find little here that is "new"—certainly not a presentation of a novel formula for foreseeing. (Any literate reader not acquainted with the social science literature might well find de Jouvenel's book a congenial introduction thereto.) What is innovative is the consistency with which each of the classic problems of epistemology and method in the social sciences is expounded from the standpoint of its bearing upon the problem of making forecasts—or "conjectures," as de Jouvenel prefers to call them. The work is written so lucidly that it is deceptive in its simplicity; one does well to read it closely. For instance, Auguste Comte's mischievous confusion of scientific prediction and historical forecasting is dealt with in less than two pages. If one has previously read Popper on this point, de Jouvenel's treatment seems deft and incisive. If one had not encountered the distinction before, perhaps it would seem to be dealing with a minor issue.

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There is no possibility of summarizing de Jouvenel's book. The only sensible course is to recommend that it be read. A reading may leave one both more skeptical of the possibility of making forecasts accurate and more convinced of the necessity for attempting them.

Social reporting

A commonplace remark in the futurist literature is that improvement in the art of forecasting requires a great expansion in the quantity, comprehensiveness, and reliability of social measurements. The statement seems to enjoy the status of an axiom, although it begs the question of what the relationship really is between the past and future observations in a time series.

The emphasis on improved social measurement found in futurist writing is convergent with a variety of proposals recently put forth concerning needed work on "social accounting," "social indicators," or "social reporting." One focus of this discussion is the "Full Opportunity Act of 1969," a bill introduced in the 91st Congress by Senator Walter F. Mondale and closely similar to a bill first introduced by him in the 90th Congress (see *Congressional Record*, vol. 115, no. 9, January 15, 1969). This legislation would provide for a Council of Social Advisors to gather information and statistics, appraise government programs and activities, conduct studies, and develop priorities for programs designed to implement a full opportunity policy. The Council would assist the President in the preparation of an annual social report.

A possible prototype of such a report was issued at the end of President Johnson's term of office by the staff of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1969), whose work was assisted by an Advisory Panel on Social Indicators comprising more than 40 social scientists.[1]

The work of the Panel on Social Indicators was partly preceded by and partly overlapped that of three other groups. A collaborative volume on *Social Indicators* (edited by Raymond Bauer, 1966) was issued by a committee of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences on behalf of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. A symposium on "Social goals and Indicators," edited by Bertram Gross for the American Academy of Political and Social Science (1967), may be seen as a further exploration of issues raised in the Bauer volume as well as an argument on behalf of the Mondale bill. Somewhat more academic in tone is the Russell Sage Foundation symposium on *Indicators of Social Change* (1968), in which the emphasis is on "concepts and measurements."

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[1] A summary of this report and two articles about it appeared in *The Public Interest*, no. 15, 1969.

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Without summarizing the scope of these several reports I think it is fair to state that the linkage of social reporting, as it is now being discussed, with social forecasting is largely implicit. Certainly, none of these collaborative projects has made a self-conscious effort to develop forecasting strategies or new techniques of projection and the like. Instead, the thrust of the discussion is the expression of dissatisfaction with current and past efforts at social measurement on two counts: (1) an insufficiency of data and (2) a failure to rationalize data collection systems in terms of relevance to the actual performance of American society with respect to its widely acknowledged social goals. Most of the participants in these symposia are prepared to admit that our problem is at least as much that we do not know just what we *ought* to be measuring (and, therefore, how we ought to go about measuring) as that we are failing to accumulate the kinds of information we do know how to collect. For all the number of words that have gone into the discussion of what "social accounting" might be or what "social indicators" really are for, there is clearly an uneasy feeling that we do not, in fact, have sufficient warrant for proposing these as valid analogies to economic accounting and economic indicators.

Even if it is not axiomatic that the study of past trends is the key to forecasting the future, it does give one pause to reflect that a demand for social forecasting is forthcoming in the absence of a clear consensus as to what it is that should be forecast. If we do not know what measurements to make on the present state of American society, or how to make them, for what variables are we to offer forecasts of future magnitudes?

The predicament has been somewhat exaggerated here for sake of emphasis. There is, to be sure, no reason to believe that any reasonable proposal for social accounts will result in discarding our well-developed system of demographic bookkeeping or certain of our more reputable series of social statistics. Projections of these magnitudes will continue to be the backbone of attempts at forecasting for the foreseeable future (a forecast of forecasting!). Moreover, one would have to question the wisdom of putting the matter of forecasting in a position of top priority in the effort to institutionalize a periodic social report. As I have argued earlier, many forecasts may serve primarily to signal issues requiring attention now. A social report will, of necessity, contain many future-oriented interpretations.

Social forecasting: what next?

In this report on social forecasting—which is too long, as the apology goes, because of insufficient time to write a short report—I have not resisted the temptation to be critical of fellow social scientists and skeptical of their ability to foretell. It is hoped that the

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picture is not one-sided. One of the participants in discussions of the Commission on the Year 2000 observed, "In reading an old document, *Recent Social Trends,* which dates from the 1930's, I was first struck by the excellence in methodology and then by the similarity between its projections and those of today." *Recent Social Trends* was not, of course, an enterprise primarily oriented to forecasting. Its intention was, as President Hoover phrased it, "to help all of us to see where social stresses are occurring and where major efforts should be undertaken to deal with them constructively." As I have just said, any good social report will contain many future-oriented interpretations, and this holds for the volume in question. Perhaps it was precisely at the points where the attention to forecasting became most self-conscious —as in the discussion of future population—that the investigators' statements about the future became least useful.

I have tried to show that useful forecasts issue from good analysis, and that to be useful they need not be "correct." The forecasts of declining population or explosive population growth, of the emergence of garrison states, of declining intelligence, and of increasing social rigidification that were reviewed above remain pertinent even if "wrong." If anyone had the illusion that prudent conduct depends on *knowing* what will happen in regard to such matters as these, it is time for him to remedy deficiencies in his education.

One answer to our question, "What next?" is, therefore, "More of the same." Social science at its best can produce good analysis; and the results of good analysis can almost always be given an orientation toward the future.

But good is not good enough. In concluding I want to suggest two points of departure for future analyses that may well be fruitful in producing formal forecasts as well as productive of better analysis.

The idea of "cohort"

The first is the notion of cohort, which has been exploited with exceedingly instructive results in demography but has only lately been systematically considered as a strategic approach to the analysis of social change (e.g., by Norman Ryder). A cohort is the aggregate of all persons who experience an event defining their membership at approximately the same time; the "birth cohort" of persons born in a given year or in a five year period is the prototypical example. The metabolism of a society involves the replacement of each cohort by its successor *pari passu* with the passage of time, while each cohort proceeds through a sequence of ages. This obvious statement acquires significance when coupled with three others, also obvious; first, that the inclinations and response tendencies of human beings alter with age; second, that experiences leave more or less lasting impressions; and third, that persons alive at one time have different

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experiences from those living at a different time. The possibility arises of treating the collective life history of a cohort as a biography, attending to the features that distinguish it as well as to the structural outlines it shares with any other such biography.

The use to which we can put these truisms depends upon the knowledge we have of the causal connections between events occurring at different junctures of the life cycle. He who would forecast what ideas will be attractive twenty years hence might be well advised to investigate what is happening now in the nursery schools. To be sure, we know all too little about what carries over from childhood to early adulthood, and how. But there is a strong suspicion abroad that current problems of communication are complicated by the fact that some cohorts grew up listening to radio while younger ones had TV for a nursemaid.

Some social change has as prerequisite a kind of "intercohort forgetting." Rapid progress in the computer field seems to require the participation of the young, who have never learned the now obsolete techniques of information processing. Science moves because the apprentice investigator never has to learn all the false theories his master has disproved, and therefore has a mind uncluttered with irrelevance. The case is different with politics and war, except as these acquire the orientation of the sciences, for in these fields leadership devolves not to the young and imaginative but to the old and experienced. Hence the generals are proverbially fighting the last war before this one, and the politicians act on the assumption that the power alignments prevailing in their youth remain in force.

The projection of a social trend will be quite a different matter according as one of two situations pertains: (a) a set of dispositions is firmly established in youth and remains relatively fixed thereafter, or (b) people in the several segments of the life cycle are about equally susceptible to change. In the former category might be placed various habits and qualifications. For example, the eradication of illiteracy or cigaret smoking from a population is probably best approached by means of the education of youth; the passage of time and the succession of cohorts, if such education is successful, will accomplish the desired result in due course. (The example may be faulty if more effective techniques of adult education can be brought to bear upon the situation.) Cases approximating the conditions assumed for this example require analysis and forecasting procedures that take advantage of inter- and intracohort comparisons.

Even if all age groups are in some sense equally exposed to the impact of current social changes, they are likely to be differentially responsive thereto. Such response differentials will set up a pattern of age-grading that has a potentiality for inducing intercohort (miscalled "intergenerational") conflict or erecting communications barriers. Most accounts of the socialization process focus on the so-

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cialization of the young by the old. The diffusion of norms and ideas in the reverse direction merits closer study, for to the extent that this can happen, the pace of social change may be accelerated.

If we reckon the central or "adult" portion of the life cycle as comprising the fifty years from ages 15 to 64, it is obvious that in a half century there is a complete turnover in the adult population of any society. In forecasting for any date in the future we are implicitly describing the future of at least some people who have not yet experienced adult life. In forecasting for a date more than fifty years hence, all our statements apply to persons who have not yet reached maturity. The self-conscious adoption of a cohort perspective may prevent the forecaster from being more presumptuous than he should.

The ecological approach

My treatment of the other promising approach I wanted to mention must be equally cursory. It is the notion of analyzing social change and formulating forecasts in an ecological framework. At least a nominal commitment to this strategy is much more widespread today than it was a decade ago when I first joined in a manifesto on its behalf. Incidentally, in regard to forecasts about the diffusion of ideas, I should like to call attention to the successful forecast by the literary critic, Kenneth Burke, back in 1937: "Among the sciences, there is one little fellow named Ecology, and in time we shall pay him more attention."

The idea of ecology is being literally forced upon us, not only by the explosive growth of human numbers, but also by a multifaceted expansion of the human niche in the planetary ecosystem, which involves (in addition to sheer numerical increase) an acceleration in technological capability; a much deeper penetration of the environment, or intervention in the flows of materials and energy through the ecosystem; and an increasing complexity and elaboration of systems of human social organization. In consequence, one is unable meaningfully to discuss many "social trends" or "technological trends" in isolation, much less to extrapolate them in a blind fashion. The analytical or projection model must take account of the interactions of population, environment, technology, and social organization. Once the possibility of far-reaching ramifications of these interactions is seen, the analyst is constrained to question the compatibility of apparently distinct trends, when they are extrapolated even a short distance ahead. For what period into the future can one project the increasing population size and the increasing ratio of automobiles to people in the Los Angeles metropolitan area without having to entertain the possibility that this population will suffocate itself?

Many have commented on the ecological dilemma of mankind in the present age; for example, John McHale writes: "Without touch-

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ing upon the more familiar problems of war, hunger and human disease, even a cursory glance at our ecosystem is sobering. It should be apparent to all, that we now live in such close community, and within such delicate 'life' margins, that all our actions are now cast on a planetary scale and that our gross ecological errors may reverberate for centuries."

The theme is carried forward in the most audacious proposal I have yet seen for a venture in social forecasting, Clifford Humphrey's suggested project to produce the Century Report, "a comprehensive outline of the ensuing ecological crisis, its expected symptoms and possible implications for our values, aspirations and social institutions." Apart from his diagnosis of "ecological crisis," the challenging aspect of Humphrey's proposal is his argument that neither the use of historical precedents as analogies nor the extrapolation of trends representing technological "progress" or economic "growth" is adequate to the forecasts that need to be made. The crisis in the making is one for which our standard techniques will not serve much longer.

A final "forecast of forecasting," therefore, might go as follows: As ingredients of our forecasts we will, with increasing methodological sophistication, continue to prepare projections, trend extrapolations, model simulations, and developmental constructs so as to provide as broad an array as may be useful of the logically possible pathways to hypothetical futures. In issuing responsible *forecasts* on the basis of such materials, however, we will self-consciously include several components:

(1) a delineation of the trends or developments as projected, extrapolated, or constructed;

(2) an assessment of mutual facilitation or incompatibility of the several trends as projected;

(3) an estimate of the ecological ramifications of the trends, if realized;

(4) an appraisal of the potential social feedbacks upon the trends and their ecological ramifications; and

(5) a conspectus of the apparent range of alternatives that are open: X *can* happen if . . . , but Y *may* happen unless . . .

There will be no pretense that we can gradually move toward the perfection of methods of anticipating what will actually occur, for such perfectibility is not logically possible, esthetically appealing, or morally inspiring. What we may hope to improve, if not perfect, is our sense of responsibility for making known the implications of our knowledge.

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REVIEW ESSAY

An Emerging Republican Majority?

NELSON W. POLSBY

GEORGE WALLACE's rallying cry—"They's more of us than they is of them"—might well have served as an epigraph for Kevin Phillips' *The Emerging Republican Majority* (Arlington House, 1969). The apparent purpose of this weighty volume is to demonstrate that the "research directors, associate professors, social workers, educational consultants, urbanologists, development planners, journalists, brotherhood executives, foundation staffers, communications specialists, culture vendors, pornography merchants, poverty theorists, and so forth"—whom Phillips identifies as the main beneficiaries of the New Deal era—are numerically too few to elect a president in the near future. Moreover, it seems unlikely that even the addition of pointy-headed bureaucrats and intellectual morons would put the Democrats over the top. Thus Phillips reasons that President Nixon should pay no attention to those who argue that he should move leftward in search of a secure Republican majority. The true majority, as Phillips sees it, is already both Republican and conservative, and is likely to become more so in the future.

Phillips—a young lawyer, former Nixon campaign worker, and now special assistant to Attorney General Mitchell—is frank to say that this majority stands for policies that he himself prefers, and that his interpretation is offered as a lawyer might tender a brief. Because his brief is so long, so copiously decorated with facts and factlets, statistical tables, maps, and other paraphernalia that may be mistaken for empirical demonstration, and because his argument may find favor with persons on the right seeking comfort, persons on the left seeking alarm, and persons in the middle seeking information, it seems worthwhile to give it more than a passing glance.

LIKE the New Deal alliance that it is supposed to replace as America's ruling coalition, the emerging Republican majority has a large number of disparate components:

1. *Sun Belt conservatives.* All across the south, the southwest, and on into southern California, there is enormous urban and suburban population growth. These "new cities are centers of commerce, light industry, military preparedness, defense production and space-age

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technology, vocational seedbeds of a huge middle class." "The very areas of greatest population explosion," says Phillips, "are the demonstrated strongholds of Reagan, Goldwater, Gurney, and Tower, the vanguardmen of the new conservative sun politics." At one point Phillips argues that much as Al Smith prematurely consolidated the urban poor and brought them into the Democratic party, Barry Goldwater in 1964 did the same for middle class sun belt conservatives.

2. *Backlash urban voters.* Phillips sees the race issue as the millstone of the Democratic party, and he argues that many major population groups are likely to turn or remain Republican as a result of the Democratic commitment to racial equality. One such group will be the urban Catholics, who learned how to vote Republican in the Eisenhower years, and switched back only temporarily because Kennedy was Catholic. These groups are located mostly, but not exclusively, in the northeast.

3. *The Heartland*, an area that takes in the midwest, the mountain states, and the trans-Appalachian border states. The features of the Heartland that make it prime Republican territory are, first, that large parts of it are small town conservative or German Catholic and Republican anyway; second, that other parts of it were settled by southerners who will turn Republican as a result of the race issue; and third, that in the cities of the Heartland, there will be backlash voting much as in the cities of the east. "During the mid-nineteen sixties . . . the urban Catholics of the Great Lakes began to turn conservative in response to liberal Democratic politics reflecting a large influx of poor Negroes from the South."

4. *The Old South.* Here George Wallace is the transition figure as Goldwater was elsewhere. Phillips confidently adds Wallace voters to Nixon voters to get a resounding 57 per cent majority in repudiation of the Democrats in the 1968 election. The Democrats, he believes, have permanently alienated white southern voters in national politics, whether from the black belt or from subsistence farming areas where there never have been many Negroes. "Quite simply, as liberalism metamorphosed from an economic populist stance—supporting farm, highway, health, education and pension expenditures against conservative budget-cutting—into a credo of social engineering, it lost the support of poor whites." "Whereas the 1948 Dixiecrats revolt—the first wave of Southern Democratic deterioration—left about half of the white Southern electorate in the Democratic presidential column, the 1968 Wallace candidacy broke loose all but 10 to 15%, including the upcountry and pineywoods poor whites who had hitherto spurned both Dixiecrats and Republicans. There is a strong precedent for this 1968 estrangement of previous loyal Democrats persisting beyond one election. . . . From the best suburbs of Dallas to the darkest Black Belts of South Carolina, the Dixiecrat party served many conservatives as a way station between a no longer appealing Democratic Party and the increasingly Southern-concerned GOP. History will doubtless label George Wallace's party a similar way-station for another element of Southern voters."

5. *Remnants of the Republican establishment.* Phillips predicts

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that the trend in the northeast for the Republicans to get a smaller share of the vote will continue. He is consoled by the facts that the percentage of the nationwide vote cast in the northeast is on the decline, and that, within the northeast, the cities are losing out to the suburbs. The suburbs, it is true, are becoming less Republican, but backlash Catholics should provide some suburban Republican and conservative growth. And while the conservatism of traditional Republican strongholds in New England is weakening, Republicans may inherit Wallaceite voting blocs in Maryland, Delaware, and New Jersey. Phillips has very few good words to say regarding "silk stocking" Republicans' influence on the future of the party. Since nationwide they haven't got the votes and take the wrong (which is to say, liberal) side of most issues, their share in the new coalition will have to be small. "The Republican Party is no longer the party of the northeast—and an increasing part of its northeastern strength is rooted in voting streams like the urban Catholics and rural non-Yankees who have historically been allies . . . of the South and West."

How plausible is all of this? If we grant Phillips' main premises, quite plausible indeed. But are there any good empirical grounds for granting his premises? Phillips himself devotes surprisingly few pages to their support. Much of the book, in fact, is taken up with entertaining digressions into the minutia of local political lore: migration patterns across the Appalachians, the contrast between northern and southern Ohio, how settlers in Washington and Oregon differed, and so on. This is, in general, not the sort of information one would need in order to test the truth of Phillips' argument. A skeptic might look at the coalition he has in mind and see things quite differently.

Consider the Sun Belt. To begin with, it is not true that all growing Sun Belt cities are traditionally conservative. Over the last decade, for example, most of the liberal Democratic Congressmen from Texas have represented the growing cities of Houston, Galveston, Fort Worth, Austin, Beaumont, and San Antonio. In the second place, Phillips' belief that traditionally conservative cities of the west and southwest will necessarily remain so as people from all over the country pour into them is based on a simple confusion between container and contents—a mistake he does not make when contemplating the migration of southern whites into the liberal, industrial cities of the north. An influx of northeners is changing Florida from a one-party to a two-party state, and the largest growth of all has been in liberal, metropolitan Dade County. Likewise, the state of Virginia has become more competitive between the parties, and, if we can judge by the results of primary elections over the last few years, its Democratic party is becoming more liberal. Or take the case of California. Owing to the weakness of its political parties, it will undoubtedly continue to show very volatile patterns of voting. Under these circumstances, if Phillips is right, it is peculiar that George Wallace did so badly in California in 1968. And if conservatism is as popular as Phillips says, why does he seek to explain away Max Rafferty's resounding

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defeat for the Senate on the ground that his campaign was "marred" by "ideological stridency"? Perhaps Los Angeles is not quite as conservative a city as Phillips paints it. He ignores support for liberals in such burgeoning places as central Los Angeles and even the San Fernando Valley (as well as San Jose and Oakland in the north), though he pays close attention to conservative Orange County and San Diego. And he writes off Hawaii—also rapidly growing, in the Sun Belt, and liberal—as insignificant. What all this suggests is that as the Sun Belt becomes more populous it does not necessarily grow uniformly more conservative. Republicans do have a chance to win in previously one-party Democratic areas, but liberal Democrats now also have a chance to compete in previously conservative Democratic strongholds.

The Heartland component of Phillips' case seems even weaker. It is true that in 1968 Nixon won all the Heartland states except Minnesota and Michigan. But in doing so he had immense help from George Wallace, who made the difference in all the border states. These Wallace voters had been Democratic, Phillips argues, but are on their way to becoming Republican. Perhaps; but party tradition and pocketbook issues would work in the other direction. Throughout the farm belt, Nixon did less well in 1968 than he did in 1960, whereas in most of the mountain states, he gained slightly over his 1960 showing. There is simply no basis for Phillips' proclamation of a "united Heartland."

On the other hand, there is some reason to concede the Old South to the forces Phillips seems intent upon consolidating under the banner of the Republican party. Anti-Negro feeling does run high there. So, of course, does anti-Republican feeling, but Goldwater did carry five southern states against Lyndon Johnson, and it is easy to imagine Richard Nixon's having done so against Humphrey if Wallace had not been on the ballot. Phillips recognizes, however, that the south as a distinctive political entity is shrinking in size; Texas and Florida have been overrun, and Georgia, Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina are not far behind. This will certainly create opportunities for the Republican party (as it will also for liberal Democrats) where none existed before 1948.

A look at the men southern electorates are sending to Congress helps to make the point that the south is becoming more like the rest of the nation in its voting behavior rather than simply more conservative. Sun Belt population growth in Texas and Florida has more than balanced the loss of Congressional seats in the less urbanized of the eleven former Confederate states. In 1961, the south held 105 seats in Congress; in 1969, 106. Over the eight year period, Republicans have gained sharply—from 6 to 25 seats, nearly a quarter of the total, and many of them from urban and suburban areas. The growth of southern bipartisanship and the redistribution of the southern population works two ways: liberal Democrats (Carl Elliott, Clark Thompson, Frank Smith) have been squeezed out in redistricting maneuvers, but so have conservative Democrats (Frank Boykin, James Davis, Dale Alford). Republicans have replaced con-

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servative Democrats more often than they have replaced liberals; by a rough count, there are about as many liberal southern Democrats in Congress today as there were in 1961. An incidental, but rather important, consequence of the rise of Republican fortunes in the south is that so long as Democrats control the House, the net effect is to reduce the influence of the south in Congress. This is not only of great significance to the Democratic caucus, but to the standing committees as well. At the start of the decade, southerners held 11 committee chairmanships; today they hold 8, which is roughly proportional to the percentage of southerners in the House Democratic party.

Concerning the backlash voters, Phillips' premise is quite clear: anti-Negro feeling will drive large numbers of urban Catholics and blue collar workers into the Republican party. It is easy enough to document the existence of these feelings (though Phillips does not do so), but there are a number of factors that militate the other way: Democratic party loyalty for some voters, the political activity of unions for others, and the salience of economic issues in general. It is not easy to predict the ultimate decision of a voter torn between what he conceives to be his economic self-interest and his racial prejudices. For many voters, especially those not reached by labor union campaigning in 1968, a vote for Wallace avoided the dilemma, since Wallace was neither a plutocrat nor an integrationist. But future Republican presidential candidates may or may not come to be seen in that light. In some respects, 1968 combined all the elements least favorable to the Democrats for this group of voters—high prosperity, depressing the salience of economic issues; extremely visible urban turmoil, increasing the salience of race and law-and-order; and the availability of every ballot of a populist, racist alternative. What about the future? Phillips counts heavily on the race issue having the same powerful long-term impact on the basic loyalties of voters as the Civil War and the Great Depression once did. For some voters it well may; this certainly will be one of the main questions analysts will be asking as they comb through the attitude and opinion surveys on the election.

Just as party loyalty, habitual allegiances, and tradition will undoubtedly play a part in retarding the movement of some antiliberal voters into the Republican party, so, we must assume, will corresponding forces prevent the wholesale capture of the well-educated, the liberal, and the altruistic by the Democrats. Thus Phillips is undoubtedly right that silk stocking, Wall Street liberals, and their Yankee and suburban cousins, will continue to contribute to the Republican vote.

They will also continue to have a say in party policy-making. This prospect Phillips clearly finds distasteful on what appear to be prudential grounds. If there is, as he implies, a strong tendency for American voters to align themselves with parties according to their current convictions about public policy, and if most Americans are

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middle class, conservative, and anti-Negro and will vote that way if the Republican party gives them the chance (it being plain that the Democrats are hopelessly commited otherwise), then the existence within the Republican party of an eastern establishment that is liberal, upper-class, and pro-Negro is an embarrassment and a nuisance.

One would have thought that Republicans would have found the 1964 election an adequate test of this choice-not-an-echo reasoning. But hope springs eternal—as well it might, since five years later they are in the White House, and presumably intelligent people are squabbling over whether or not to award President Nixon an honorary title to George Wallace's votes.

Phillips gives no data that will settle the question of the Wallace vote. Aggregate voting statistics do not lend themselves to inferences about second choices. Meanwhile, readers and politicians will want to know whether it is true that the voting behavior of the American electorate is issue-oriented, or becoming more so. Two decades of survey research indicates that, on the whole, it is not. Most voters make what V. O. Key called a standing decision to support one party or the other, and this commitment is likely to be shaken or superseded over the long run only by new issues of the most compelling urgency. Are anti-Negro feelings associated with economic conservatism? Apparently not. Bigotry and approval of the welfare state are not logically incompatible, nor is it unusual to see them conjoined in the attitudes of Americans. Are Americans actually conservative in their dispositions toward the broad range of economic and social domestic policies? That is not the way they respond when asked directly. How, then, will Phillips effect the trade between Republican upper-class liberals and Democratic working-class authoritarians if the players refuse to report to their new teams?

If economic issues, interest group activity, party loyalty, and inertia still count along with race prejudice in determining partisan alignments, is there in fact a Republican majority? Again, evidently not. Richard Nixon, after all, received 43 per cent of the popular vote—well under a majority. He never went much above that in public opinion polls, while during the unusually short campaign Hubert Humphrey steadily eroded the Wallace vote and, even more significantly, gained heavily among the "undecideds." Year after year voters are asked, what political party do you belong to? By a bit less than two to one, those who declare a party preference say Democratic. The accompanying table gives figures from the Michigan Survey Research Center on party identification for the last 16 years, including new findings for October 1968, when party defections should have surfaced if short run decisions to desert the Democratic party were in fact a down payment on a long run commitment. But the figures show essentially no movement in that direction.

Some of these Democrats do not vote Democratic, and some of them do not vote at all. In 1968, the Survey Research Center found

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that about 18 per cent of the Democratic identifiers deserted to Nixon and 11 per cent to Wallace, while Nixon only lost 7 per cent of the Republican identifiers to Humphrey and 5 per cent to Wallace. About 60 per cent of the Wallace vote came from Democratic identifiers and leaners. So, manifestly, in a truly bad year for Democrats, a Republican can win.

But long-term patterns of party affiliation seem remarkably stable. Over the whole 16 year period, there is a slight increase in voters' tendency to classify themselves as politically unaffiliated. This parallels the massive influx of post-World War II babies into the electorate, and I assume that a large proportion of the rise in non-affiliation can be explained by the changing proportion of young people, who affiliate and vote at a much lower rate than their elders. In spite of these small changes, there is a discernible long-run Democratic advantage in presidential elections. This is also sometimes visible in voting for offices other than the presidency. Even in a year like 1968, when, according to Phillips, a Republican majority (Wallace plus Nixon) emerged, the Democrats won by a large majority in the House of Representatives. Since then Democrats have won special elections for the Heartland Republican safe seats of James Battin of Montana and Melvin Laird of Wisconsin and held the late Robert Everett's Democratic seat in Tennessee by a very wide margin.

TABLE 1. *The Distribution of Party Identification in the United States, 1952-1968 (in per cent).*

Question: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT) Would you call yourself a strong (R) (D) or a not very strong (R) (D)? (IF INDEPENDENT) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?"

	Oct. 1952	Oct. 1954	Oct. 1956	Oct. 1958	Oct. 1960	Nov. 1962	Oct. 1964	Nov. 1966	Oct. 1968
Democrat									
Strong	22	22	21	23	21	23	26	18	19.7
Weak	25	25	23	24	25	23	25	27	24.9
Independent									
Democrat	10	9	7	7	8	8	9	9	9.9
Independent	5	7	9	8	8	8	8	12	10.0
Republican	7	6	8	4	7	6	6	7	9.2
Republican									
Weak	14	14	14	16	13	16	13	15	14.9
Strong	13	13	15	13	14	12	11	10	10.1
Apolitical, Don't know	4	4	3	5	4	4	2	2	1.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of Cases	1614	1139	1772	1269	3021	1289	1571	1291	1556

Source: Survey Research Center, The University of Michigan

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How, then, may President Nixon cause a Republican majority to emerge? There is little beyond public policy that a president can manipulate. Given the improbability that American voters will overhaul their basic long-run commitments in response to most policies, three years is not much time to make an impact, no matter what he does. But following Phillips' reasoning at least part of the way, President Nixon can make the Republican party more hospitable to working and lower middle class people whose anti-Negro feelings are balanced by their beliefs that Republicans are the "party of the rich." Encouraging racial backlash, however, is the hard way to do it because such a strategy would probably entail an increase in violence that would jeopardize a lot more than the effectiveness and good reputation of the Nixon presidency. A less hazardous course would be to woo the lower middle class by making economic concessions to them. Nixon's initial tax reform policy and (to a lesser extent) the welfare proposals of the new administration seem reasonably well adapted to this strategy. But again, it is unlikely that anything the President can do over the short run will drastically affect the party allegiances of the vast majority of Americans.

Even if Phillips is wrong in suggesting that the race issue has already remade the American electorate, it may yet do so. If this happens, the majority Phillips identifies may conceivably emerge. But whether a Republican administration—or any administration—can govern effectively, or wisely, by catering to the impulses that would mobilize such a majority may well be doubted.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Otis Dudley Duncan is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Population Studies Center at the University of Michigan. . . . Charles Frankel is Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University and author of the forthcoming book *High on Foggy Bottom: An Outsider's View of Government* to be published by Harper and Row. . . . Edwin Harwood is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Rice University. . . . J. H. Hexter is Professor of History at Yale University. . . . Daniel Patrick Moynihan is Assistant to the President for Urban Affairs. His essay *Toward a National Urban Policy* will be published in the spring in a volume of the same name by Basic Books. . . . Joseph Pechman is Director of Economic Studies, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. . . . Nelson Polsby is Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley.

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